From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: "Xin Li (Intel)" <xin@zytor.com>
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
corbet@lwn.net, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,
bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org,
hpa@zytor.com, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, luto@kernel.org,
peterz@infradead.org, chao.gao@intel.com, xin3.li@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 08/19] KVM: VMX: Add support for FRED context save/restore
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2025 09:27:16 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aFrR5Nk1Ge3_ApWy@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250328171205.2029296-9-xin@zytor.com>
On Fri, Mar 28, 2025, Xin Li (Intel) wrote:
> From: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
>
> Handle FRED MSR access requests, allowing FRED context to be set/get
> from both host and guest.
>
> During VM save/restore and live migration, FRED context needs to be
> saved/restored, which requires FRED MSRs to be accessed from userspace,
> e.g., Qemu.
>
> Note, handling of MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP0, i.e., MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP, is not
> added yet, which is done in the KVM CET patch set.
>
> Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
> Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
> ---
>
> Changes since v2:
> * Add a helper to convert FRED MSR index to VMCS field encoding to
> make the code more compact (Chao Gao).
> * Get rid of the "host_initiated" check because userspace has to set
> CPUID before MSRs (Chao Gao & Sean Christopherson).
> * Address a few cleanup comments (Sean Christopherson).
>
> Changes since v1:
> * Use kvm_cpu_cap_has() instead of cpu_feature_enabled() (Chao Gao).
> * Fail host requested FRED MSRs access if KVM cannot virtualize FRED
> (Chao Gao).
> * Handle the case FRED MSRs are valid but KVM cannot virtualize FRED
> (Chao Gao).
> * Add sanity checks when writing to FRED MSRs.
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 76 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index 1fd32aa255f9..ae9712624413 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -1426,6 +1426,24 @@ static void vmx_write_guest_kernel_gs_base(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u64 data)
> preempt_enable();
> vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base = data;
> }
> +
> +static u64 vmx_read_guest_fred_rsp0(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
> +{
> + preempt_disable();
> + if (vmx->guest_state_loaded)
> + vmx->msr_guest_fred_rsp0 = read_msr(MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0);
> + preempt_enable();
> + return vmx->msr_guest_fred_rsp0;
> +}
> +
> +static void vmx_write_guest_fred_rsp0(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u64 data)
> +{
> + preempt_disable();
> + if (vmx->guest_state_loaded)
> + wrmsrns(MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0, data);
> + preempt_enable();
> + vmx->msr_guest_fred_rsp0 = data;
> +}
> #endif
Maybe add helpers to deal with the preemption stuff? Oh, never mind, FRED
uses WRMSRNS. Hmm, actually, can't these all be non-serializing? KVM is
progating *guest* values to hardware, so a VM-Enter is guaranteed before the
CPU value can be consumed.
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
static u64 vmx_read_guest_host_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr, u64 *cache)
{
preempt_disable();
if (vmx->guest_state_loaded)
*cache = read_msr(msr);
preempt_enable();
return *cache;
}
static u64 vmx_write_guest_host_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr, u64 data,
u64 *cache)
{
preempt_disable();
if (vmx->guest_state_loaded)
wrmsrns(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, data);
preempt_enable();
*cache = data;
}
static u64 vmx_read_guest_kernel_gs_base(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
return vmx_read_guest_host_msr(vmx, MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE,
&vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base);
}
static void vmx_write_guest_kernel_gs_base(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u64 data)
{
vmx_write_guest_host_msr(vmx, MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, data,
&vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base);
}
static u64 vmx_read_guest_fred_rsp0(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
return vmx_read_guest_host_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0,
&vmx->msr_guest_fred_rsp0);
}
static void vmx_write_guest_fred_rsp0(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u64 data)
{
return vmx_write_guest_host_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0, data,
&vmx->msr_guest_fred_rsp0);
}
#endif
> static void grow_ple_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> @@ -2039,6 +2057,24 @@ int vmx_get_feature_msr(u32 msr, u64 *data)
> }
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> +static u32 fred_msr_vmcs_fields[] = {
This should be const.
> + GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP1,
> + GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP2,
> + GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP3,
> + GUEST_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS,
> + GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP1,
> + GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP2,
> + GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP3,
> + GUEST_IA32_FRED_CONFIG,
> +};
I think it also makes sense to add a static_assert() here, more so to help
readers follow along than anything else.
static_assert(MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG - MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP1 ==
ARRAY_SIZE(fred_msr_vmcs_fields) - 1);
> +
> +static u32 fred_msr_to_vmcs(u32 msr)
> +{
> + return fred_msr_vmcs_fields[msr - MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP1];
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> /*
> * Reads an msr value (of 'msr_info->index') into 'msr_info->data'.
> * Returns 0 on success, non-0 otherwise.
> @@ -2061,6 +2097,12 @@ int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE:
> msr_info->data = vmx_read_guest_kernel_gs_base(vmx);
> break;
> + case MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0:
> + msr_info->data = vmx_read_guest_fred_rsp0(vmx);
> + break;
> + case MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP1 ... MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG:
> + msr_info->data = vmcs_read64(fred_msr_to_vmcs(msr_info->index));
> + break;
> #endif
> case MSR_EFER:
> return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
> @@ -2268,6 +2310,12 @@ int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> vmx_update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
> }
> break;
> + case MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0:
> + vmx_write_guest_fred_rsp0(vmx, data);
> + break;
> + case MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP1 ... MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG:
> + vmcs_write64(fred_msr_to_vmcs(msr_index), data);
> + break;
> #endif
> case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
> if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index c841817a914a..007577143337 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -318,6 +318,9 @@ static const u32 msrs_to_save_base[] = {
> MSR_STAR,
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> MSR_CSTAR, MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, MSR_LSTAR,
> + MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP1, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP2,
> + MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP3, MSR_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS, MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP1,
> + MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP2, MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP3, MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG,
> #endif
> MSR_IA32_TSC, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA,
> MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS, MSR_TSC_AUX,
> @@ -1849,6 +1852,23 @@ static int __kvm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 data,
>
> data = (u32)data;
> break;
> + case MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 ... MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG:
> + if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FRED))
> + return 1;
Yeesh, this is a bit of a no-win situation. Having to re-check the MSR index is
no fun, but the amount of overlap between MSRs is significant, i.e. I see why you
bundled everything together. Ugh, and MSR_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS is buried smack dab
in the middle of everything.
> +
> + /* Bit 11, bits 5:4, and bit 2 of the IA32_FRED_CONFIG must be zero */
Eh, the comment isn't helping much. If we want to add more documentation, add
#defines. But I think we can documented the reserved behavior while also tidying
up the code a bit.
After much fiddling, how about this?
case MSR_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS:
if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FRED))
return 1;
break;
case MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 ... MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP3:
case MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP1 ... MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG: {
u64 reserved_bits;
if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FRED))
return 1;
if (is_noncanonical_msr_address(data, vcpu))
return 1;
switch (index) {
case MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG:
reserved_bits = BIT_ULL(11) | GENMASK_ULL(5, 4) | BIT_ULL(2);
break;
case MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 ... MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP3:
reserved_bits = GENMASK_ULL(5, 0);
break;
case MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP1 ... MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP3:
reserved_bits = GENMASK_ULL(2, 0);
break;
default:
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
return 1;
}
if (data & reserved_bits)
return 1;
break;
}
> @@ -1893,6 +1913,10 @@ int __kvm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 *data,
> !guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDPID))
> return 1;
> break;
> + case MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 ... MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG:
> + if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FRED))
> + return 1;
> + break;
> }
>
> msr.index = index;
> @@ -7455,6 +7479,10 @@ static void kvm_probe_msr_to_save(u32 msr_index)
> if (!(kvm_get_arch_capabilities() & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
> return;
> break;
> + case MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 ... MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG:
> + if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_FRED))
> + return;
> + break;
> default:
> break;
> }
> --
> 2.48.1
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-06-24 16:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-03-28 17:11 [PATCH v4 00/19] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 01/19] KVM: VMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 02/19] KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config Xin Li (Intel)
2025-04-14 7:41 ` Chao Gao
2025-04-14 16:53 ` Xin Li
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 03/19] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 15:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 04/19] x86/cea: Export per CPU array 'cea_exception_stacks' for KVM to use Xin Li (Intel)
2025-04-10 8:53 ` Christoph Hellwig
2025-04-10 14:18 ` Dave Hansen
2025-04-11 16:16 ` Xin Li
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 05/19] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 06/19] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR interception Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 15:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 07/19] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 15:44 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 08/19] KVM: VMX: Add support for FRED context save/restore Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 16:27 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2025-06-25 17:18 ` Xin Li
2025-06-26 17:22 ` Xin Li
2025-06-26 20:50 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 09/19] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 10/19] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 11/19] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 12/19] KVM: x86: Save/restore the nested flag of an exception Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 13/19] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 14/19] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 16:32 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-25 17:38 ` Xin Li
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 15/19] KVM: x86: Allow FRED/LKGS to be advertised to guests Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 16:38 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-25 18:05 ` Xin Li
2025-06-25 18:29 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 16/19] KVM: nVMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 16:54 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 17/19] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED VMCS fields to nested VMX context management Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 18/19] KVM: nVMX: Add VMCS FRED states checking Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 19/19] KVM: nVMX: Allow VMX FRED controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:25 ` [PATCH v4 00/19] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li
2025-06-24 17:06 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-24 17:43 ` Xin Li
2025-06-24 17:47 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-06-24 18:02 ` Xin Li
2025-06-24 18:40 ` H. Peter Anvin
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