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From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <acme@redhat.com>, <bp@alien8.de>,
	<dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <hpa@zytor.com>,
	<john.allen@amd.com>, <mingo@kernel.org>, <mingo@redhat.com>,
	<minipli@grsecurity.net>, <mlevitsk@redhat.com>,
	<namhyung@kernel.org>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>, <prsampat@amd.com>,
	<rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>, <shuah@kernel.org>,
	<tglx@linutronix.de>, <weijiang.yang@intel.com>, <x86@kernel.org>,
	<xin@zytor.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v14 15/22] KVM: x86: Don't emulate instructions guarded by CET
Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2025 22:42:52 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aMl3bAHObST4b1S/@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <aMQ4L8id7f1fK16J@google.com>

>On second thought, I think it's worth doing the CPL checks.  Explaining why KVM
>doesn't bother with checking privilege level is more work than just writing the
>code.
>
>	/*
>	 * Reject emulation if KVM might need to emulate shadow stack updates
>	 * and/or indirect branch tracking enforcement, which the emulator
>	 * doesn't support.
>	 */
>	if (opcode.flags & (ShadowStack | IndirBrnTrk) &&
>	    ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 4) & X86_CR4_CET) {
>		u64 u_cet = 0, s_cet = 0;
>
>		/*
>		 * Check both User and Supervisor on far transfers as inter-
>		 * privilege level transfers are impacted by CET at the target
>		 * privilege levels, and that is not known at this time.  The
>	 	 * the expectation is that the guest will not require emulation
>		 * of any CET-affected instructions at any privilege level.
>		 */
>		if (!(opcode.flags & NearBranch)) {
>			u_cet = s_cet = CET_SHSTK_EN | CET_ENDBR_EN;
>		} else if (ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt) == 3) {
>			u_cet = CET_SHSTK_EN | CET_ENDBR_EN;
>		} else {
>			s_cet = CET_SHSTK_EN | CET_ENDBR_EN;
>		}
>
>		if ((u_cet && ctxt->ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_IA32_U_CET, &u_cet)) ||
>		    (s_cet && ctxt->ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_IA32_S_CET, &s_cet)))
>			return EMULATION_FAILED;
>
>		if ((u_cet | s_cet) & CET_SHSTK_EN && opcode.flags & ShadowStack)
>			  return EMULATION_FAILED;
>
>		if ((u_cet | s_cet) & CET_ENDBR_EN && opcode.flags & IndirBrnTrk)
>			  return EMULATION_FAILED;
>	}
>
>Side topic, has anyone actually tested that this works?  I.e. that attempts to
>emulate CET-affected instructions result in emulation failure?

I haven't. :(

>I'd love to have
>a selftest for this (hint, hint), but presumably writing one is non-trivial due
>to the need to get the selftest compiled with the necessary annotations, setup,
>and whatnot.

Sure. I'll try to write a selftest for this, but I'm unsure about its
complexity. Can you clarify what you mean by "necessary annotations,
setup..."? It seems to me that some simple assembly code, like
test_em_rdmsr(), should work.

For now, I plan to do a quick test by tweaking KUT's cet.c to force
emulation of CET-affected instructions.

  reply	other threads:[~2025-09-16 14:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-09-09  9:39 [PATCH v14 00/22] Enable CET Virtualization Chao Gao
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 01/22] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_{G,S}ET_ONE_REG uAPIs support Chao Gao
2025-09-10  9:03   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-10 17:17   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-10 17:35   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 02/22] KVM: x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Chao Gao
2025-09-11  6:52   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 03/22] KVM: x86: Check XSS validity against guest CPUIDs Chao Gao
2025-09-10  9:22   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-10 11:33     ` Chao Gao
2025-09-10 18:47       ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 04/22] KVM: x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Chao Gao
2025-09-10  9:23   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-11  7:02   ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 05/22] KVM: x86: Initialize kvm_caps.supported_xss Chao Gao
2025-09-10  9:36   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 06/22] KVM: x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs Chao Gao
2025-09-10  9:37   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-10 11:18     ` Chao Gao
2025-09-10 13:46       ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-10 15:24         ` Chao Gao
2025-09-10 17:50       ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 07/22] KVM: x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Chao Gao
2025-09-10  9:38   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 08/22] KVM: x86: Report KVM supported CET MSRs as to-be-saved Chao Gao
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 09/22] KVM: VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Chao Gao
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 10/22] KVM: x86: Enable guest SSP read/write interface with new uAPIs Chao Gao
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 11/22] KVM: VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs Chao Gao
2025-09-11  8:05   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-11  9:02     ` Chao Gao
2025-09-11 20:24       ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 12/22] KVM: x86: Save and reload SSP to/from SMRAM Chao Gao
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 13/22] KVM: VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs Chao Gao
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 14/22] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields Chao Gao
2025-09-12 22:04   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 15/22] KVM: x86: Don't emulate instructions guarded by CET Chao Gao
2025-09-11  9:18   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-11 10:42     ` Chao Gao
2025-09-12  6:23       ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-12 14:37         ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 15:11           ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-16 14:42             ` Chao Gao [this message]
2025-09-12 14:42   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 16/22] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Chao Gao
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 17/22] KVM: nVMX: Virtualize NO_HW_ERROR_CODE_CC for L1 event injection to L2 Chao Gao
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 18/22] KVM: nVMX: Prepare for enabling CET support for nested guest Chao Gao
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 19/22] KVM: nVMX: Add consistency checks for CR0.WP and CR4.CET Chao Gao
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 20/22] KVM: nVMX: Add consistency checks for CET states Chao Gao
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 21/22] KVM: nVMX: Advertise new VM-Entry/Exit control bits for CET state Chao Gao
2025-09-09  9:39 ` [PATCH v14 22/22] KVM: selftest: Add tests for KVM_{GET,SET}_ONE_REG Chao Gao
2025-09-10 18:06   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-09  9:52 ` [PATCH v14 00/22] Enable CET Virtualization Chao Gao
2025-09-10 18:29   ` Sean Christopherson

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