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From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
To: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] crypto: asymmetric_keys - simplify asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id
Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2025 14:10:38 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aOuavtSpoNLWHoMS@wunner.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251007185220.234611-3-thorsten.blum@linux.dev>

On Tue, Oct 07, 2025 at 08:52:21PM +0200, Thorsten Blum wrote:
> Use struct_size() to calculate the number of bytes to allocate for the
> asymmetric key id.

Why?  To what end?  To guard against an overflow?

I've gone through the callers of asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id() and
it seems they all limit the length of the keyid.  Guarding against
an overflow in asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id() could thus only be
justified as a defense-in-depth measure, but I doubt that's worth it.

Callers I've found:

- keyctl_keyring_search() [security/keys/keyctl.c]
    keyring_search()
      type->match_preparse() == asymmetric_key_match_preparse()
        asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id()

  Here the size of the key id is constrained to 4096 bytes
  (KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE) by keyctl_keyring_search().

- request_key() [security/keys/keyctl.c]
    request_key_and_link()
        type->match_preparse() == asymmetric_key_match_preparse()
          asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id()

  Same here.

- asymmetric_verify() [security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c]
    request_asymmetric_key()
      find_asymmetric_key()
        keyring_search()
          type->match_preparse() == asymmetric_key_match_preparse()
            asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id()

  Here the size of the key id is a 32-bit integer.

- pkcs7_validate_trust_one() [crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c]
    find_asymmetric_key()
      keyring_search()
        type->match_preparse() == asymmetric_key_match_preparse()
          asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id()

  Here the key id in hexadecimal is constructed from its binary form,
  asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id() then converts that back.  Naturally
  the back conversion shouldn't overflow.

- restrict_link_by_signature() [crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c]
    find_asymmetric_key()
      keyring_search()
        type->match_preparse() == asymmetric_key_match_preparse()
          asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id()

  Same here.

> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
> @@ -236,12 +236,11 @@ struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id)
>  	if (asciihexlen & 1)
>  		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>  
> -	match_id = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_id) + asciihexlen / 2,
> -			   GFP_KERNEL);
> +	hexlen = asciihexlen / 2;
> +	match_id = kmalloc(struct_size(match_id, data, hexlen), GFP_KERNEL);
>  	if (!match_id)
>  		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);

This doesn't look more readable to be honest.

> -	ret = __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(id, match_id, asciihexlen / 2);
> -	if (ret < 0) {
> +	if (__asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(id, match_id, hexlen) < 0) {
>  		kfree(match_id);
>  		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>  	}

If anything, return ret instead of removing the ret variable.
The only negative return value of __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id()
is -EINVAL, hence that's returned directly here.

Thanks,

Lukas

  reply	other threads:[~2025-10-12 12:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-10-07 18:52 [PATCH 1/2] crypto: asymmetric_keys - prevent overflow in asymmetric_key_generate_id Thorsten Blum
2025-10-07 18:52 ` [PATCH 2/2] crypto: asymmetric_keys - simplify asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id Thorsten Blum
2025-10-12 12:10   ` Lukas Wunner [this message]
2025-10-12 13:23     ` Thorsten Blum
2025-10-13  7:00       ` Lukas Wunner
2025-10-12  7:38 ` [PATCH 1/2] crypto: asymmetric_keys - prevent overflow in asymmetric_key_generate_id Lukas Wunner

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