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From: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@earth.li>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com,
	ross.philipson@oracle.com,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@opinsys.com>,
	Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	open list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:KEYS/KEYRINGS" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM"
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 07/10] tpm-buf: check for corruption in tpm_buf_append_handle()
Date: Tue, 30 Sep 2025 12:13:11 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aNu7R8J8h8Kmon0H@earth.li> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250929194832.2913286-8-jarkko@kernel.org>

On Mon, Sep 29, 2025 at 10:48:29PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@opinsys.com>
> 
> Unify TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR and TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW into TPM_BUF_INVALID
> flag because semantically they are identical.
> 
> Test and set TPM_BUF_INVALID in tpm_buf_append_handle() following the
> pattern from other functions in tpm-buf.c.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@opinsys.com>

Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@meta.com>

> ---
> v3:
> - No changes.
> v2:
> - A new patch.
> ---
>  drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c                | 14 ++++++++------
>  include/linux/tpm.h                       |  8 +++-----
>  security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c |  6 +++---
>  3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c
> index dc882fc9fa9e..69ee77400539 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c
> @@ -104,13 +104,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_length);
>   */
>  void tpm_buf_append(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u8 *new_data, u16 new_length)
>  {
> -	/* Return silently if overflow has already happened. */
> -	if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW)
> +	if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID)
>  		return;
>  
>  	if ((buf->length + new_length) > PAGE_SIZE) {
>  		WARN(1, "tpm_buf: write overflow\n");
> -		buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW;
> +		buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_INVALID;
>  		return;
>  	}
>  
> @@ -157,8 +156,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_u32);
>   */
>  void tpm_buf_append_handle(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle)
>  {
> +	if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID)
> +		return;
> +
>  	if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_TPM2B) {
>  		dev_err(&chip->dev, "Invalid buffer type (TPM2B)\n");
> +		buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_INVALID;
>  		return;
>  	}
>  
> @@ -177,14 +180,13 @@ static void tpm_buf_read(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset, size_t count, void
>  {
>  	off_t next_offset;
>  
> -	/* Return silently if overflow has already happened. */
> -	if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR)
> +	if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID)
>  		return;
>  
>  	next_offset = *offset + count;
>  	if (next_offset > buf->length) {
>  		WARN(1, "tpm_buf: read out of boundary\n");
> -		buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR;
> +		buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_INVALID;
>  		return;
>  	}
>  
> diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
> index e72e7657faa2..5283f32781c4 100644
> --- a/include/linux/tpm.h
> +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
> @@ -366,12 +366,10 @@ struct tpm_header {
>  } __packed;
>  
>  enum tpm_buf_flags {
> -	/* the capacity exceeded: */
> -	TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW	= BIT(0),
>  	/* TPM2B format: */
> -	TPM_BUF_TPM2B		= BIT(1),
> -	/* read out of boundary: */
> -	TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR	= BIT(2),
> +	TPM_BUF_TPM2B		= BIT(0),
> +	/* The buffer is in invalid and unusable state: */
> +	TPM_BUF_INVALID		= BIT(1),
>  };
>  
>  /*
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> index 8e3b283a59b2..119d5152c0db 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> @@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>  	/* creation PCR */
>  	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0);
>  
> -	if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) {
> +	if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) {
>  		rc = -E2BIG;
>  		tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
>  		goto out;
> @@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>  		goto out;
>  
>  	blob_len = tpm_buf_read_u32(&buf, &offset);
> -	if (blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE || buf.flags & TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR) {
> +	if (blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE || buf.flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) {
>  		rc = -E2BIG;
>  		goto out;
>  	}
> @@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>  
>  	tpm_buf_append(&buf, blob, blob_len);
>  
> -	if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) {
> +	if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) {
>  		rc = -E2BIG;
>  		tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
>  		goto out;
> -- 
> 2.39.5
> 
> 

J.

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Web [       Reality is for people with no grasp of fantasy.        ]
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  reply	other threads:[~2025-09-30 11:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-09-29 19:48 [PATCH v3 00/10] tpm: Decouple Trenchboot dependencies Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-09-29 19:48 ` [PATCH v3 01/10] tpm: Cap the number of PCR banks Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-09-30 11:09   ` Jonathan McDowell
2025-09-30 12:36     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-09-30 14:17       ` James Bottomley
2025-10-01 11:16         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-10-01 12:52           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-09-29 19:48 ` [PATCH v3 02/10] tpm: Use -EPERM as fallback error code in tpm_ret_to_err Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-09-30 12:11   ` Stefano Garzarella
2025-09-30 12:37     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-09-29 19:48 ` [PATCH v3 03/10] KEYS: trusted: Use tpm_ret_to_err() in trusted_tpm2 Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-09-30 12:12   ` Stefano Garzarella
2025-09-30 12:39     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-09-29 19:48 ` [PATCH v3 04/10] tpm2-sessions: Remove 'attributes' from tpm_buf_append_auth Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-09-30 11:10   ` Jonathan McDowell
2025-09-30 12:39     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-09-29 19:48 ` [PATCH v3 05/10] tpm2-sessions: Umask tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-09-30 11:11   ` Jonathan McDowell
2025-09-30 12:41     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-09-29 19:48 ` [PATCH v3 06/10] KEYS: trusted: Open code tpm2_buf_append() Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-09-29 19:48 ` [PATCH v3 07/10] tpm-buf: check for corruption in tpm_buf_append_handle() Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-09-30 11:13   ` Jonathan McDowell [this message]
2025-09-30 12:43     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-09-29 19:48 ` [PATCH v3 08/10] tpm-buf: Remove chip parameter from tpm_buf_append_handle Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-09-30 11:14   ` Jonathan McDowell
2025-09-29 19:48 ` [PATCH v3 09/10] tpm-buf: Build PCR extend commands Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-09-29 19:48 ` [PATCH v3 10/10] tpm-buf: Enable managed and stack allocations Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-09-30 12:44   ` Stefano Garzarella
2025-09-30 13:11     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-09-30 13:20       ` Stefano Garzarella
2025-09-29 20:10 ` [PATCH v3 00/10] tpm: Decouple Trenchboot dependencies Jarkko Sakkinen

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