From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <m.wieczorretman@pm.me>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman@intel.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, kvm <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 09/14] x86/mm: LAM compatible non-canonical definition
Date: Fri, 16 Jan 2026 06:57:04 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aWpRwJqjzBxOaRwi@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2968b97c-5d71-4c05-9013-f275bdbd9cd5@gmail.com>
On Fri, Jan 16, 2026, Andrey Ryabinin wrote:
> On 1/12/26 6:28 PM, Maciej Wieczor-Retman wrote:
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/page.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/page.h
> > index bcf5cad3da36..b7940fa49e64 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/page.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/page.h
> > @@ -82,9 +82,22 @@ static __always_inline void *pfn_to_kaddr(unsigned long pfn)
> > return __va(pfn << PAGE_SHIFT);
> > }
> >
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS
> > +#define CANONICAL_MASK(vaddr_bits) (BIT_ULL(63) | BIT_ULL((vaddr_bits) - 1))
>
> why is the choice of CANONICAL_MASK() gated at compile time? Shouldn’t this be a
> runtime decision based on whether LAM is enabled or not on the running system?
>
> > +#else
> > +#define CANONICAL_MASK(vaddr_bits) GENMASK_ULL(63, vaddr_bits)
> > +#endif
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * To make an address canonical either set or clear the bits defined by the
> > + * CANONICAL_MASK(). Clear the bits for userspace addresses if the top address
> > + * bit is a zero. Set the bits for kernel addresses if the top address bit is a
> > + * one.
> > + */
> > static __always_inline u64 __canonical_address(u64 vaddr, u8 vaddr_bits)
>
> +Cc KVM
Thanks!
> This is used extensively in KVM code. As far as I can tell, it may be used to
> determine whether a guest virtual address is canonical or not.
Yep, KVM uses this both to check canonical addresses and to force a canonical
address (Intel and AMD disagree on the MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_{EIP,ESP} semantics in
64-bit mode) for guest addresses. This change will break KVM badly if KASAN_SW_TAGS=y.
> case, the result should depend on whether LAM is enabled for the guest, not
> the host (and certainly not a host's compile-time option).
Ya, KVM could roll its own versions, but IMO these super low level helpers should
do exactly what they say. E.g. at a glance, I'm not sure pt_event_addr_filters_sync()
should be subjected to KASAN_SW_TAGS either. If that's true, then AFAICT the
_only_ code that wants the LAM-aware behavior is copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed(),
so maybe just handle it there? Not sure that's a great long-term maintenance
story either though.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-01-16 14:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-01-12 17:26 [PATCH v8 00/14] kasan: x86: arm64: KASAN tag-based mode for x86 Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-12 17:27 ` [PATCH v8 01/14] kasan: sw_tags: Use arithmetic shift for shadow computation Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-15 22:42 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2026-01-16 13:11 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-12 17:27 ` [PATCH v8 02/14] kasan: arm64: x86: Make special tags arch specific Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-13 1:21 ` Andrey Konovalov
2026-01-13 17:32 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-16 13:32 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2026-01-12 17:27 ` [PATCH v8 03/14] kasan: Fix inline mode for x86 tag-based mode Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-16 13:33 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2026-01-12 17:27 ` [PATCH v8 04/14] x86/kasan: Add arch specific kasan functions Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-13 1:21 ` Andrey Konovalov
2026-01-13 16:12 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-16 13:35 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2026-01-12 17:27 ` [PATCH v8 05/14] x86/mm: Reset tag for virtual to physical address conversions Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-12 17:27 ` [PATCH v8 06/14] mm/execmem: Untag addresses in EXECMEM_ROX related pointer arithmetic Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-12 17:27 ` [PATCH v8 07/14] x86/mm: Physical address comparisons in fill_p*d/pte Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-12 17:28 ` [PATCH v8 08/14] x86/kasan: KASAN raw shadow memory PTE init Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-16 13:36 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2026-01-12 17:28 ` [PATCH v8 09/14] x86/mm: LAM compatible non-canonical definition Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-16 14:25 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2026-01-16 14:57 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2026-01-16 15:56 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-16 17:00 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-16 17:09 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-12 17:28 ` [PATCH v8 10/14] x86/mm: LAM initialization Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-12 17:28 ` [PATCH v8 11/14] x86: Minimal SLAB alignment Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-12 17:28 ` [PATCH v8 12/14] arm64: Unify software tag-based KASAN inline recovery path Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-12 17:28 ` [PATCH v8 13/14] x86/kasan: Logical bit shift for kasan_mem_to_shadow Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-13 1:21 ` Andrey Konovalov
2026-01-14 16:52 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-15 3:57 ` Andrey Konovalov
2026-01-15 16:43 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-17 1:21 ` Andrey Konovalov
2026-01-17 6:53 ` Maciej Wieczór-Retman
2026-01-19 11:40 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-12 17:28 ` [PATCH v8 14/14] x86/kasan: Make software tag-based kasan available Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-13 1:21 ` Andrey Konovalov
2026-01-13 15:31 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-13 11:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-01-13 16:00 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-13 16:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-01-12 18:29 ` [PATCH v8 00/14] kasan: x86: arm64: KASAN tag-based mode for x86 Andrew Morton
2026-01-12 20:08 ` Maciej Wieczór-Retman
2026-01-12 20:53 ` Andrew Morton
2026-01-13 1:47 ` Andrey Konovalov
2026-01-12 20:27 ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-13 11:47 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-01-13 17:34 ` Andrew Morton
2026-01-22 17:25 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-01-13 1:44 ` Andrey Konovalov
2026-01-19 16:33 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2026-01-19 19:43 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
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