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From: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
To: Ranganath V N <vnranganath.20@gmail.com>
Cc: davem@davemloft.net, david.hunter.linux@gmail.com,
	edumazet@google.com, jhs@mojatatu.com, jiri@resnulli.us,
	khalid@kernel.org, kuba@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, pabeni@redhat.com,
	skhan@linuxfoundation.org,
	syzbot+0c85cae3350b7d486aee@syzkaller.appspotmail.com,
	xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/2] net: sched: act_ife: initialize struct tc_ife to fix KMSAN kernel-infoleak
Date: Wed, 5 Nov 2025 12:59:02 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aQtKFtETfGBOPpCV@horms.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251105100403.17786-1-vnranganath.20@gmail.com>

On Wed, Nov 05, 2025 at 03:33:58PM +0530, Ranganath V N wrote:
> On 11/4/25 19:38, Simon Horman wrote:
> > On Sat, Nov 01, 2025 at 06:04:46PM +0530, Ranganath V N wrote:
> >> Fix a KMSAN kernel-infoleak detected  by the syzbot .
> >>
> >> [net?] KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in __skb_datagram_iter
> >>
> >> In tcf_ife_dump(), the variable 'opt' was partially initialized using a
> >> designatied initializer. While the padding bytes are reamined
> >> uninitialized. nla_put() copies the entire structure into a
> >> netlink message, these uninitialized bytes leaked to userspace.
> >>
> >> Initialize the structure with memset before assigning its fields
> >> to ensure all members and padding are cleared prior to beign copied.
> >
> > Perhaps not important, but this seems to only describe patch 1/2.
> >
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Ranganath V N <vnranganath.20@gmail.com>
> >
> > Sorry for not looking more carefully at v1.
> >
> > The presence of this padding seems pretty subtle to me.
> > And while I agree that your change fixes the problem described.
> > I wonder if it would be better to make things more obvious
> > by adding a 2-byte pad member to the structures involved.
> 
> Thanks for the input.
> 
> One question — even though adding a 2-byte `pad` field silences KMSAN,
> would that approach be reliable across all architectures?
> Since the actual amount and placement of padding can vary depending on
> structure alignment and compiler behavior, I’m wondering if this would only
> silence the report on certain builds rather than fixing the root cause.
> 
> The current memset-based initialization explicitly clears all bytes in the
> structure (including any compiler-inserted padding), which seems safer and
> more consistent across architectures.
> 
> Also, adding a new member — even a padding field — could potentially alter
> the structure size or layout as seen from user space. That might 
> unintentionally affect existing user-space expectations.
> 
> Do you think relying on a manual pad field is good enough?

I think these are the right questions to ask.

My thinking is that structures will be padded to a multiple
of either 4 or 8 bytes, depending on the architecture.

And my observation is that that the unpadded length of both of the structures
in question are 22 bytes. And that on x86_64 they are padded to 24 bytes.
Which is divisible by both 4 and 8. So I assume this will be consistent
for all architectures. If so, I think this would address the questions you
raised.

I do, however, agree that your current memset-based approach is safer
in the sense that it carries a lower risk of breaking things because
it has fewer assumptions (that we have thought of so far).

  reply	other threads:[~2025-11-05 12:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-11-01 12:34 [PATCH v2 0/2] net: sched: act_ife: initialize struct tc_ife to fix KMSAN kernel-infoleak Ranganath V N
2025-11-01 12:34 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] " Ranganath V N
2025-11-04 14:10   ` Simon Horman
2025-11-01 12:34 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] net: sched: act_connmark: zero initialize the struct to avoid KMSAN Ranganath V N
2025-11-04 14:08 ` [PATCH v2 0/2] net: sched: act_ife: initialize struct tc_ife to fix KMSAN kernel-infoleak Simon Horman
2025-11-05 10:03   ` Ranganath V N
2025-11-05 12:59     ` Simon Horman [this message]
2025-11-05 15:09       ` Jamal Hadi Salim
2025-11-05 19:13         ` Simon Horman
2025-11-06 13:31           ` Ranganath V N

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