* [PATCH 0/2] move TPM-specific fields into trusted_tpm_options
@ 2026-01-23 16:55 Srish Srinivasan
2026-01-23 16:55 ` [PATCH 1/2] keys/trusted_keys: fix handle passed to tpm_buf_append_name during unseal Srish Srinivasan
2026-01-23 16:55 ` [PATCH 2/2] keys/trusted_keys: move TPM-specific fields into trusted_tpm_options Srish Srinivasan
0 siblings, 2 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Srish Srinivasan @ 2026-01-23 16:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity, keyrings, linuxppc-dev
Cc: maddy, mpe, npiggin, christophe.leroy, James.Bottomley, jarkko,
zohar, nayna, stefanb, rnsastry, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, ssrish
A recently posted patch series titled 'Extend "trusted" keys to support
a new trust source named the PowerVM Key Wrapping Module (PKWM)'
introduced a change in the handling of backend-specific fields in the
backend agnostic trusted_key_options structure. However, there are a
number of TPM-specific fields that are residing in trusted_key_options
and they have not been migrated yet.
This patch series intends to move all TPM-spcific fields out of
trusted_key_options into a newly defined trusted_tpm_options structure.
A pointer to the trusted_tpm_options struct is stored in
trusted_key_option's private.
Along with the migration of TPM-specific fields, this patch series includes
a preparatory bug-fix patch: passing the blob_handle to tpm_buf_append_name
during TPM2_Unseal instead of the keyhandle.
This patch series has been validated against both TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0
trusted-key backends using a vTPM environment, on x86_64 and ppc64le.
Testing included key creation, loading, resealing (TPM 2.0), key revocation
, unlinking, invalidation, and reloading trusted keys from encrypted blobs.
I would welcome any additional testing from upstream to further strengthen
the validation.
This patch series is intended to be applied on top of the PKWM trusted-keys
series posted earlier [1], which introduces a pointer named private in the
trusted_key_options structure to handle backend-specific fields.
Srish Srinivasan (2):
keys/trusted_keys: fix handle passed to tpm_buf_append_name during
unseal
keys/trusted_keys: move TPM-specific fields into trusted_tpm_options
[1]
lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/20260115100504.488665-1-ssrish@linux.ibm.com/T
include/keys/trusted-type.h | 11 ---
include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 14 +++
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 103 ++++++++++++++--------
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 66 +++++++++-----
4 files changed, 123 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-)
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 1/2] keys/trusted_keys: fix handle passed to tpm_buf_append_name during unseal
2026-01-23 16:55 [PATCH 0/2] move TPM-specific fields into trusted_tpm_options Srish Srinivasan
@ 2026-01-23 16:55 ` Srish Srinivasan
2026-01-25 16:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-01-23 16:55 ` [PATCH 2/2] keys/trusted_keys: move TPM-specific fields into trusted_tpm_options Srish Srinivasan
1 sibling, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Srish Srinivasan @ 2026-01-23 16:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity, keyrings, linuxppc-dev
Cc: maddy, mpe, npiggin, christophe.leroy, James.Bottomley, jarkko,
zohar, nayna, stefanb, rnsastry, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, ssrish
TPM2_Unseal[1] expects the handle of a loaded data object, and not the
handle of the parent key. But the tpm2_unseal_cmd provides the parent
keyhandle instead of blob_handle for the session HMAC calculation. This
causes unseal to fail.
Fix this by passing blob_handle to tpm_buf_append_name().
Fixes: 6e9722e9a7bf ("tpm2-sessions: Fix out of range indexing in name_size")
References:
[1] trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
Trusted-Platform-Module-2.0-Library-Part-3-Version-184_pub.pdf
Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
---
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index a7ea4a1c3bed..6340823f8b53 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
}
/**
- * tpm2_unseal_cmd() - execute a TPM2_Unload command
+ * tpm2_unseal_cmd() - execute a TPM2_Unseal command
*
* @chip: TPM chip to use
* @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
return rc;
}
- rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
+ rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, blob_handle, NULL);
if (rc)
goto out;
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 2/2] keys/trusted_keys: move TPM-specific fields into trusted_tpm_options
2026-01-23 16:55 [PATCH 0/2] move TPM-specific fields into trusted_tpm_options Srish Srinivasan
2026-01-23 16:55 ` [PATCH 1/2] keys/trusted_keys: fix handle passed to tpm_buf_append_name during unseal Srish Srinivasan
@ 2026-01-23 16:55 ` Srish Srinivasan
2026-01-25 17:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
1 sibling, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Srish Srinivasan @ 2026-01-23 16:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity, keyrings, linuxppc-dev
Cc: maddy, mpe, npiggin, christophe.leroy, James.Bottomley, jarkko,
zohar, nayna, stefanb, rnsastry, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, ssrish
The trusted_key_options struct contains TPM-specific fields (keyhandle,
keyauth, blobauth_len, blobauth, pcrinfo_len, pcrinfo, pcrlock, hash,
policydigest_len, policydigest, and policyhandle). This leads to the
accumulation of backend-specific fields in the generic options structure.
Define trusted_tpm_options structure and move the TPM-specific fields
there. Store a pointer to trusted_tpm_options in trusted_key_options's
private.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
---
include/keys/trusted-type.h | 11 ---
include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 14 +++
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 103 ++++++++++++++--------
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 62 ++++++++-----
4 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
index 03527162613f..b80f250305b8 100644
--- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h
+++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
@@ -39,17 +39,6 @@ struct trusted_key_payload {
struct trusted_key_options {
uint16_t keytype;
- uint32_t keyhandle;
- unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
- uint32_t blobauth_len;
- unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
- uint32_t pcrinfo_len;
- unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
- int pcrlock;
- uint32_t hash;
- uint32_t policydigest_len;
- unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
- uint32_t policyhandle;
void *private;
};
diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
index 0fadc6a4f166..355ebd36cbfd 100644
--- a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
+++ b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
@@ -7,6 +7,20 @@
extern struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops;
+struct trusted_tpm_options {
+ uint32_t keyhandle;
+ unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ uint32_t blobauth_len;
+ unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ uint32_t pcrinfo_len;
+ unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
+ int pcrlock;
+ uint32_t hash;
+ uint32_t policydigest_len;
+ unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ uint32_t policyhandle;
+};
+
int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
struct trusted_key_options *options);
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
index 636acb66a4f6..0ab0234ebe37 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
@@ -50,12 +50,14 @@ enum {
#if TPM_DEBUG
static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
{
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts = o->private;
+
pr_info("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype);
- pr_info("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle);
- pr_info("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock);
- pr_info("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len);
+ pr_info("sealing key handle %0X\n", tpm_opts->keyhandle);
+ pr_info("pcrlock %d\n", tpm_opts->pcrlock);
+ pr_info("pcrinfo %d\n", tpm_opts->pcrinfo_len);
print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
- 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
+ 16, 1, tpm_opts->pcrinfo, tpm_opts->pcrinfo_len, 0);
}
static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
@@ -624,6 +626,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
struct trusted_key_options *o)
{
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
struct tpm_buf tb;
int ret;
@@ -634,9 +637,12 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
/* include migratable flag at end of sealed key */
p->key[p->key_len] = p->migratable;
- ret = tpm_seal(&tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth,
+ tpm_opts = o->private;
+
+ ret = tpm_seal(&tb, o->keytype, tpm_opts->keyhandle, tpm_opts->keyauth,
p->key, p->key_len + 1, p->blob, &p->blob_len,
- o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len);
+ tpm_opts->blobauth, tpm_opts->pcrinfo,
+ tpm_opts->pcrinfo_len);
if (ret < 0)
pr_info("srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
@@ -650,6 +656,7 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
struct trusted_key_options *o)
{
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
struct tpm_buf tb;
int ret;
@@ -657,8 +664,10 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
if (ret)
return ret;
- ret = tpm_unseal(&tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len,
- o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len);
+ tpm_opts = o->private;
+
+ ret = tpm_unseal(&tb, tpm_opts->keyhandle, tpm_opts->keyauth, p->blob,
+ p->blob_len, tpm_opts->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len);
if (ret < 0)
pr_info("srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
else
@@ -695,6 +704,7 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
struct trusted_key_options *opt)
{
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
char *p = c;
int token;
@@ -710,7 +720,9 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
if (tpm2 < 0)
return tpm2;
- opt->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+ tpm_opts = opt->private;
+
+ tpm_opts->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
if (!c)
return 0;
@@ -724,11 +736,11 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
switch (token) {
case Opt_pcrinfo:
- opt->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2;
- if (opt->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE)
+ tpm_opts->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2;
+ if (tpm_opts->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
- res = hex2bin(opt->pcrinfo, args[0].from,
- opt->pcrinfo_len);
+ res = hex2bin(tpm_opts->pcrinfo, args[0].from,
+ tpm_opts->pcrinfo_len);
if (res < 0)
return -EINVAL;
break;
@@ -737,12 +749,12 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
if (res < 0)
return -EINVAL;
opt->keytype = SEAL_keytype;
- opt->keyhandle = handle;
+ tpm_opts->keyhandle = handle;
break;
case Opt_keyauth:
if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
- res = hex2bin(opt->keyauth, args[0].from,
+ res = hex2bin(tpm_opts->keyauth, args[0].from,
SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
if (res < 0)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -753,21 +765,23 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
* hex strings. TPM 2.0 authorizations are simple
* passwords (although it can take a hash as well)
*/
- opt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from);
+ tpm_opts->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from);
- if (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {
- res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,
+ if (tpm_opts->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {
+ res = hex2bin(tpm_opts->blobauth, args[0].from,
TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
if (res < 0)
return -EINVAL;
- opt->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE;
+ tpm_opts->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE;
break;
}
- if (tpm2 && opt->blobauth_len <= sizeof(opt->blobauth)) {
- memcpy(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,
- opt->blobauth_len);
+ if (tpm2 &&
+ tpm_opts->blobauth_len <=
+ sizeof(tpm_opts->blobauth)) {
+ memcpy(tpm_opts->blobauth, args[0].from,
+ tpm_opts->blobauth_len);
break;
}
@@ -785,14 +799,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock);
if (res < 0)
return -EINVAL;
- opt->pcrlock = lock;
+ tpm_opts->pcrlock = lock;
break;
case Opt_hash:
if (test_bit(Opt_policydigest, &token_mask))
return -EINVAL;
for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) {
if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) {
- opt->hash = i;
+ tpm_opts->hash = i;
break;
}
}
@@ -804,14 +818,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
}
break;
case Opt_policydigest:
- digest_len = hash_digest_size[opt->hash];
+ digest_len = hash_digest_size[tpm_opts->hash];
if (!tpm2 || strlen(args[0].from) != (2 * digest_len))
return -EINVAL;
- res = hex2bin(opt->policydigest, args[0].from,
+ res = hex2bin(tpm_opts->policydigest, args[0].from,
digest_len);
if (res < 0)
return -EINVAL;
- opt->policydigest_len = digest_len;
+ tpm_opts->policydigest_len = digest_len;
break;
case Opt_policyhandle:
if (!tpm2)
@@ -819,7 +833,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle);
if (res < 0)
return -EINVAL;
- opt->policyhandle = handle;
+ tpm_opts->policyhandle = handle;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
@@ -830,6 +844,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
{
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
struct trusted_key_options *options;
int tpm2;
@@ -842,14 +857,23 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
/* set any non-zero defaults */
options->keytype = SRK_keytype;
- if (!tpm2)
- options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
+ tpm_opts = kzalloc(sizeof(*tpm_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tpm_opts) {
+ kfree_sensitive(options);
+ options = NULL;
+ } else {
+ if (!tpm2)
+ tpm_opts->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
+
+ options->private = tpm_opts;
+ }
}
return options;
}
static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
{
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts = NULL;
struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
int ret = 0;
int tpm2;
@@ -867,7 +891,9 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
goto out;
dump_options(options);
- if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
+ tpm_opts = options->private;
+
+ if (!tpm_opts->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
@@ -881,20 +907,22 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
goto out;
}
- if (options->pcrlock) {
- ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
+ if (tpm_opts->pcrlock) {
+ ret = pcrlock(tpm_opts->pcrlock);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
goto out;
}
}
out:
+ kfree_sensitive(options->private);
kfree_sensitive(options);
return ret;
}
static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
{
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts = NULL;
struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
int ret = 0;
int tpm2;
@@ -912,7 +940,9 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
goto out;
dump_options(options);
- if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
+ tpm_opts = options->private;
+
+ if (!tpm_opts->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
@@ -924,14 +954,15 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
if (ret < 0)
pr_info("key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
- if (options->pcrlock) {
- ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
+ if (tpm_opts->pcrlock) {
+ ret = pcrlock(tpm_opts->pcrlock);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
goto out;
}
}
out:
+ kfree_sensitive(options->private);
kfree_sensitive(options);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index 6340823f8b53..568c4af9010c 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
struct trusted_key_options *options,
u8 *src, u32 len)
{
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
const int SCRATCH_SIZE = PAGE_SIZE;
u8 *scratch = kmalloc(SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
u8 *work = scratch, *work1;
@@ -46,7 +47,9 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
work = asn1_encode_oid(work, end_work, tpm2key_oid,
asn1_oid_len(tpm2key_oid));
- if (options->blobauth_len == 0) {
+ tpm_opts = options->private;
+
+ if (tpm_opts->blobauth_len == 0) {
unsigned char bool[3], *w = bool;
/* tag 0 is emptyAuth */
w = asn1_encode_boolean(w, w + sizeof(bool), true);
@@ -69,7 +72,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
goto err;
}
- work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle);
+ work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, tpm_opts->keyhandle);
work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len);
work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, priv, priv_len);
@@ -102,6 +105,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
struct trusted_key_options *options,
u8 **buf)
{
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
int ret;
struct tpm2_key_context ctx;
u8 *blob;
@@ -120,8 +124,10 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
if (!blob)
return -ENOMEM;
+ tpm_opts = options->private;
+
*buf = blob;
- options->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
+ tpm_opts->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len);
blob += ctx.priv_len;
@@ -233,6 +239,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
struct trusted_key_options *options)
{
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
struct tpm_buf buf, sized;
int blob_len = 0;
@@ -240,11 +247,13 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
u32 flags;
int rc;
- hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(options->hash);
+ tpm_opts = options->private;
+
+ hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(tpm_opts->hash);
if (hash < 0)
return hash;
- if (!options->keyhandle)
+ if (!tpm_opts->keyhandle)
return -EINVAL;
rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
@@ -268,18 +277,19 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
goto out_put;
}
- rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
+ rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, tpm_opts->keyhandle, NULL);
if (rc)
goto out;
tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT,
- options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ tpm_opts->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
/* sensitive */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, options->blobauth_len);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, tpm_opts->blobauth_len);
- if (options->blobauth_len)
- tpm_buf_append(&sized, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
+ if (tpm_opts->blobauth_len)
+ tpm_buf_append(&sized, tpm_opts->blobauth,
+ tpm_opts->blobauth_len);
tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, payload->key_len);
tpm_buf_append(&sized, payload->key, payload->key_len);
@@ -292,14 +302,15 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
/* key properties */
flags = 0;
- flags |= options->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH;
+ flags |= tpm_opts->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH;
flags |= payload->migratable ? 0 : (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT);
tpm_buf_append_u32(&sized, flags);
/* policy */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, options->policydigest_len);
- if (options->policydigest_len)
- tpm_buf_append(&sized, options->policydigest, options->policydigest_len);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, tpm_opts->policydigest_len);
+ if (tpm_opts->policydigest_len)
+ tpm_buf_append(&sized, tpm_opts->policydigest,
+ tpm_opts->policydigest_len);
/* public parameters */
tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, TPM_ALG_NULL);
@@ -373,6 +384,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
u32 *blob_handle)
{
u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) = NULL;
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
struct tpm_buf buf;
unsigned int private_len;
unsigned int public_len;
@@ -391,8 +403,10 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
blob_ref = blob;
}
+ tpm_opts = options->private;
+
/* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */
- if (!options->keyhandle)
+ if (!tpm_opts->keyhandle)
return -EINVAL;
/* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */
@@ -433,11 +447,11 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
return rc;
}
- rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
+ rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, tpm_opts->keyhandle, NULL);
if (rc)
goto out;
- tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, options->keyauth,
+ tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, tpm_opts->keyauth,
TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
tpm_buf_append(&buf, blob, blob_len);
@@ -481,6 +495,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct trusted_key_options *options,
u32 blob_handle)
{
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
struct tpm_header *head;
struct tpm_buf buf;
u16 data_len;
@@ -502,10 +517,12 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
if (rc)
goto out;
- if (!options->policyhandle) {
+ tpm_opts = options->private;
+
+ if (!tpm_opts->policyhandle) {
tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT,
- options->blobauth,
- options->blobauth_len);
+ tpm_opts->blobauth,
+ tpm_opts->blobauth_len);
} else {
/*
* FIXME: The policy session was generated outside the
@@ -518,9 +535,10 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
* could repeat our actions with the exfiltrated
* password.
*/
- tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, options->policyhandle,
+ tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, tpm_opts->policyhandle,
NULL /* nonce */, 0, 0,
- options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
+ tpm_opts->blobauth,
+ tpm_opts->blobauth_len);
if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0);
} else {
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 1/2] keys/trusted_keys: fix handle passed to tpm_buf_append_name during unseal
2026-01-23 16:55 ` [PATCH 1/2] keys/trusted_keys: fix handle passed to tpm_buf_append_name during unseal Srish Srinivasan
@ 2026-01-25 16:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2026-01-25 16:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Srish Srinivasan
Cc: linux-integrity, keyrings, linuxppc-dev, maddy, mpe, npiggin,
christophe.leroy, James.Bottomley, zohar, nayna, stefanb,
rnsastry, linux-kernel, linux-security-module
On Fri, Jan 23, 2026 at 10:25:03PM +0530, Srish Srinivasan wrote:
> TPM2_Unseal[1] expects the handle of a loaded data object, and not the
> handle of the parent key. But the tpm2_unseal_cmd provides the parent
> keyhandle instead of blob_handle for the session HMAC calculation. This
> causes unseal to fail.
>
> Fix this by passing blob_handle to tpm_buf_append_name().
>
> Fixes: 6e9722e9a7bf ("tpm2-sessions: Fix out of range indexing in name_size")
>
> References:
> [1] trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
> Trusted-Platform-Module-2.0-Library-Part-3-Version-184_pub.pdf
>
> Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 4 ++--
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> index a7ea4a1c3bed..6340823f8b53 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> @@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> }
>
> /**
> - * tpm2_unseal_cmd() - execute a TPM2_Unload command
> + * tpm2_unseal_cmd() - execute a TPM2_Unseal command
> *
> * @chip: TPM chip to use
> * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
> @@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> return rc;
> }
>
> - rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
> + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, blob_handle, NULL);
> if (rc)
> goto out;
>
> --
> 2.43.0
>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
And applied. I also need to check what is wrong with my QA because
it should have catched this.
BR, Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 2/2] keys/trusted_keys: move TPM-specific fields into trusted_tpm_options
2026-01-23 16:55 ` [PATCH 2/2] keys/trusted_keys: move TPM-specific fields into trusted_tpm_options Srish Srinivasan
@ 2026-01-25 17:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-02-17 6:52 ` Srish Srinivasan
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2026-01-25 17:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Srish Srinivasan
Cc: linux-integrity, keyrings, linuxppc-dev, maddy, mpe, npiggin,
christophe.leroy, James.Bottomley, zohar, nayna, stefanb,
rnsastry, linux-kernel, linux-security-module
On Fri, Jan 23, 2026 at 10:25:04PM +0530, Srish Srinivasan wrote:
> The trusted_key_options struct contains TPM-specific fields (keyhandle,
> keyauth, blobauth_len, blobauth, pcrinfo_len, pcrinfo, pcrlock, hash,
> policydigest_len, policydigest, and policyhandle). This leads to the
> accumulation of backend-specific fields in the generic options structure.
>
> Define trusted_tpm_options structure and move the TPM-specific fields
> there. Store a pointer to trusted_tpm_options in trusted_key_options's
> private.
>
> No functional change intended.
>
> Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
> include/keys/trusted-type.h | 11 ---
> include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 14 +++
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 103 ++++++++++++++--------
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 62 ++++++++-----
> 4 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
> index 03527162613f..b80f250305b8 100644
> --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h
> +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
> @@ -39,17 +39,6 @@ struct trusted_key_payload {
>
> struct trusted_key_options {
> uint16_t keytype;
> - uint32_t keyhandle;
> - unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
> - uint32_t blobauth_len;
> - unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
> - uint32_t pcrinfo_len;
> - unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
> - int pcrlock;
> - uint32_t hash;
> - uint32_t policydigest_len;
> - unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
> - uint32_t policyhandle;
> void *private;
> };
>
> diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
> index 0fadc6a4f166..355ebd36cbfd 100644
> --- a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
> +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
> @@ -7,6 +7,20 @@
>
> extern struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops;
>
> +struct trusted_tpm_options {
> + uint32_t keyhandle;
> + unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
> + uint32_t blobauth_len;
> + unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
> + uint32_t pcrinfo_len;
> + unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
> + int pcrlock;
> + uint32_t hash;
> + uint32_t policydigest_len;
> + unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
> + uint32_t policyhandle;
> +};
> +
> int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> struct trusted_key_options *options);
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> index 636acb66a4f6..0ab0234ebe37 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> @@ -50,12 +50,14 @@ enum {
> #if TPM_DEBUG
> static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
> {
> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts = o->private;
TPM context is obvious i.e., actually private would be a better name.
> +
> pr_info("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype);
> - pr_info("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle);
> - pr_info("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock);
> - pr_info("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len);
> + pr_info("sealing key handle %0X\n", tpm_opts->keyhandle);
> + pr_info("pcrlock %d\n", tpm_opts->pcrlock);
> + pr_info("pcrinfo %d\n", tpm_opts->pcrinfo_len);
> print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
> - 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
> + 16, 1, tpm_opts->pcrinfo, tpm_opts->pcrinfo_len, 0);
> }
Should be replaced with pr_debug() and KERN_DEBUG as precursory patch
(and remove TPM_DEBUG).
>
> static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
> @@ -624,6 +626,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
> static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
> struct trusted_key_options *o)
> {
> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
> struct tpm_buf tb;
> int ret;
>
> @@ -634,9 +637,12 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
> /* include migratable flag at end of sealed key */
> p->key[p->key_len] = p->migratable;
>
> - ret = tpm_seal(&tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth,
> + tpm_opts = o->private;
Not sure why this is not done in the declaration.
> +
> + ret = tpm_seal(&tb, o->keytype, tpm_opts->keyhandle, tpm_opts->keyauth,
> p->key, p->key_len + 1, p->blob, &p->blob_len,
> - o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len);
> + tpm_opts->blobauth, tpm_opts->pcrinfo,
> + tpm_opts->pcrinfo_len);
> if (ret < 0)
> pr_info("srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
>
> @@ -650,6 +656,7 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
> static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
> struct trusted_key_options *o)
> {
> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
> struct tpm_buf tb;
> int ret;
>
> @@ -657,8 +664,10 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
> if (ret)
> return ret;
>
> - ret = tpm_unseal(&tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len,
> - o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len);
> + tpm_opts = o->private;
> +
> + ret = tpm_unseal(&tb, tpm_opts->keyhandle, tpm_opts->keyauth, p->blob,
> + p->blob_len, tpm_opts->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len);
> if (ret < 0)
> pr_info("srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
> else
> @@ -695,6 +704,7 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
> static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
> struct trusted_key_options *opt)
> {
> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
> substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
> char *p = c;
> int token;
> @@ -710,7 +720,9 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
> if (tpm2 < 0)
> return tpm2;
>
> - opt->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
> + tpm_opts = opt->private;
> +
I'd remove this empty line.
> + tpm_opts->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
>
> if (!c)
> return 0;
> @@ -724,11 +736,11 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>
> switch (token) {
> case Opt_pcrinfo:
> - opt->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2;
> - if (opt->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE)
> + tpm_opts->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2;
> + if (tpm_opts->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE)
> return -EINVAL;
> - res = hex2bin(opt->pcrinfo, args[0].from,
> - opt->pcrinfo_len);
> + res = hex2bin(tpm_opts->pcrinfo, args[0].from,
> + tpm_opts->pcrinfo_len);
> if (res < 0)
> return -EINVAL;
> break;
> @@ -737,12 +749,12 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
> if (res < 0)
> return -EINVAL;
> opt->keytype = SEAL_keytype;
> - opt->keyhandle = handle;
> + tpm_opts->keyhandle = handle;
> break;
> case Opt_keyauth:
> if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
> return -EINVAL;
> - res = hex2bin(opt->keyauth, args[0].from,
> + res = hex2bin(tpm_opts->keyauth, args[0].from,
> SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
> if (res < 0)
> return -EINVAL;
> @@ -753,21 +765,23 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
> * hex strings. TPM 2.0 authorizations are simple
> * passwords (although it can take a hash as well)
> */
> - opt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from);
> + tpm_opts->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from);
>
> - if (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {
> - res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,
> + if (tpm_opts->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {
> + res = hex2bin(tpm_opts->blobauth, args[0].from,
> TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
> if (res < 0)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> - opt->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE;
> + tpm_opts->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE;
> break;
> }
>
> - if (tpm2 && opt->blobauth_len <= sizeof(opt->blobauth)) {
> - memcpy(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,
> - opt->blobauth_len);
> + if (tpm2 &&
> + tpm_opts->blobauth_len <=
> + sizeof(tpm_opts->blobauth)) {
> + memcpy(tpm_opts->blobauth, args[0].from,
> + tpm_opts->blobauth_len);
> break;
> }
>
> @@ -785,14 +799,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
> res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock);
> if (res < 0)
> return -EINVAL;
> - opt->pcrlock = lock;
> + tpm_opts->pcrlock = lock;
> break;
> case Opt_hash:
> if (test_bit(Opt_policydigest, &token_mask))
> return -EINVAL;
> for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) {
> if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) {
> - opt->hash = i;
> + tpm_opts->hash = i;
> break;
> }
> }
> @@ -804,14 +818,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
> }
> break;
> case Opt_policydigest:
> - digest_len = hash_digest_size[opt->hash];
> + digest_len = hash_digest_size[tpm_opts->hash];
> if (!tpm2 || strlen(args[0].from) != (2 * digest_len))
> return -EINVAL;
> - res = hex2bin(opt->policydigest, args[0].from,
> + res = hex2bin(tpm_opts->policydigest, args[0].from,
> digest_len);
> if (res < 0)
> return -EINVAL;
> - opt->policydigest_len = digest_len;
> + tpm_opts->policydigest_len = digest_len;
> break;
> case Opt_policyhandle:
> if (!tpm2)
> @@ -819,7 +833,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
> res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle);
> if (res < 0)
> return -EINVAL;
> - opt->policyhandle = handle;
> + tpm_opts->policyhandle = handle;
> break;
> default:
> return -EINVAL;
> @@ -830,6 +844,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>
> static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
> {
> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
> struct trusted_key_options *options;
> int tpm2;
>
> @@ -842,14 +857,23 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
> /* set any non-zero defaults */
> options->keytype = SRK_keytype;
>
> - if (!tpm2)
> - options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
> + tpm_opts = kzalloc(sizeof(*tpm_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!tpm_opts) {
> + kfree_sensitive(options);
> + options = NULL;
> + } else {
> + if (!tpm2)
> + tpm_opts->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
> +
> + options->private = tpm_opts;
> + }
> }
> return options;
> }
>
> static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
> {
> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts = NULL;
> struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
> int ret = 0;
> int tpm2;
> @@ -867,7 +891,9 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
> goto out;
> dump_options(options);
>
> - if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
> + tpm_opts = options->private;
> +
> + if (!tpm_opts->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
> ret = -EINVAL;
> goto out;
> }
> @@ -881,20 +907,22 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
> goto out;
> }
>
> - if (options->pcrlock) {
> - ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
> + if (tpm_opts->pcrlock) {
> + ret = pcrlock(tpm_opts->pcrlock);
> if (ret < 0) {
> pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
> goto out;
> }
> }
> out:
> + kfree_sensitive(options->private);
> kfree_sensitive(options);
> return ret;
> }
>
> static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
> {
> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts = NULL;
> struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
> int ret = 0;
> int tpm2;
> @@ -912,7 +940,9 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
> goto out;
> dump_options(options);
>
> - if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
> + tpm_opts = options->private;
> +
> + if (!tpm_opts->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
> ret = -EINVAL;
> goto out;
> }
> @@ -924,14 +954,15 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
> if (ret < 0)
> pr_info("key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
>
> - if (options->pcrlock) {
> - ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
> + if (tpm_opts->pcrlock) {
> + ret = pcrlock(tpm_opts->pcrlock);
> if (ret < 0) {
> pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
> goto out;
> }
> }
> out:
> + kfree_sensitive(options->private);
> kfree_sensitive(options);
> return ret;
> }
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> index 6340823f8b53..568c4af9010c 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> struct trusted_key_options *options,
> u8 *src, u32 len)
> {
> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
> const int SCRATCH_SIZE = PAGE_SIZE;
> u8 *scratch = kmalloc(SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
> u8 *work = scratch, *work1;
> @@ -46,7 +47,9 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> work = asn1_encode_oid(work, end_work, tpm2key_oid,
> asn1_oid_len(tpm2key_oid));
>
> - if (options->blobauth_len == 0) {
> + tpm_opts = options->private;
> +
> + if (tpm_opts->blobauth_len == 0) {
> unsigned char bool[3], *w = bool;
> /* tag 0 is emptyAuth */
> w = asn1_encode_boolean(w, w + sizeof(bool), true);
> @@ -69,7 +72,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> goto err;
> }
>
> - work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle);
> + work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, tpm_opts->keyhandle);
> work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len);
> work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, priv, priv_len);
>
> @@ -102,6 +105,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> struct trusted_key_options *options,
> u8 **buf)
> {
> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
> int ret;
> struct tpm2_key_context ctx;
> u8 *blob;
> @@ -120,8 +124,10 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> if (!blob)
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> + tpm_opts = options->private;
> +
> *buf = blob;
> - options->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
> + tpm_opts->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
>
> memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len);
> blob += ctx.priv_len;
> @@ -233,6 +239,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> struct trusted_key_options *options)
> {
> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
> off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
> struct tpm_buf buf, sized;
> int blob_len = 0;
> @@ -240,11 +247,13 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> u32 flags;
> int rc;
>
> - hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(options->hash);
> + tpm_opts = options->private;
> +
> + hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(tpm_opts->hash);
> if (hash < 0)
> return hash;
>
> - if (!options->keyhandle)
> + if (!tpm_opts->keyhandle)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
> @@ -268,18 +277,19 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> goto out_put;
> }
>
> - rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
> + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, tpm_opts->keyhandle, NULL);
> if (rc)
> goto out;
>
> tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT,
> - options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
> + tpm_opts->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
>
> /* sensitive */
> - tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, options->blobauth_len);
> + tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, tpm_opts->blobauth_len);
>
> - if (options->blobauth_len)
> - tpm_buf_append(&sized, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
> + if (tpm_opts->blobauth_len)
> + tpm_buf_append(&sized, tpm_opts->blobauth,
> + tpm_opts->blobauth_len);
>
> tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, payload->key_len);
> tpm_buf_append(&sized, payload->key, payload->key_len);
> @@ -292,14 +302,15 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>
> /* key properties */
> flags = 0;
> - flags |= options->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH;
> + flags |= tpm_opts->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH;
> flags |= payload->migratable ? 0 : (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT);
> tpm_buf_append_u32(&sized, flags);
>
> /* policy */
> - tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, options->policydigest_len);
> - if (options->policydigest_len)
> - tpm_buf_append(&sized, options->policydigest, options->policydigest_len);
> + tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, tpm_opts->policydigest_len);
> + if (tpm_opts->policydigest_len)
> + tpm_buf_append(&sized, tpm_opts->policydigest,
> + tpm_opts->policydigest_len);
>
> /* public parameters */
> tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, TPM_ALG_NULL);
> @@ -373,6 +384,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> u32 *blob_handle)
> {
> u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) = NULL;
> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
> struct tpm_buf buf;
> unsigned int private_len;
> unsigned int public_len;
> @@ -391,8 +403,10 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> blob_ref = blob;
> }
>
> + tpm_opts = options->private;
> +
> /* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */
> - if (!options->keyhandle)
> + if (!tpm_opts->keyhandle)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> /* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */
> @@ -433,11 +447,11 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> return rc;
> }
>
> - rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
> + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, tpm_opts->keyhandle, NULL);
> if (rc)
> goto out;
>
> - tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, options->keyauth,
> + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, tpm_opts->keyauth,
> TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
>
> tpm_buf_append(&buf, blob, blob_len);
> @@ -481,6 +495,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> struct trusted_key_options *options,
> u32 blob_handle)
> {
> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
> struct tpm_header *head;
> struct tpm_buf buf;
> u16 data_len;
> @@ -502,10 +517,12 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> if (rc)
> goto out;
>
> - if (!options->policyhandle) {
> + tpm_opts = options->private;
> +
> + if (!tpm_opts->policyhandle) {
> tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT,
> - options->blobauth,
> - options->blobauth_len);
> + tpm_opts->blobauth,
> + tpm_opts->blobauth_len);
> } else {
> /*
> * FIXME: The policy session was generated outside the
> @@ -518,9 +535,10 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> * could repeat our actions with the exfiltrated
> * password.
> */
> - tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, options->policyhandle,
> + tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, tpm_opts->policyhandle,
> NULL /* nonce */, 0, 0,
> - options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
> + tpm_opts->blobauth,
> + tpm_opts->blobauth_len);
> if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
> tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0);
> } else {
> --
> 2.43.0
>
BR, Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 2/2] keys/trusted_keys: move TPM-specific fields into trusted_tpm_options
2026-01-25 17:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2026-02-17 6:52 ` Srish Srinivasan
0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Srish Srinivasan @ 2026-02-17 6:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jarkko Sakkinen
Cc: linux-integrity, keyrings, James.Bottomley, zohar, nayna, stefanb,
linux-kernel, linux-security-module, Srish Srinivasan
Hi Jarkko,
thanks for taking a look.
And, apologies for the delayed response.
On 1/25/26 10:30 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 23, 2026 at 10:25:04PM +0530, Srish Srinivasan wrote:
>> The trusted_key_options struct contains TPM-specific fields (keyhandle,
>> keyauth, blobauth_len, blobauth, pcrinfo_len, pcrinfo, pcrlock, hash,
>> policydigest_len, policydigest, and policyhandle). This leads to the
>> accumulation of backend-specific fields in the generic options structure.
>>
>> Define trusted_tpm_options structure and move the TPM-specific fields
>> there. Store a pointer to trusted_tpm_options in trusted_key_options's
>> private.
>>
>> No functional change intended.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
>> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
>> ---
>> include/keys/trusted-type.h | 11 ---
>> include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 14 +++
>> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 103 ++++++++++++++--------
>> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 62 ++++++++-----
>> 4 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
>> index 03527162613f..b80f250305b8 100644
>> --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h
>> +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
>> @@ -39,17 +39,6 @@ struct trusted_key_payload {
>>
>> struct trusted_key_options {
>> uint16_t keytype;
>> - uint32_t keyhandle;
>> - unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
>> - uint32_t blobauth_len;
>> - unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
>> - uint32_t pcrinfo_len;
>> - unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
>> - int pcrlock;
>> - uint32_t hash;
>> - uint32_t policydigest_len;
>> - unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
>> - uint32_t policyhandle;
>> void *private;
>> };
>>
>> diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
>> index 0fadc6a4f166..355ebd36cbfd 100644
>> --- a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
>> +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
>> @@ -7,6 +7,20 @@
>>
>> extern struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops;
>>
>> +struct trusted_tpm_options {
>> + uint32_t keyhandle;
>> + unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
>> + uint32_t blobauth_len;
>> + unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
>> + uint32_t pcrinfo_len;
>> + unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
>> + int pcrlock;
>> + uint32_t hash;
>> + uint32_t policydigest_len;
>> + unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
>> + uint32_t policyhandle;
>> +};
>> +
>> int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>> struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>> struct trusted_key_options *options);
>> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
>> index 636acb66a4f6..0ab0234ebe37 100644
>> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
>> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
>> @@ -50,12 +50,14 @@ enum {
>> #if TPM_DEBUG
>> static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
>> {
>> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts = o->private;
>
> TPM context is obvious i.e., actually private would be a better name.
Noted. Will make the change.
>
>> +
>> pr_info("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype);
>> - pr_info("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle);
>> - pr_info("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock);
>> - pr_info("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len);
>> + pr_info("sealing key handle %0X\n", tpm_opts->keyhandle);
>> + pr_info("pcrlock %d\n", tpm_opts->pcrlock);
>> + pr_info("pcrinfo %d\n", tpm_opts->pcrinfo_len);
>> print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
>> - 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
>> + 16, 1, tpm_opts->pcrinfo, tpm_opts->pcrinfo_len, 0);
>> }
> Should be replaced with pr_debug() and KERN_DEBUG as precursory patch
> (and remove TPM_DEBUG).
Will fix this, and make it a preparatory clean-up patch.
>
>>
>> static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
>> @@ -624,6 +626,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
>> static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
>> struct trusted_key_options *o)
>> {
>> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
>> struct tpm_buf tb;
>> int ret;
>>
>> @@ -634,9 +637,12 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
>> /* include migratable flag at end of sealed key */
>> p->key[p->key_len] = p->migratable;
>>
>> - ret = tpm_seal(&tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth,
>> + tpm_opts = o->private;
> Not sure why this is not done in the declaration.
Will fix this.
>
>> +
>> + ret = tpm_seal(&tb, o->keytype, tpm_opts->keyhandle, tpm_opts->keyauth,
>> p->key, p->key_len + 1, p->blob, &p->blob_len,
>> - o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len);
>> + tpm_opts->blobauth, tpm_opts->pcrinfo,
>> + tpm_opts->pcrinfo_len);
>> if (ret < 0)
>> pr_info("srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
>>
>> @@ -650,6 +656,7 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
>> static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
>> struct trusted_key_options *o)
>> {
>> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
>> struct tpm_buf tb;
>> int ret;
>>
>> @@ -657,8 +664,10 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
>> if (ret)
>> return ret;
>>
>> - ret = tpm_unseal(&tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len,
>> - o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len);
>> + tpm_opts = o->private;
>> +
>> + ret = tpm_unseal(&tb, tpm_opts->keyhandle, tpm_opts->keyauth, p->blob,
>> + p->blob_len, tpm_opts->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len);
>> if (ret < 0)
>> pr_info("srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
>> else
>> @@ -695,6 +704,7 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
>> static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>> struct trusted_key_options *opt)
>> {
>> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
>> substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
>> char *p = c;
>> int token;
>> @@ -710,7 +720,9 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>> if (tpm2 < 0)
>> return tpm2;
>>
>> - opt->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
>> + tpm_opts = opt->private;
>> +
> I'd remove this empty line.
Will fix this.
>
>> + tpm_opts->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
>>
>> if (!c)
>> return 0;
>> @@ -724,11 +736,11 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>>
>> switch (token) {
>> case Opt_pcrinfo:
>> - opt->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2;
>> - if (opt->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE)
>> + tpm_opts->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2;
>> + if (tpm_opts->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE)
>> return -EINVAL;
>> - res = hex2bin(opt->pcrinfo, args[0].from,
>> - opt->pcrinfo_len);
>> + res = hex2bin(tpm_opts->pcrinfo, args[0].from,
>> + tpm_opts->pcrinfo_len);
>> if (res < 0)
>> return -EINVAL;
>> break;
>> @@ -737,12 +749,12 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>> if (res < 0)
>> return -EINVAL;
>> opt->keytype = SEAL_keytype;
>> - opt->keyhandle = handle;
>> + tpm_opts->keyhandle = handle;
>> break;
>> case Opt_keyauth:
>> if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
>> return -EINVAL;
>> - res = hex2bin(opt->keyauth, args[0].from,
>> + res = hex2bin(tpm_opts->keyauth, args[0].from,
>> SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
>> if (res < 0)
>> return -EINVAL;
>> @@ -753,21 +765,23 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>> * hex strings. TPM 2.0 authorizations are simple
>> * passwords (although it can take a hash as well)
>> */
>> - opt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from);
>> + tpm_opts->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from);
>>
>> - if (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {
>> - res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,
>> + if (tpm_opts->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {
>> + res = hex2bin(tpm_opts->blobauth, args[0].from,
>> TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
>> if (res < 0)
>> return -EINVAL;
>>
>> - opt->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE;
>> + tpm_opts->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE;
>> break;
>> }
>>
>> - if (tpm2 && opt->blobauth_len <= sizeof(opt->blobauth)) {
>> - memcpy(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,
>> - opt->blobauth_len);
>> + if (tpm2 &&
>> + tpm_opts->blobauth_len <=
>> + sizeof(tpm_opts->blobauth)) {
>> + memcpy(tpm_opts->blobauth, args[0].from,
>> + tpm_opts->blobauth_len);
>> break;
>> }
>>
>> @@ -785,14 +799,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>> res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock);
>> if (res < 0)
>> return -EINVAL;
>> - opt->pcrlock = lock;
>> + tpm_opts->pcrlock = lock;
>> break;
>> case Opt_hash:
>> if (test_bit(Opt_policydigest, &token_mask))
>> return -EINVAL;
>> for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) {
>> if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) {
>> - opt->hash = i;
>> + tpm_opts->hash = i;
>> break;
>> }
>> }
>> @@ -804,14 +818,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>> }
>> break;
>> case Opt_policydigest:
>> - digest_len = hash_digest_size[opt->hash];
>> + digest_len = hash_digest_size[tpm_opts->hash];
>> if (!tpm2 || strlen(args[0].from) != (2 * digest_len))
>> return -EINVAL;
>> - res = hex2bin(opt->policydigest, args[0].from,
>> + res = hex2bin(tpm_opts->policydigest, args[0].from,
>> digest_len);
>> if (res < 0)
>> return -EINVAL;
>> - opt->policydigest_len = digest_len;
>> + tpm_opts->policydigest_len = digest_len;
>> break;
>> case Opt_policyhandle:
>> if (!tpm2)
>> @@ -819,7 +833,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>> res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle);
>> if (res < 0)
>> return -EINVAL;
>> - opt->policyhandle = handle;
>> + tpm_opts->policyhandle = handle;
>> break;
>> default:
>> return -EINVAL;
>> @@ -830,6 +844,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>>
>> static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
>> {
>> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
>> struct trusted_key_options *options;
>> int tpm2;
>>
>> @@ -842,14 +857,23 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
>> /* set any non-zero defaults */
>> options->keytype = SRK_keytype;
>>
>> - if (!tpm2)
>> - options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
>> + tpm_opts = kzalloc(sizeof(*tpm_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
>> + if (!tpm_opts) {
>> + kfree_sensitive(options);
>> + options = NULL;
>> + } else {
>> + if (!tpm2)
>> + tpm_opts->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
>> +
>> + options->private = tpm_opts;
>> + }
>> }
>> return options;
>> }
>>
>> static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
>> {
>> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts = NULL;
>> struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
>> int ret = 0;
>> int tpm2;
>> @@ -867,7 +891,9 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
>> goto out;
>> dump_options(options);
>>
>> - if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
>> + tpm_opts = options->private;
>> +
>> + if (!tpm_opts->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
>> ret = -EINVAL;
>> goto out;
>> }
>> @@ -881,20 +907,22 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
>> goto out;
>> }
>>
>> - if (options->pcrlock) {
>> - ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
>> + if (tpm_opts->pcrlock) {
>> + ret = pcrlock(tpm_opts->pcrlock);
>> if (ret < 0) {
>> pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
>> goto out;
>> }
>> }
>> out:
>> + kfree_sensitive(options->private);
>> kfree_sensitive(options);
>> return ret;
>> }
>>
>> static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
>> {
>> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts = NULL;
>> struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
>> int ret = 0;
>> int tpm2;
>> @@ -912,7 +940,9 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
>> goto out;
>> dump_options(options);
>>
>> - if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
>> + tpm_opts = options->private;
>> +
>> + if (!tpm_opts->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
>> ret = -EINVAL;
>> goto out;
>> }
>> @@ -924,14 +954,15 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
>> if (ret < 0)
>> pr_info("key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
>>
>> - if (options->pcrlock) {
>> - ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
>> + if (tpm_opts->pcrlock) {
>> + ret = pcrlock(tpm_opts->pcrlock);
>> if (ret < 0) {
>> pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
>> goto out;
>> }
>> }
>> out:
>> + kfree_sensitive(options->private);
>> kfree_sensitive(options);
>> return ret;
>> }
>> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
>> index 6340823f8b53..568c4af9010c 100644
>> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
>> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
>> @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>> struct trusted_key_options *options,
>> u8 *src, u32 len)
>> {
>> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
>> const int SCRATCH_SIZE = PAGE_SIZE;
>> u8 *scratch = kmalloc(SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
>> u8 *work = scratch, *work1;
>> @@ -46,7 +47,9 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>> work = asn1_encode_oid(work, end_work, tpm2key_oid,
>> asn1_oid_len(tpm2key_oid));
>>
>> - if (options->blobauth_len == 0) {
>> + tpm_opts = options->private;
>> +
>> + if (tpm_opts->blobauth_len == 0) {
>> unsigned char bool[3], *w = bool;
>> /* tag 0 is emptyAuth */
>> w = asn1_encode_boolean(w, w + sizeof(bool), true);
>> @@ -69,7 +72,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>> goto err;
>> }
>>
>> - work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle);
>> + work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, tpm_opts->keyhandle);
>> work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len);
>> work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, priv, priv_len);
>>
>> @@ -102,6 +105,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>> struct trusted_key_options *options,
>> u8 **buf)
>> {
>> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
>> int ret;
>> struct tpm2_key_context ctx;
>> u8 *blob;
>> @@ -120,8 +124,10 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>> if (!blob)
>> return -ENOMEM;
>>
>> + tpm_opts = options->private;
>> +
>> *buf = blob;
>> - options->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
>> + tpm_opts->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
>>
>> memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len);
>> blob += ctx.priv_len;
>> @@ -233,6 +239,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>> struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>> struct trusted_key_options *options)
>> {
>> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
>> off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
>> struct tpm_buf buf, sized;
>> int blob_len = 0;
>> @@ -240,11 +247,13 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>> u32 flags;
>> int rc;
>>
>> - hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(options->hash);
>> + tpm_opts = options->private;
>> +
>> + hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(tpm_opts->hash);
>> if (hash < 0)
>> return hash;
>>
>> - if (!options->keyhandle)
>> + if (!tpm_opts->keyhandle)
>> return -EINVAL;
>>
>> rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
>> @@ -268,18 +277,19 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>> goto out_put;
>> }
>>
>> - rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
>> + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, tpm_opts->keyhandle, NULL);
>> if (rc)
>> goto out;
>>
>> tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT,
>> - options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
>> + tpm_opts->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
>>
>> /* sensitive */
>> - tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, options->blobauth_len);
>> + tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, tpm_opts->blobauth_len);
>>
>> - if (options->blobauth_len)
>> - tpm_buf_append(&sized, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
>> + if (tpm_opts->blobauth_len)
>> + tpm_buf_append(&sized, tpm_opts->blobauth,
>> + tpm_opts->blobauth_len);
>>
>> tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, payload->key_len);
>> tpm_buf_append(&sized, payload->key, payload->key_len);
>> @@ -292,14 +302,15 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>>
>> /* key properties */
>> flags = 0;
>> - flags |= options->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH;
>> + flags |= tpm_opts->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH;
>> flags |= payload->migratable ? 0 : (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT);
>> tpm_buf_append_u32(&sized, flags);
>>
>> /* policy */
>> - tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, options->policydigest_len);
>> - if (options->policydigest_len)
>> - tpm_buf_append(&sized, options->policydigest, options->policydigest_len);
>> + tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, tpm_opts->policydigest_len);
>> + if (tpm_opts->policydigest_len)
>> + tpm_buf_append(&sized, tpm_opts->policydigest,
>> + tpm_opts->policydigest_len);
>>
>> /* public parameters */
>> tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, TPM_ALG_NULL);
>> @@ -373,6 +384,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>> u32 *blob_handle)
>> {
>> u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) = NULL;
>> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
>> struct tpm_buf buf;
>> unsigned int private_len;
>> unsigned int public_len;
>> @@ -391,8 +403,10 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>> blob_ref = blob;
>> }
>>
>> + tpm_opts = options->private;
>> +
>> /* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */
>> - if (!options->keyhandle)
>> + if (!tpm_opts->keyhandle)
>> return -EINVAL;
>>
>> /* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */
>> @@ -433,11 +447,11 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>> return rc;
>> }
>>
>> - rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
>> + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, tpm_opts->keyhandle, NULL);
>> if (rc)
>> goto out;
>>
>> - tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, options->keyauth,
>> + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, tpm_opts->keyauth,
>> TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
>>
>> tpm_buf_append(&buf, blob, blob_len);
>> @@ -481,6 +495,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>> struct trusted_key_options *options,
>> u32 blob_handle)
>> {
>> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
>> struct tpm_header *head;
>> struct tpm_buf buf;
>> u16 data_len;
>> @@ -502,10 +517,12 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>> if (rc)
>> goto out;
>>
>> - if (!options->policyhandle) {
>> + tpm_opts = options->private;
>> +
>> + if (!tpm_opts->policyhandle) {
>> tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT,
>> - options->blobauth,
>> - options->blobauth_len);
>> + tpm_opts->blobauth,
>> + tpm_opts->blobauth_len);
>> } else {
>> /*
>> * FIXME: The policy session was generated outside the
>> @@ -518,9 +535,10 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>> * could repeat our actions with the exfiltrated
>> * password.
>> */
>> - tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, options->policyhandle,
>> + tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, tpm_opts->policyhandle,
>> NULL /* nonce */, 0, 0,
>> - options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
>> + tpm_opts->blobauth,
>> + tpm_opts->blobauth_len);
>> if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
>> tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0);
>> } else {
>> --
>> 2.43.0
>>
> BR, Jarkko
I will shortly send out v2 with the changes.
Thanks,
Srish.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2026-02-17 6:52 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2026-01-23 16:55 [PATCH 0/2] move TPM-specific fields into trusted_tpm_options Srish Srinivasan
2026-01-23 16:55 ` [PATCH 1/2] keys/trusted_keys: fix handle passed to tpm_buf_append_name during unseal Srish Srinivasan
2026-01-25 16:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-01-23 16:55 ` [PATCH 2/2] keys/trusted_keys: move TPM-specific fields into trusted_tpm_options Srish Srinivasan
2026-01-25 17:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-02-17 6:52 ` Srish Srinivasan
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