From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E3FF4233704; Sun, 25 Jan 2026 17:00:33 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1769360434; cv=none; b=c3Z+9VwKNYdh1QxUterymvRO8BzaLz3xAAhUdvqt6ha/ikO9d7VFB38HglurJDwNiO3XhxysKE4jpGrnC6oONL3UjHUAbnR9XlLR0xG5RRwp8WspGodHZhwSq5OtVYHQ22IXUjby2RSJp6/32SsA8V5osNNBx4K+Do+kGIn9FrY= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1769360434; c=relaxed/simple; bh=HNaH/YLTfsSk+bB4xuFuu795ZNZqlYMV3XQe25nIlLE=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=GDZzlaVdH1f5deW9mTmfsCkbFOV8lHPhECdO8S1wV3xhq9snTki2YQEc68HeV1oCHdhj1d8Ou7Nn+A8WEMIjVVxUAPEjtv+WV/YN6PmB/Kk3mDYexuxKNy7KUq2x84xj20zFI0yEdcjuAp1hLppXeTZ6SiVV+whCTUIxdYEqK9Q= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=q7lDyOqS; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="q7lDyOqS" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id BD3ABC4CEF1; Sun, 25 Jan 2026 17:00:32 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1769360433; bh=HNaH/YLTfsSk+bB4xuFuu795ZNZqlYMV3XQe25nIlLE=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=q7lDyOqSlcb1RUrMQa1YnIlq6Ad5e1/ZAi3yqIvS3pa/ozEdawUTw+DmfhVpJoG5J SdfCj6ruISFjFhOZLmFHc/5xp9wWBL43li563CVLYsimFyOaU+Ntg8FvEGr88btjEn bNFfvBQCLZkf6g+JnpjUXJXUkDU1tl2Htj9PcXmPyFqD6aWkfmR92ZaEGIU0/2jLm7 EG5MWWecpkaOrE1YmBhTi4ovH9kxu3tYDF+UnZPVtt+4ou1Ph7VofXQ2wWuRZXvBXC 31YTmLhkjCeWrfvIEYhCI5ffMXR0/uVbAC9jOWgIY4RXRmpUo2gyKHp40sxDXZlcCz 7qCdDhhYqhkoQ== Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2026 19:00:29 +0200 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Srish Srinivasan Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, maddy@linux.ibm.com, mpe@ellerman.id.au, npiggin@gmail.com, christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com, stefanb@linux.ibm.com, rnsastry@linux.ibm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] keys/trusted_keys: move TPM-specific fields into trusted_tpm_options Message-ID: References: <20260123165504.461607-1-ssrish@linux.ibm.com> <20260123165504.461607-3-ssrish@linux.ibm.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20260123165504.461607-3-ssrish@linux.ibm.com> On Fri, Jan 23, 2026 at 10:25:04PM +0530, Srish Srinivasan wrote: > The trusted_key_options struct contains TPM-specific fields (keyhandle, > keyauth, blobauth_len, blobauth, pcrinfo_len, pcrinfo, pcrlock, hash, > policydigest_len, policydigest, and policyhandle). This leads to the > accumulation of backend-specific fields in the generic options structure. > > Define trusted_tpm_options structure and move the TPM-specific fields > there. Store a pointer to trusted_tpm_options in trusted_key_options's > private. > > No functional change intended. > > Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan > Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger > --- > include/keys/trusted-type.h | 11 --- > include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 14 +++ > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 103 ++++++++++++++-------- > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 62 ++++++++----- > 4 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h > index 03527162613f..b80f250305b8 100644 > --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h > +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h > @@ -39,17 +39,6 @@ struct trusted_key_payload { > > struct trusted_key_options { > uint16_t keytype; > - uint32_t keyhandle; > - unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; > - uint32_t blobauth_len; > - unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; > - uint32_t pcrinfo_len; > - unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE]; > - int pcrlock; > - uint32_t hash; > - uint32_t policydigest_len; > - unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; > - uint32_t policyhandle; > void *private; > }; > > diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h > index 0fadc6a4f166..355ebd36cbfd 100644 > --- a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h > +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h > @@ -7,6 +7,20 @@ > > extern struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops; > > +struct trusted_tpm_options { > + uint32_t keyhandle; > + unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; > + uint32_t blobauth_len; > + unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; > + uint32_t pcrinfo_len; > + unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE]; > + int pcrlock; > + uint32_t hash; > + uint32_t policydigest_len; > + unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; > + uint32_t policyhandle; > +}; > + > int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, > struct trusted_key_payload *payload, > struct trusted_key_options *options); > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c > index 636acb66a4f6..0ab0234ebe37 100644 > --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c > @@ -50,12 +50,14 @@ enum { > #if TPM_DEBUG > static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o) > { > + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts = o->private; TPM context is obvious i.e., actually private would be a better name. > + > pr_info("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype); > - pr_info("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle); > - pr_info("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock); > - pr_info("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len); > + pr_info("sealing key handle %0X\n", tpm_opts->keyhandle); > + pr_info("pcrlock %d\n", tpm_opts->pcrlock); > + pr_info("pcrinfo %d\n", tpm_opts->pcrinfo_len); > print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, > - 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0); > + 16, 1, tpm_opts->pcrinfo, tpm_opts->pcrinfo_len, 0); > } Should be replaced with pr_debug() and KERN_DEBUG as precursory patch (and remove TPM_DEBUG). > > static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s) > @@ -624,6 +626,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, > static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, > struct trusted_key_options *o) > { > + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts; > struct tpm_buf tb; > int ret; > > @@ -634,9 +637,12 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, > /* include migratable flag at end of sealed key */ > p->key[p->key_len] = p->migratable; > > - ret = tpm_seal(&tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, > + tpm_opts = o->private; Not sure why this is not done in the declaration. > + > + ret = tpm_seal(&tb, o->keytype, tpm_opts->keyhandle, tpm_opts->keyauth, > p->key, p->key_len + 1, p->blob, &p->blob_len, > - o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len); > + tpm_opts->blobauth, tpm_opts->pcrinfo, > + tpm_opts->pcrinfo_len); > if (ret < 0) > pr_info("srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret); > > @@ -650,6 +656,7 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, > static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, > struct trusted_key_options *o) > { > + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts; > struct tpm_buf tb; > int ret; > > @@ -657,8 +664,10 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, > if (ret) > return ret; > > - ret = tpm_unseal(&tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len, > - o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len); > + tpm_opts = o->private; > + > + ret = tpm_unseal(&tb, tpm_opts->keyhandle, tpm_opts->keyauth, p->blob, > + p->blob_len, tpm_opts->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len); > if (ret < 0) > pr_info("srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret); > else > @@ -695,6 +704,7 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = { > static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, > struct trusted_key_options *opt) > { > + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts; > substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; > char *p = c; > int token; > @@ -710,7 +720,9 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, > if (tpm2 < 0) > return tpm2; > > - opt->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1; > + tpm_opts = opt->private; > + I'd remove this empty line. > + tpm_opts->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1; > > if (!c) > return 0; > @@ -724,11 +736,11 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, > > switch (token) { > case Opt_pcrinfo: > - opt->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2; > - if (opt->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE) > + tpm_opts->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2; > + if (tpm_opts->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE) > return -EINVAL; > - res = hex2bin(opt->pcrinfo, args[0].from, > - opt->pcrinfo_len); > + res = hex2bin(tpm_opts->pcrinfo, args[0].from, > + tpm_opts->pcrinfo_len); > if (res < 0) > return -EINVAL; > break; > @@ -737,12 +749,12 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, > if (res < 0) > return -EINVAL; > opt->keytype = SEAL_keytype; > - opt->keyhandle = handle; > + tpm_opts->keyhandle = handle; > break; > case Opt_keyauth: > if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) > return -EINVAL; > - res = hex2bin(opt->keyauth, args[0].from, > + res = hex2bin(tpm_opts->keyauth, args[0].from, > SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); > if (res < 0) > return -EINVAL; > @@ -753,21 +765,23 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, > * hex strings. TPM 2.0 authorizations are simple > * passwords (although it can take a hash as well) > */ > - opt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from); > + tpm_opts->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from); > > - if (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) { > - res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, > + if (tpm_opts->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) { > + res = hex2bin(tpm_opts->blobauth, args[0].from, > TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); > if (res < 0) > return -EINVAL; > > - opt->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE; > + tpm_opts->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE; > break; > } > > - if (tpm2 && opt->blobauth_len <= sizeof(opt->blobauth)) { > - memcpy(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, > - opt->blobauth_len); > + if (tpm2 && > + tpm_opts->blobauth_len <= > + sizeof(tpm_opts->blobauth)) { > + memcpy(tpm_opts->blobauth, args[0].from, > + tpm_opts->blobauth_len); > break; > } > > @@ -785,14 +799,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, > res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock); > if (res < 0) > return -EINVAL; > - opt->pcrlock = lock; > + tpm_opts->pcrlock = lock; > break; > case Opt_hash: > if (test_bit(Opt_policydigest, &token_mask)) > return -EINVAL; > for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) { > if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) { > - opt->hash = i; > + tpm_opts->hash = i; > break; > } > } > @@ -804,14 +818,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, > } > break; > case Opt_policydigest: > - digest_len = hash_digest_size[opt->hash]; > + digest_len = hash_digest_size[tpm_opts->hash]; > if (!tpm2 || strlen(args[0].from) != (2 * digest_len)) > return -EINVAL; > - res = hex2bin(opt->policydigest, args[0].from, > + res = hex2bin(tpm_opts->policydigest, args[0].from, > digest_len); > if (res < 0) > return -EINVAL; > - opt->policydigest_len = digest_len; > + tpm_opts->policydigest_len = digest_len; > break; > case Opt_policyhandle: > if (!tpm2) > @@ -819,7 +833,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, > res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle); > if (res < 0) > return -EINVAL; > - opt->policyhandle = handle; > + tpm_opts->policyhandle = handle; > break; > default: > return -EINVAL; > @@ -830,6 +844,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, > > static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void) > { > + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts; > struct trusted_key_options *options; > int tpm2; > > @@ -842,14 +857,23 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void) > /* set any non-zero defaults */ > options->keytype = SRK_keytype; > > - if (!tpm2) > - options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE; > + tpm_opts = kzalloc(sizeof(*tpm_opts), GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!tpm_opts) { > + kfree_sensitive(options); > + options = NULL; > + } else { > + if (!tpm2) > + tpm_opts->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE; > + > + options->private = tpm_opts; > + } > } > return options; > } > > static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) > { > + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts = NULL; > struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL; > int ret = 0; > int tpm2; > @@ -867,7 +891,9 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) > goto out; > dump_options(options); > > - if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) { > + tpm_opts = options->private; > + > + if (!tpm_opts->keyhandle && !tpm2) { > ret = -EINVAL; > goto out; > } > @@ -881,20 +907,22 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) > goto out; > } > > - if (options->pcrlock) { > - ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock); > + if (tpm_opts->pcrlock) { > + ret = pcrlock(tpm_opts->pcrlock); > if (ret < 0) { > pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret); > goto out; > } > } > out: > + kfree_sensitive(options->private); > kfree_sensitive(options); > return ret; > } > > static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) > { > + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts = NULL; > struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL; > int ret = 0; > int tpm2; > @@ -912,7 +940,9 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) > goto out; > dump_options(options); > > - if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) { > + tpm_opts = options->private; > + > + if (!tpm_opts->keyhandle && !tpm2) { > ret = -EINVAL; > goto out; > } > @@ -924,14 +954,15 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) > if (ret < 0) > pr_info("key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret); > > - if (options->pcrlock) { > - ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock); > + if (tpm_opts->pcrlock) { > + ret = pcrlock(tpm_opts->pcrlock); > if (ret < 0) { > pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret); > goto out; > } > } > out: > + kfree_sensitive(options->private); > kfree_sensitive(options); > return ret; > } > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c > index 6340823f8b53..568c4af9010c 100644 > --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c > @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, > struct trusted_key_options *options, > u8 *src, u32 len) > { > + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts; > const int SCRATCH_SIZE = PAGE_SIZE; > u8 *scratch = kmalloc(SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); > u8 *work = scratch, *work1; > @@ -46,7 +47,9 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, > work = asn1_encode_oid(work, end_work, tpm2key_oid, > asn1_oid_len(tpm2key_oid)); > > - if (options->blobauth_len == 0) { > + tpm_opts = options->private; > + > + if (tpm_opts->blobauth_len == 0) { > unsigned char bool[3], *w = bool; > /* tag 0 is emptyAuth */ > w = asn1_encode_boolean(w, w + sizeof(bool), true); > @@ -69,7 +72,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, > goto err; > } > > - work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle); > + work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, tpm_opts->keyhandle); > work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len); > work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, priv, priv_len); > > @@ -102,6 +105,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, > struct trusted_key_options *options, > u8 **buf) > { > + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts; > int ret; > struct tpm2_key_context ctx; > u8 *blob; > @@ -120,8 +124,10 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, > if (!blob) > return -ENOMEM; > > + tpm_opts = options->private; > + > *buf = blob; > - options->keyhandle = ctx.parent; > + tpm_opts->keyhandle = ctx.parent; > > memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len); > blob += ctx.priv_len; > @@ -233,6 +239,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, > struct trusted_key_payload *payload, > struct trusted_key_options *options) > { > + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts; > off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; > struct tpm_buf buf, sized; > int blob_len = 0; > @@ -240,11 +247,13 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, > u32 flags; > int rc; > > - hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(options->hash); > + tpm_opts = options->private; > + > + hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(tpm_opts->hash); > if (hash < 0) > return hash; > > - if (!options->keyhandle) > + if (!tpm_opts->keyhandle) > return -EINVAL; > > rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip); > @@ -268,18 +277,19 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, > goto out_put; > } > > - rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); > + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, tpm_opts->keyhandle, NULL); > if (rc) > goto out; > > tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT, > - options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); > + tpm_opts->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); > > /* sensitive */ > - tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, options->blobauth_len); > + tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, tpm_opts->blobauth_len); > > - if (options->blobauth_len) > - tpm_buf_append(&sized, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len); > + if (tpm_opts->blobauth_len) > + tpm_buf_append(&sized, tpm_opts->blobauth, > + tpm_opts->blobauth_len); > > tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, payload->key_len); > tpm_buf_append(&sized, payload->key, payload->key_len); > @@ -292,14 +302,15 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, > > /* key properties */ > flags = 0; > - flags |= options->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH; > + flags |= tpm_opts->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH; > flags |= payload->migratable ? 0 : (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT); > tpm_buf_append_u32(&sized, flags); > > /* policy */ > - tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, options->policydigest_len); > - if (options->policydigest_len) > - tpm_buf_append(&sized, options->policydigest, options->policydigest_len); > + tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, tpm_opts->policydigest_len); > + if (tpm_opts->policydigest_len) > + tpm_buf_append(&sized, tpm_opts->policydigest, > + tpm_opts->policydigest_len); > > /* public parameters */ > tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, TPM_ALG_NULL); > @@ -373,6 +384,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, > u32 *blob_handle) > { > u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) = NULL; > + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts; > struct tpm_buf buf; > unsigned int private_len; > unsigned int public_len; > @@ -391,8 +403,10 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, > blob_ref = blob; > } > > + tpm_opts = options->private; > + > /* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */ > - if (!options->keyhandle) > + if (!tpm_opts->keyhandle) > return -EINVAL; > > /* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */ > @@ -433,11 +447,11 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, > return rc; > } > > - rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); > + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, tpm_opts->keyhandle, NULL); > if (rc) > goto out; > > - tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, options->keyauth, > + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, tpm_opts->keyauth, > TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); > > tpm_buf_append(&buf, blob, blob_len); > @@ -481,6 +495,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, > struct trusted_key_options *options, > u32 blob_handle) > { > + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts; > struct tpm_header *head; > struct tpm_buf buf; > u16 data_len; > @@ -502,10 +517,12 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, > if (rc) > goto out; > > - if (!options->policyhandle) { > + tpm_opts = options->private; > + > + if (!tpm_opts->policyhandle) { > tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, > - options->blobauth, > - options->blobauth_len); > + tpm_opts->blobauth, > + tpm_opts->blobauth_len); > } else { > /* > * FIXME: The policy session was generated outside the > @@ -518,9 +535,10 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, > * could repeat our actions with the exfiltrated > * password. > */ > - tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, options->policyhandle, > + tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, tpm_opts->policyhandle, > NULL /* nonce */, 0, 0, > - options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len); > + tpm_opts->blobauth, > + tpm_opts->blobauth_len); > if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) { > tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0); > } else { > -- > 2.43.0 > BR, Jarkko