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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	 acme@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
	hpa@zytor.com,  john.allen@amd.com, mingo@kernel.org,
	mingo@redhat.com,  minipli@grsecurity.net, mlevitsk@redhat.com,
	namhyung@kernel.org,  pbonzini@redhat.com, prsampat@amd.com,
	rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com,  shuah@kernel.org,
	tglx@linutronix.de, weijiang.yang@intel.com, x86@kernel.org,
	 xin@zytor.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v14 06/22] KVM: x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs
Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2025 10:50:19 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aMG6Wx9k2T47OTge@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <aMFedyAqac+S38P2@intel.com>

On Wed, Sep 10, 2025, Chao Gao wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 10, 2025 at 05:37:50PM +0800, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
> >On 9/9/2025 5:39 PM, Chao Gao wrote:
> >> From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> >> 
> >> Load the guest's FPU state if userspace is accessing MSRs whose values
> >> are managed by XSAVES. Introduce two helpers, kvm_{get,set}_xstate_msr(),
> >> to facilitate access to such kind of MSRs.
> >> 
> >> If MSRs supported in kvm_caps.supported_xss are passed through to guest,
> >> the guest MSRs are swapped with host's before vCPU exits to userspace and
> >> after it reenters kernel before next VM-entry.
> >> 
> >> Because the modified code is also used for the KVM_GET_MSRS device ioctl(),
> >> explicitly check @vcpu is non-null before attempting to load guest state.
> >> The XSAVE-managed MSRs cannot be retrieved via the device ioctl() without
> >> loading guest FPU state (which doesn't exist).
> >> 
> >> Note that guest_cpuid_has() is not queried as host userspace is allowed to
> >> access MSRs that have not been exposed to the guest, e.g. it might do
> >> KVM_SET_MSRS prior to KVM_SET_CPUID2.
> 
> ...
> 
> >> +	bool fpu_loaded = false;
> >>   	int i;
> >> -	for (i = 0; i < msrs->nmsrs; ++i)
> >> +	for (i = 0; i < msrs->nmsrs; ++i) {
> >> +		/*
> >> +		 * If userspace is accessing one or more XSTATE-managed MSRs,
> >> +		 * temporarily load the guest's FPU state so that the guest's
> >> +		 * MSR value(s) is resident in hardware, i.e. so that KVM can
> >> +		 * get/set the MSR via RDMSR/WRMSR.
> >> +		 */
> >> +		if (vcpu && !fpu_loaded && kvm_caps.supported_xss &&
> >
> >why not check vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xss?
> 
> Looks like Sean anticipated someone would ask this question.

I don't think so, I'm pretty sure querying kvm_caps.supported_xss is a holdover
from the early days of this patch, e.g. before guest_cpu_cap_has() existed, and
potentially even before vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xss existed.

I'm pretty sure we can make this less weird and more accurate:

/*
 * Returns true if the MSR in question is managed via XSTATE, i.e. is context
 * switched with the rest of guest FPU state.  Note!  S_CET is _not_ context
 * switched via XSTATE even though it _is_ saved/restored via XSAVES/XRSTORS.
 * Because S_CET is loaded on VM-Enter and VM-Exit via dedicated VMCS fields,
 * the value saved/restored via XSTATE is always the host's value.  That detail
 * is _extremely_ important, as the guest's S_CET must _never_ be resident in
 * hardware while executing in the host.  Loading guest values for U_CET and
 * PL[0-3]_SSP while executing in the kernel is safe, as U_CET is specific to
 * userspace, and PL[0-3]_SSP are only consumed when transitioning to lower
 * privilegel levels, i.e. are effectively only consumed by userspace as well.
 */
static bool is_xstate_managed_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr)
{
	if (!vcpu)
		return false;

	switch (msr) {
	case MSR_IA32_U_CET:
		return guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
		       guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT);
	case MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP ... MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP:
		return guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
	default:
		return false;
	}
}

Which is very desirable because the KVM_{G,S}ET_ONE_REG path also needs to
load/put the FPU, as found via a WIP selftest that tripped:

  KVM_BUG_ON(!vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->in_use, vcpu->kvm);

And if we simplify is_xstate_managed_msr(), then the accessors can also do:

  KVM_BUG_ON(!is_xstate_managed_msr(vcpu, msr_info->index), vcpu->kvm);

  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-09-10 17:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-09-09  9:39 [PATCH v14 00/22] Enable CET Virtualization Chao Gao
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 01/22] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_{G,S}ET_ONE_REG uAPIs support Chao Gao
2025-09-10  9:03   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-10 17:17   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-10 17:35   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 02/22] KVM: x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Chao Gao
2025-09-11  6:52   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 03/22] KVM: x86: Check XSS validity against guest CPUIDs Chao Gao
2025-09-10  9:22   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-10 11:33     ` Chao Gao
2025-09-10 18:47       ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 04/22] KVM: x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Chao Gao
2025-09-10  9:23   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-11  7:02   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 05/22] KVM: x86: Initialize kvm_caps.supported_xss Chao Gao
2025-09-10  9:36   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 06/22] KVM: x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs Chao Gao
2025-09-10  9:37   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-10 11:18     ` Chao Gao
2025-09-10 13:46       ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-10 15:24         ` Chao Gao
2025-09-10 17:50       ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 07/22] KVM: x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Chao Gao
2025-09-10  9:38   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 08/22] KVM: x86: Report KVM supported CET MSRs as to-be-saved Chao Gao
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 09/22] KVM: VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Chao Gao
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 10/22] KVM: x86: Enable guest SSP read/write interface with new uAPIs Chao Gao
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 11/22] KVM: VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs Chao Gao
2025-09-11  8:05   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-11  9:02     ` Chao Gao
2025-09-11 20:24       ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 12/22] KVM: x86: Save and reload SSP to/from SMRAM Chao Gao
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 13/22] KVM: VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs Chao Gao
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 14/22] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields Chao Gao
2025-09-12 22:04   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 15/22] KVM: x86: Don't emulate instructions guarded by CET Chao Gao
2025-09-11  9:18   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-11 10:42     ` Chao Gao
2025-09-12  6:23       ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-12 14:37         ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 15:11           ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-16 14:42             ` Chao Gao
2025-09-12 14:42   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 16/22] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Chao Gao
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 17/22] KVM: nVMX: Virtualize NO_HW_ERROR_CODE_CC for L1 event injection to L2 Chao Gao
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 18/22] KVM: nVMX: Prepare for enabling CET support for nested guest Chao Gao
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 19/22] KVM: nVMX: Add consistency checks for CR0.WP and CR4.CET Chao Gao
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 20/22] KVM: nVMX: Add consistency checks for CET states Chao Gao
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 21/22] KVM: nVMX: Advertise new VM-Entry/Exit control bits for CET state Chao Gao
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 22/22] KVM: selftest: Add tests for KVM_{GET,SET}_ONE_REG Chao Gao
2025-09-10 18:06   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-09  9:52 ` [PATCH v14 00/22] Enable CET Virtualization Chao Gao
2025-09-10 18:29   ` Sean Christopherson

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