From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
To: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Cc: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
<acme@redhat.com>, <bp@alien8.de>, <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
<hpa@zytor.com>, <john.allen@amd.com>, <mingo@kernel.org>,
<mingo@redhat.com>, <minipli@grsecurity.net>,
<mlevitsk@redhat.com>, <namhyung@kernel.org>,
<pbonzini@redhat.com>, <prsampat@amd.com>,
<rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>, <seanjc@google.com>,
<shuah@kernel.org>, <tglx@linutronix.de>,
<weijiang.yang@intel.com>, <x86@kernel.org>, <xin@zytor.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v14 06/22] KVM: x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs
Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2025 23:24:02 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aMGYEvUZ6sg6dPvs@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5077c390-1211-42fc-b753-2a23187cf8ca@intel.com>
On Wed, Sep 10, 2025 at 09:46:01PM +0800, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
>On 9/10/2025 7:18 PM, Chao Gao wrote:
>> On Wed, Sep 10, 2025 at 05:37:50PM +0800, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
>> > On 9/9/2025 5:39 PM, Chao Gao wrote:
>> > > From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
>> > >
>> > > Load the guest's FPU state if userspace is accessing MSRs whose values
>> > > are managed by XSAVES. Introduce two helpers, kvm_{get,set}_xstate_msr(),
>> > > to facilitate access to such kind of MSRs.
>> > >
>> > > If MSRs supported in kvm_caps.supported_xss are passed through to guest,
>> > > the guest MSRs are swapped with host's before vCPU exits to userspace and
>> > > after it reenters kernel before next VM-entry.
>> > >
>> > > Because the modified code is also used for the KVM_GET_MSRS device ioctl(),
>> > > explicitly check @vcpu is non-null before attempting to load guest state.
>> > > The XSAVE-managed MSRs cannot be retrieved via the device ioctl() without
>> > > loading guest FPU state (which doesn't exist).
>> > >
>> > > Note that guest_cpuid_has() is not queried as host userspace is allowed to
>> > > access MSRs that have not been exposed to the guest, e.g. it might do
>> > > KVM_SET_MSRS prior to KVM_SET_CPUID2.
>>
>> ...
>>
>> > > + bool fpu_loaded = false;
>> > > int i;
>> > > - for (i = 0; i < msrs->nmsrs; ++i)
>> > > + for (i = 0; i < msrs->nmsrs; ++i) {
>> > > + /*
>> > > + * If userspace is accessing one or more XSTATE-managed MSRs,
>> > > + * temporarily load the guest's FPU state so that the guest's
>> > > + * MSR value(s) is resident in hardware, i.e. so that KVM can
>> > > + * get/set the MSR via RDMSR/WRMSR.
>> > > + */
>> > > + if (vcpu && !fpu_loaded && kvm_caps.supported_xss &&
>> >
>> > why not check vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xss?
>>
>> Looks like Sean anticipated someone would ask this question.
>
>here it determines whether to call kvm_load_guest_fpu().
>
>- based on kvm_caps.supported_xss, it will always load guest fpu.
>- based on vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xss, it depends on whether userspace
>calls KVM_SET_CPUID2 and whether it enables any XSS feature.
>
>So the difference is when no XSS feature is enabled for the VM.
>
>In this case, if checking vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xss, it will skip
>kvm_load_guest_fpu(). And it will result in GET_MSR gets usrerspace's value
>and SET_MSR changes userspace's value, when MSR access is eventually allowed
>in later do_msr() callback. Is my understanding correctly?
Actually, there will be no functional issue.
Those MSR accesses are always "rejected" with KVM_MSR_RET_UNSUPPORTED by
__kvm_set/get_msr() and get fixup if they are "host_initiated" in
kvm_do_msr_access(). KVM doesn't access any hardware MSRs in the process.
Using vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xss here also works, but the correctness
isn't that obvious for this special case.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-09-10 15:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-09-09 9:39 [PATCH v14 00/22] Enable CET Virtualization Chao Gao
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 01/22] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_{G,S}ET_ONE_REG uAPIs support Chao Gao
2025-09-10 9:03 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-10 17:17 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-10 17:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 02/22] KVM: x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Chao Gao
2025-09-11 6:52 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 03/22] KVM: x86: Check XSS validity against guest CPUIDs Chao Gao
2025-09-10 9:22 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-10 11:33 ` Chao Gao
2025-09-10 18:47 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 04/22] KVM: x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Chao Gao
2025-09-10 9:23 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-11 7:02 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 05/22] KVM: x86: Initialize kvm_caps.supported_xss Chao Gao
2025-09-10 9:36 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 06/22] KVM: x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs Chao Gao
2025-09-10 9:37 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-10 11:18 ` Chao Gao
2025-09-10 13:46 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-10 15:24 ` Chao Gao [this message]
2025-09-10 17:50 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 07/22] KVM: x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Chao Gao
2025-09-10 9:38 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 08/22] KVM: x86: Report KVM supported CET MSRs as to-be-saved Chao Gao
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 09/22] KVM: VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Chao Gao
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 10/22] KVM: x86: Enable guest SSP read/write interface with new uAPIs Chao Gao
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 11/22] KVM: VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs Chao Gao
2025-09-11 8:05 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-11 9:02 ` Chao Gao
2025-09-11 20:24 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 12/22] KVM: x86: Save and reload SSP to/from SMRAM Chao Gao
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 13/22] KVM: VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs Chao Gao
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 14/22] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields Chao Gao
2025-09-12 22:04 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 15/22] KVM: x86: Don't emulate instructions guarded by CET Chao Gao
2025-09-11 9:18 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-11 10:42 ` Chao Gao
2025-09-12 6:23 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-12 14:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 15:11 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-16 14:42 ` Chao Gao
2025-09-12 14:42 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 16/22] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Chao Gao
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 17/22] KVM: nVMX: Virtualize NO_HW_ERROR_CODE_CC for L1 event injection to L2 Chao Gao
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 18/22] KVM: nVMX: Prepare for enabling CET support for nested guest Chao Gao
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 19/22] KVM: nVMX: Add consistency checks for CR0.WP and CR4.CET Chao Gao
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 20/22] KVM: nVMX: Add consistency checks for CET states Chao Gao
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 21/22] KVM: nVMX: Advertise new VM-Entry/Exit control bits for CET state Chao Gao
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 22/22] KVM: selftest: Add tests for KVM_{GET,SET}_ONE_REG Chao Gao
2025-09-10 18:06 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-09 9:52 ` [PATCH v14 00/22] Enable CET Virtualization Chao Gao
2025-09-10 18:29 ` Sean Christopherson
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