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From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ipc: don't audit capability check in ipc_permissions()
Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2026 20:01:27 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aXgcd81ktMaAHhwj@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhQYLJVweDgBkRo=0_kS1TAUQH_YfT+woSfBW0SjUO4nqg@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, Jan 26, 2026 at 05:50:12PM -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 22, 2026 at 9:56 AM Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> > The IPC sysctls implement the ctl_table_root::permissions hook and
> > they override the file access mode based on the CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
> > capability, which is being checked regardless of whether any access is
> > actually denied or not, so if an LSM denies the capability, an audit
> > record may be logged even when access is in fact granted.
> >
> > It wouldn't be viable to restructure the sysctl permission logic to only
> > check the capability when the access would be actually denied if it's
> > not granted. Thus, do the same as in net_ctl_permissions()
> > (net/sysctl_net.c) - switch from ns_capable() to ns_capable_noaudit(),
> > so that the check never emits an audit record.
> >
> > Fixes: 0889f44e2810 ("ipc: Check permissions for checkpoint_restart sysctls at open time")
> > Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
> > ---
> >  include/linux/capability.h | 6 ++++++
> >  ipc/ipc_sysctl.c           | 2 +-
> >  2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> This change seems reasonable to me, but I would make sure Serge has a
> chance to review/ACK this patch as it has a capability impact.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>

Thanks - looks good to me.

  reply	other threads:[~2026-01-27  2:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-01-22 14:13 [PATCH] ipc: don't audit capability check in ipc_permissions() Ondrej Mosnacek
2026-01-22 14:37 ` Alexey Gladkov
2026-01-26 22:50 ` Paul Moore
2026-01-27  2:01   ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2026-01-27 22:06     ` Paul Moore
2026-01-28  3:26       ` Serge E. Hallyn

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