From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Kevin Cheng <chengkev@google.com>
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, yosry.ahmed@linux.dev
Subject: Re: [PATCH V2 2/4] KVM: SVM: Fix nested NPF injection to set PFERR_GUEST_{PAGE,FINAL}_MASK
Date: Tue, 24 Feb 2026 08:42:50 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aZ3VCq4s7l9f4JTw@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260224071822.369326-3-chengkev@google.com>
On Tue, Feb 24, 2026, Kevin Cheng wrote:
> When KVM emulates an instruction for L2 and encounters a nested page
> fault (e.g., during string I/O emulation), nested_svm_inject_npf_exit()
> injects an NPF to L1. However, the code incorrectly hardcodes
> (1ULL << 32) for exit_info_1's upper bits when the original exit was
> not an NPF. This always sets PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK even when the fault
> occurred on a page table page, preventing L1 from correctly identifying
> the cause of the fault.
>
> Set PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK in the error code when a nested page fault
> occurs during a guest page table walk, and PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK when
> the fault occurs on the final GPA-to-HPA translation.
>
> Widen error_code in struct x86_exception from u16 to u64 to accommodate
> the PFERR_GUEST_* bits (bits 32 and 33).
Stale comment as this was moved to a separate patch.
> Update nested_svm_inject_npf_exit() to use fault->error_code directly
> instead of hardcoding the upper bits. Also add a WARN_ON_ONCE if neither
> PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK nor PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK is set, as this would
> indicate a bug in the page fault handling code.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kevin Cheng <chengkev@google.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 ++
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 22 ++++++++++------------
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c | 19 +++++++++++++------
> 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> index ff07c45e3c731..454f84660edfc 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> @@ -280,6 +280,8 @@ enum x86_intercept_stage;
> #define PFERR_GUEST_RMP_MASK BIT_ULL(31)
> #define PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK BIT_ULL(32)
> #define PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK BIT_ULL(33)
> +#define PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK \
> + (PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK | PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK)
> #define PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK BIT_ULL(34)
> #define PFERR_GUEST_SIZEM_MASK BIT_ULL(35)
> #define PFERR_GUEST_VMPL_MASK BIT_ULL(36)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
> index 37eba7dafd14f..f148c92b606ba 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
> @@ -385,18 +385,12 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,
> real_gpa = kvm_translate_gpa(vcpu, mmu, gfn_to_gpa(table_gfn),
> nested_access, &walker->fault);
>
> - /*
> - * FIXME: This can happen if emulation (for of an INS/OUTS
> - * instruction) triggers a nested page fault. The exit
> - * qualification / exit info field will incorrectly have
> - * "guest page access" as the nested page fault's cause,
> - * instead of "guest page structure access". To fix this,
> - * the x86_exception struct should be augmented with enough
> - * information to fix the exit_qualification or exit_info_1
> - * fields.
> - */
> - if (unlikely(real_gpa == INVALID_GPA))
> + if (unlikely(real_gpa == INVALID_GPA)) {
> +#if PTTYPE != PTTYPE_EPT
I would rather swap the order of patches two and three, so that we end up with
a "positive" if-statement. I.e. add EPT first so that we get (spoiler alert):
#if PTTYPE == PTTYPE_EPT
walker->fault.exit_qualification |= EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID;
#else
walker->fault.error_code |= PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK;
#endif
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
> index de90b104a0dd5..1013e814168b5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
> @@ -40,18 +40,25 @@ static void nested_svm_inject_npf_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb;
>
> if (vmcb->control.exit_code != SVM_EXIT_NPF) {
> - /*
> - * TODO: track the cause of the nested page fault, and
> - * correctly fill in the high bits of exit_info_1.
> - */
> - vmcb->control.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_NPF;
> - vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = (1ULL << 32);
> + vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = fault->error_code;
> vmcb->control.exit_info_2 = fault->address;
> }
>
> + vmcb->control.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_NPF;
> vmcb->control.exit_info_1 &= ~0xffffffffULL;
> vmcb->control.exit_info_1 |= fault->error_code;
>
> + /*
> + * All nested page faults should be annotated as occurring on the
> + * final translation *or* the page walk. Arbitrarily choose "final"
> + * if KVM is buggy and enumerated both or neither.
> + */
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(hweight64(vmcb->control.exit_info_1 &
> + PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK) != 1)) {
> + vmcb->control.exit_info_1 &= ~PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK;
> + vmcb->control.exit_info_1 |= PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK;
> + }
This is all kinds of messy. KVM _appears_ to still rely on the hardware-reported
address + error_code
if (vmcb->control.exit_code != SVM_EXIT_NPF) {
vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = fault->error_code;
vmcb->control.exit_info_2 = fault->address;
}
But then drops bits 31:0 in favor of the fault error code. Then even more
bizarrely, bitwise-ORs bits 63:32 and WARNs if multiple bits in
PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK are set. In practice, the bitwise-OR of 63:32 is
_only_ going to affect PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK, because the other defined
bits are all specific to SNP, and KVM doesn't support nested virtualization for
SEV+.
So I don't understand why this isn't simply:
vmcb->control.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_NPF;
vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = fault->error_code;
/*
* All nested page faults should be annotated as occurring on the
* final translation *or* the page walk. Arbitrarily choose "final"
* if KVM is buggy and enumerated both or neither.
*/
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(hweight64(vmcb->control.exit_info_1 &
PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK) != 1)) {
vmcb->control.exit_info_1 &= ~PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK;
vmcb->control.exit_info_1 |= PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK;
}
Which would more or less align with the proposed nEPT handling.
> +
> nested_svm_vmexit(svm);
> }
>
> --
> 2.53.0.414.gf7e9f6c205-goog
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-02-24 16:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-24 7:18 [PATCH V2 0/4] KVM: X86: Correctly populate nested page fault Kevin Cheng
2026-02-24 7:18 ` [PATCH V2 1/4] KVM: x86: Widen x86_exception's error_code to 64 bits Kevin Cheng
2026-02-24 7:18 ` [PATCH V2 2/4] KVM: SVM: Fix nested NPF injection to set PFERR_GUEST_{PAGE,FINAL}_MASK Kevin Cheng
2026-02-24 16:42 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2026-02-24 16:53 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 3:50 ` Kevin Cheng
2026-03-05 19:46 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-13 4:50 ` Kevin Cheng
2026-03-13 5:36 ` Kevin Cheng
2026-02-24 7:18 ` [PATCH V2 3/4] KVM: VMX: Don't consult original exit qualification for nested EPT violation injection Kevin Cheng
2026-02-24 17:31 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-02-24 19:00 ` Yosry Ahmed
2026-02-24 19:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-02-24 19:42 ` Yosry Ahmed
2026-02-24 20:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-02-24 7:18 ` [PATCH V2 4/4] KVM: selftests: Add nested page fault injection test Kevin Cheng
2026-02-24 17:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 3:54 ` Kevin Cheng
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