public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
To: Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	<seanjc@google.com>, <corbet@lwn.net>, <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	<mingo@redhat.com>, <bp@alien8.de>, <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	<x86@kernel.org>, <hpa@zytor.com>, <luto@kernel.org>,
	<peterz@infradead.org>, <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	<hch@infradead.org>, <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 20/22] KVM: nVMX: Validate FRED-related VMCS fields
Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2026 10:33:43 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aXA7B9bbMNGBocTC@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <229A00D7-178E-47E4-B596-B467B2C66956@zytor.com>

On Tue, Jan 20, 2026 at 01:19:55AM -0800, Xin Li wrote:
>>> @@ -3047,22 +3049,11 @@ static int nested_check_vm_entry_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>>> u8 vector = intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
>>> u32 intr_type = intr_info & INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK;
>>> bool has_error_code = intr_info & INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK;
>>> + bool has_nested_exception = vmx->nested.msrs.basic & VMX_BASIC_NESTED_EXCEPTION;
>> 
>> has_error_code reflects whether the to-be-injected event has an error code.
>> Using has_nested_exception for CPU capabilities here is a bit confusing.
>
>Looks better to just remove has_error_code.
>
>> 
>>> bool urg = nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12,
>>>    SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST);
>>> bool prot_mode = !urg || vmcs12->guest_cr0 & X86_CR0_PE;
>>> 
>>> - /* VM-entry interruption-info field: interruption type */
>>> - if (CC(intr_type == INTR_TYPE_RESERVED) ||
>>> -     CC(intr_type == INTR_TYPE_OTHER_EVENT &&
>>> -        !nested_cpu_supports_monitor_trap_flag(vcpu)))
>>> - return -EINVAL;
>>> -
>>> - /* VM-entry interruption-info field: vector */
>>> - if (CC(intr_type == INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR && vector != NMI_VECTOR) ||
>>> -     CC(intr_type == INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION && vector > 31) ||
>>> -     CC(intr_type == INTR_TYPE_OTHER_EVENT && vector != 0))
>>> - return -EINVAL;
>>> -
>>> /*
>>>  * Cannot deliver error code in real mode or if the interrupt
>>>  * type is not hardware exception. For other cases, do the
>>> @@ -3086,8 +3077,28 @@ static int nested_check_vm_entry_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>>> if (CC(intr_info & INTR_INFO_RESVD_BITS_MASK))
>>> return -EINVAL;
>>> 
>>> - /* VM-entry instruction length */
>>> + /*
>>> +  * When the CPU enumerates VMX nested-exception support, bit 13
>>> +  * (set to indicate a nested exception) of the intr info field
>>> +  * may have value 1.  Otherwise bit 13 is reserved.
>>> +  */
>>> + if (CC(!(has_nested_exception && intr_type == INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION) &&
>>> +        intr_info & INTR_INFO_NESTED_EXCEPTION_MASK))
>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>> +
>>> switch (intr_type) {
>>> + case INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR:
>>> + break;
>> 
>> This can be dropped, as the "default" case will handle it.
>
>We don’t have a default case, as all 8 cases are listed (INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK is 0x700).
>
>> 
>>> + case INTR_TYPE_RESERVED:
>>> + return -EINVAL;
>> 
>> I think we need to add a CC() statement to make it easier to correlate a
>> VM-entry failure with a specific consistency check.
>
>What do you want me to put in CC()?
>
>CC(intr_type == INTR_TYPE_RESERVED)?

how about this incremental change?

I prefer to make has_error_code and has_nested_exception consistent, and add a
CC() statement before all "return -EINVAL" statements for debugging.

t a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
index 8682709d8759..f13df70405d9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
@@ -3049,7 +3049,7 @@ static int nested_check_vm_entry_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
		u8 vector = intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
		u32 intr_type = intr_info & INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK;
		bool has_error_code = intr_info & INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK;
-		bool has_nested_exception = vmx->nested.msrs.basic & VMX_BASIC_NESTED_EXCEPTION;
+		bool has_nested_exception = intr_info & INTR_INFO_NESTED_EXCEPTION_MASK;
		bool urg = nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12,
					   SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST);
		bool prot_mode = !urg || vmcs12->guest_cr0 & X86_CR0_PE;
@@ -3077,20 +3077,10 @@ static int nested_check_vm_entry_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
		if (CC(intr_info & INTR_INFO_RESVD_BITS_MASK))
			return -EINVAL;
 
-		/*
-		 * When the CPU enumerates VMX nested-exception support, bit 13
-		 * (set to indicate a nested exception) of the intr info field
-		 * may have value 1.  Otherwise bit 13 is reserved.
-		 */
-		if (CC(!(has_nested_exception && intr_type == INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION) &&
-		       intr_info & INTR_INFO_NESTED_EXCEPTION_MASK))
+		if (CC(intr_type == INTR_TYPE_RESERVED))
			return -EINVAL;
 
		switch (intr_type) {
-		case INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR:
-			break;
-		case INTR_TYPE_RESERVED:
-			return -EINVAL;
		case INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR:
			if (CC(vector != NMI_VECTOR))
				return -EINVAL;
@@ -3098,6 +3088,13 @@ static int nested_check_vm_entry_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
		case INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION:
			if (CC(vector > 31))
				return -EINVAL;
+			/*
+			 * When the CPU enumerates VMX nested-exception support, bit 13
+			 * (set to indicate a nested exception) of the intr info field
+			 * may have value 1.  Otherwise bit 13 is reserved.
+			 */
+			if (CC(has_nested_exception && !(vmx->nested.msrs.basic & VMX_BASIC_NESTED_EXCEPTION)))
+				return -EINVAL;
			break;
		case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION:
		case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR:
@@ -3108,6 +3105,9 @@ static int nested_check_vm_entry_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
				return -EINVAL;
			break;
		case INTR_TYPE_OTHER_EVENT:
+			if (CC(vector > 3))
+				return -EINVAL;
+
			switch (vector) {
			case 0:
				if (CC(!nested_cpu_supports_monitor_trap_flag(vcpu)))
@@ -3121,7 +3121,7 @@ static int nested_check_vm_entry_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
					return -EINVAL;
				break;
			default:
-				return -EINVAL;
+				break;
			}
			break;
		}
@@ -3454,14 +3454,15 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_guest_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
		}
		if (vmcs12->guest_cr4 & X86_CR4_FRED) {
			unsigned int ss_dpl = VMX_AR_DPL(vmcs12->guest_ss_ar_bytes);
+
+			if (CC(ss_dpl == 1 || ss_dpl == 2))
+				return -EINVAL;
+
			switch (ss_dpl) {
			case 0:
				if (CC(!(vmcs12->guest_cs_ar_bytes & VMX_AR_L_MASK)))
					return -EINVAL;
				break;
-			case 1:
-			case 2:
-				return -EINVAL;
			case 3:
				if (CC(vmcs12->guest_rflags & X86_EFLAGS_IOPL))
					return -EINVAL;

  reply	other threads:[~2026-01-21  2:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 106+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-10-26 20:18 [PATCH v9 00/22] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 01/22] KVM: VMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 02/22] KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config Xin Li (Intel)
2026-01-20  9:24   ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-22 17:57     ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 03/22] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Xin Li (Intel)
2026-03-05  0:25   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 04/22] x86/cea: Prefix event stack names with ESTACK_ Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 05/22] x86/cea: Use array indexing to simplify exception stack access Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-27 15:49   ` Dave Hansen
2025-10-28  2:31     ` Xin Li
2026-01-30 13:42   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 06/22] x86/cea: Export __this_cpu_ist_top_va() to KVM Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-27 15:50   ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-30 13:46   ` Borislav Petkov
2026-01-30 16:35     ` Xin Li
2026-01-30 17:56       ` Borislav Petkov
2026-03-07  7:38     ` Xin Li
2026-03-09 15:24       ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-09 22:57         ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 07/22] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19  2:44   ` Chao Gao
2026-01-21  6:44   ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-21 18:14     ` Xin Li
2026-01-22  0:45       ` Xin Li
2026-01-22  1:56         ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-22 17:22           ` Xin Li
2026-03-04 16:23     ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05  5:27       ` Xin Li
2026-03-05 15:21         ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 17:25           ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 08/22] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR intercepts Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12  5:49   ` Chao Gao
2026-03-05  0:48     ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05  5:56       ` Xin Li
2026-03-06  2:30       ` Chao Gao
2026-03-06 15:54         ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-16 19:49   ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-17  0:43     ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 09/22] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12  5:59   ` Chao Gao
2026-01-21  7:23   ` Binbin Wu
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 10/22] KVM: VMX: Add support for saving and restoring FRED MSRs Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12  6:16   ` Chao Gao
2025-12-01  6:20     ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 11/22] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12  6:19   ` Chao Gao
2026-01-21  8:05   ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-21 16:46     ` Xin Li
2026-01-21 20:24       ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-21 22:38         ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 12/22] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19  3:24   ` Chao Gao
2026-01-29 17:12     ` Xin Li
2026-01-29 17:21       ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-01-29 22:50         ` Xin Li
2026-03-04 16:42           ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 13/22] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19  6:54   ` Chao Gao
2026-03-07  2:07   ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-07  3:05     ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 14/22] KVM: x86: Save/restore the nested flag of an exception Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19  6:13   ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 15/22] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19  7:26   ` Chao Gao
2026-03-05  0:58     ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05  7:20       ` Xin Li
2026-03-05 15:35         ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 17:09           ` Xin Li
2026-03-05 17:46             ` Xin Li
2026-03-06  5:33       ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 16/22] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19  7:40   ` Chao Gao
2025-11-30 18:42     ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 17/22] KVM: x86: Advertise support for FRED Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12  7:30   ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20  6:56     ` Xin Li
2026-01-20  8:07       ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20  9:09         ` Xin Li
2026-01-20  9:46           ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-20 15:25             ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-20 18:04               ` Xin Li
2026-01-20 17:58             ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 18/22] KVM: nVMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 13:42   ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 19/22] KVM: nVMX: Handle FRED VMCS fields in nested VMX context Xin Li (Intel)
2025-12-02  6:32   ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20  6:30     ` Xin Li
2026-01-20 16:07       ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-20 18:10         ` Xin Li
2026-01-21  0:44       ` Chao Gao
2026-01-22 16:52         ` Xin Li
2025-12-08 22:37   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 20/22] KVM: nVMX: Validate FRED-related VMCS fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-13  3:00   ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20  9:19     ` Xin Li
2026-01-21  2:33       ` Chao Gao [this message]
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 21/22] KVM: nVMX: Guard SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros with VMX feature checks Xin Li (Intel)
2025-12-02  6:35   ` Chao Gao
2025-12-08 22:49   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 22/22] KVM: nVMX: Enable VMX FRED controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-13  3:20   ` Chao Gao
2025-11-06 17:35 ` [PATCH v9 00/22] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li
2025-11-13 22:20   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-08 22:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-09 17:08   ` Xin Li

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=aXA7B9bbMNGBocTC@intel.com \
    --to=chao.gao@intel.com \
    --cc=andrew.cooper3@citrix.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=corbet@lwn.net \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=hch@infradead.org \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=seanjc@google.com \
    --cc=sohil.mehta@intel.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    --cc=xin@zytor.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox