From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
To: Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
<seanjc@google.com>, <corbet@lwn.net>, <tglx@linutronix.de>,
<mingo@redhat.com>, <bp@alien8.de>, <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
<x86@kernel.org>, <hpa@zytor.com>, <luto@kernel.org>,
<peterz@infradead.org>, <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
<hch@infradead.org>, <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 20/22] KVM: nVMX: Validate FRED-related VMCS fields
Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2026 10:33:43 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aXA7B9bbMNGBocTC@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <229A00D7-178E-47E4-B596-B467B2C66956@zytor.com>
On Tue, Jan 20, 2026 at 01:19:55AM -0800, Xin Li wrote:
>>> @@ -3047,22 +3049,11 @@ static int nested_check_vm_entry_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>>> u8 vector = intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
>>> u32 intr_type = intr_info & INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK;
>>> bool has_error_code = intr_info & INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK;
>>> + bool has_nested_exception = vmx->nested.msrs.basic & VMX_BASIC_NESTED_EXCEPTION;
>>
>> has_error_code reflects whether the to-be-injected event has an error code.
>> Using has_nested_exception for CPU capabilities here is a bit confusing.
>
>Looks better to just remove has_error_code.
>
>>
>>> bool urg = nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12,
>>> SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST);
>>> bool prot_mode = !urg || vmcs12->guest_cr0 & X86_CR0_PE;
>>>
>>> - /* VM-entry interruption-info field: interruption type */
>>> - if (CC(intr_type == INTR_TYPE_RESERVED) ||
>>> - CC(intr_type == INTR_TYPE_OTHER_EVENT &&
>>> - !nested_cpu_supports_monitor_trap_flag(vcpu)))
>>> - return -EINVAL;
>>> -
>>> - /* VM-entry interruption-info field: vector */
>>> - if (CC(intr_type == INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR && vector != NMI_VECTOR) ||
>>> - CC(intr_type == INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION && vector > 31) ||
>>> - CC(intr_type == INTR_TYPE_OTHER_EVENT && vector != 0))
>>> - return -EINVAL;
>>> -
>>> /*
>>> * Cannot deliver error code in real mode or if the interrupt
>>> * type is not hardware exception. For other cases, do the
>>> @@ -3086,8 +3077,28 @@ static int nested_check_vm_entry_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>>> if (CC(intr_info & INTR_INFO_RESVD_BITS_MASK))
>>> return -EINVAL;
>>>
>>> - /* VM-entry instruction length */
>>> + /*
>>> + * When the CPU enumerates VMX nested-exception support, bit 13
>>> + * (set to indicate a nested exception) of the intr info field
>>> + * may have value 1. Otherwise bit 13 is reserved.
>>> + */
>>> + if (CC(!(has_nested_exception && intr_type == INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION) &&
>>> + intr_info & INTR_INFO_NESTED_EXCEPTION_MASK))
>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>> +
>>> switch (intr_type) {
>>> + case INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR:
>>> + break;
>>
>> This can be dropped, as the "default" case will handle it.
>
>We don’t have a default case, as all 8 cases are listed (INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK is 0x700).
>
>>
>>> + case INTR_TYPE_RESERVED:
>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>
>> I think we need to add a CC() statement to make it easier to correlate a
>> VM-entry failure with a specific consistency check.
>
>What do you want me to put in CC()?
>
>CC(intr_type == INTR_TYPE_RESERVED)?
how about this incremental change?
I prefer to make has_error_code and has_nested_exception consistent, and add a
CC() statement before all "return -EINVAL" statements for debugging.
t a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
index 8682709d8759..f13df70405d9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
@@ -3049,7 +3049,7 @@ static int nested_check_vm_entry_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
u8 vector = intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
u32 intr_type = intr_info & INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK;
bool has_error_code = intr_info & INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK;
- bool has_nested_exception = vmx->nested.msrs.basic & VMX_BASIC_NESTED_EXCEPTION;
+ bool has_nested_exception = intr_info & INTR_INFO_NESTED_EXCEPTION_MASK;
bool urg = nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12,
SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST);
bool prot_mode = !urg || vmcs12->guest_cr0 & X86_CR0_PE;
@@ -3077,20 +3077,10 @@ static int nested_check_vm_entry_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
if (CC(intr_info & INTR_INFO_RESVD_BITS_MASK))
return -EINVAL;
- /*
- * When the CPU enumerates VMX nested-exception support, bit 13
- * (set to indicate a nested exception) of the intr info field
- * may have value 1. Otherwise bit 13 is reserved.
- */
- if (CC(!(has_nested_exception && intr_type == INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION) &&
- intr_info & INTR_INFO_NESTED_EXCEPTION_MASK))
+ if (CC(intr_type == INTR_TYPE_RESERVED))
return -EINVAL;
switch (intr_type) {
- case INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR:
- break;
- case INTR_TYPE_RESERVED:
- return -EINVAL;
case INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR:
if (CC(vector != NMI_VECTOR))
return -EINVAL;
@@ -3098,6 +3088,13 @@ static int nested_check_vm_entry_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
case INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION:
if (CC(vector > 31))
return -EINVAL;
+ /*
+ * When the CPU enumerates VMX nested-exception support, bit 13
+ * (set to indicate a nested exception) of the intr info field
+ * may have value 1. Otherwise bit 13 is reserved.
+ */
+ if (CC(has_nested_exception && !(vmx->nested.msrs.basic & VMX_BASIC_NESTED_EXCEPTION)))
+ return -EINVAL;
break;
case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION:
case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR:
@@ -3108,6 +3105,9 @@ static int nested_check_vm_entry_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
return -EINVAL;
break;
case INTR_TYPE_OTHER_EVENT:
+ if (CC(vector > 3))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
switch (vector) {
case 0:
if (CC(!nested_cpu_supports_monitor_trap_flag(vcpu)))
@@ -3121,7 +3121,7 @@ static int nested_check_vm_entry_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
return -EINVAL;
break;
default:
- return -EINVAL;
+ break;
}
break;
}
@@ -3454,14 +3454,15 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_guest_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
}
if (vmcs12->guest_cr4 & X86_CR4_FRED) {
unsigned int ss_dpl = VMX_AR_DPL(vmcs12->guest_ss_ar_bytes);
+
+ if (CC(ss_dpl == 1 || ss_dpl == 2))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
switch (ss_dpl) {
case 0:
if (CC(!(vmcs12->guest_cs_ar_bytes & VMX_AR_L_MASK)))
return -EINVAL;
break;
- case 1:
- case 2:
- return -EINVAL;
case 3:
if (CC(vmcs12->guest_rflags & X86_EFLAGS_IOPL))
return -EINVAL;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-01-21 2:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 106+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-10-26 20:18 [PATCH v9 00/22] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 01/22] KVM: VMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 02/22] KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config Xin Li (Intel)
2026-01-20 9:24 ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-22 17:57 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 03/22] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Xin Li (Intel)
2026-03-05 0:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 04/22] x86/cea: Prefix event stack names with ESTACK_ Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 05/22] x86/cea: Use array indexing to simplify exception stack access Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-27 15:49 ` Dave Hansen
2025-10-28 2:31 ` Xin Li
2026-01-30 13:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 06/22] x86/cea: Export __this_cpu_ist_top_va() to KVM Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-27 15:50 ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-30 13:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-01-30 16:35 ` Xin Li
2026-01-30 17:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-03-07 7:38 ` Xin Li
2026-03-09 15:24 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-09 22:57 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 07/22] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 2:44 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-21 6:44 ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-21 18:14 ` Xin Li
2026-01-22 0:45 ` Xin Li
2026-01-22 1:56 ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-22 17:22 ` Xin Li
2026-03-04 16:23 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 5:27 ` Xin Li
2026-03-05 15:21 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 17:25 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 08/22] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR intercepts Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 5:49 ` Chao Gao
2026-03-05 0:48 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 5:56 ` Xin Li
2026-03-06 2:30 ` Chao Gao
2026-03-06 15:54 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-16 19:49 ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-17 0:43 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 09/22] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 5:59 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-21 7:23 ` Binbin Wu
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 10/22] KVM: VMX: Add support for saving and restoring FRED MSRs Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 6:16 ` Chao Gao
2025-12-01 6:20 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 11/22] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 6:19 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-21 8:05 ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-21 16:46 ` Xin Li
2026-01-21 20:24 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-21 22:38 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 12/22] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 3:24 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-29 17:12 ` Xin Li
2026-01-29 17:21 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-01-29 22:50 ` Xin Li
2026-03-04 16:42 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 13/22] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 6:54 ` Chao Gao
2026-03-07 2:07 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-07 3:05 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 14/22] KVM: x86: Save/restore the nested flag of an exception Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 6:13 ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 15/22] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 7:26 ` Chao Gao
2026-03-05 0:58 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 7:20 ` Xin Li
2026-03-05 15:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 17:09 ` Xin Li
2026-03-05 17:46 ` Xin Li
2026-03-06 5:33 ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 16/22] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 7:40 ` Chao Gao
2025-11-30 18:42 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 17/22] KVM: x86: Advertise support for FRED Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 7:30 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20 6:56 ` Xin Li
2026-01-20 8:07 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20 9:09 ` Xin Li
2026-01-20 9:46 ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-20 15:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-20 18:04 ` Xin Li
2026-01-20 17:58 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 18/22] KVM: nVMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 13:42 ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 19/22] KVM: nVMX: Handle FRED VMCS fields in nested VMX context Xin Li (Intel)
2025-12-02 6:32 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20 6:30 ` Xin Li
2026-01-20 16:07 ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-20 18:10 ` Xin Li
2026-01-21 0:44 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-22 16:52 ` Xin Li
2025-12-08 22:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 20/22] KVM: nVMX: Validate FRED-related VMCS fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-13 3:00 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20 9:19 ` Xin Li
2026-01-21 2:33 ` Chao Gao [this message]
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 21/22] KVM: nVMX: Guard SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros with VMX feature checks Xin Li (Intel)
2025-12-02 6:35 ` Chao Gao
2025-12-08 22:49 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 22/22] KVM: nVMX: Enable VMX FRED controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-13 3:20 ` Chao Gao
2025-11-06 17:35 ` [PATCH v9 00/22] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li
2025-11-13 22:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-08 22:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-09 17:08 ` Xin Li
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