[PATCH V2 0/4] KVM: X86: Correctly populate nested page fault

[PATCH V2 0/4] KVM: X86: Correctly populate nested page fault

[Kevin Cheng]

This series fixes how KVM populates error information whne injecting
nested page faults (NPF on SVM, EPT violations on VMX) to L1 during
instruction emulation, and adds a selftest to exercise these paths.

When a nested page fault occurs, L1 needs to know whether the fault
happened during the page table walk (on a PT page) or on the final
data page translation. Two issues exist today:

  1. SVM: The page table walker does not set
  PFERR_GUEST_{PAGE,FINAL}_MASK bits in the error code, and
  nested_svm_inject_page_fault() hardcodes the PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK
  error code.

  2. VMX: nested_ept_inject_page_fault() OR's bit 7-8 from the original
  exit qualification, which has no relation to the synthesized EPT
  violation regardless of whether it was originally an EPT violation or
  not.

Patch 1 widens x86_exception.error_code from u16 to u64 so it can carry
the PFERR_GUEST_* bits (bits 32-33).

Patch 2 sets PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK and PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK in the
walker at the kvm_translate_gpa() failure sites, and updates
nested_svm_inject_npf_exit() to use the walker-provided error code.

Patch 3 removes the OR with the hardware exit qualification in
nested_ept_inject_page_fault(), and populates EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID
and EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED in the walker alongside the NPF bits.

Patch 4 adds a selftest covering both SVM and VMX with three scenarios:
  - Final data page unmapped (final translation fault)
  - Page table page unmapped (page walk fault)
  - Final data page write-protected (protection violation)
  - Page table page write-protected (protection violation)

v1 -> v2:
  - Split out the widening of the x86_exception error code into a
    separate patch as per Sean.
  - Added a WARN if both PFERR_GUEST_* bits are set and force the
    exit_info_1 to PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK if this occurs.
  - Removed the selftest TDP helpers as per Sean
  - Added a patch to populate the EPT violation bits for VMX nested page
    faults as per Sean.
  - Expanded the added selftest to support VMX and also added a test
    case for write protected pages using the INS instruction.

base-commit: 183bb0ce8c77b0fd1fb25874112bc8751a461e49

Kevin Cheng (4):
  KVM: x86: Widen x86_exception's error_code to 64 bits
  KVM: SVM: Fix nested NPF injection to set
    PFERR_GUEST_{PAGE,FINAL}_MASK
  KVM: VMX: Don't consult original exit qualification for nested EPT
    violation injection
  KVM: selftests: Add nested page fault injection test

 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h               |   2 +
 arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h                    |   2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h                |  44 ++-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c                     |  19 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c                     |   3 -
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm      |   1 +
 .../selftests/kvm/x86/nested_npf_test.c       | 374 ++++++++++++++++++
 7 files changed, 422 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/nested_npf_test.c

--
2.53.0.414.gf7e9f6c205-goog

[PATCH V2 1/4] KVM: x86: Widen x86_exception's error_code to 64 bits

[Kevin Cheng]

Widen the error_code field in struct x86_exception from u16 to u64 to
accommodate AMD's NPF error code, which defines information bits above
bit 31, e.g. PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK (bit 32), and PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK
(bit 33).

Retain the u16 type for the local errcode variable in walk_addr_generic
as the walker synthesizes conventional #PF error codes that are
architecturally limited to bits 15:0.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Cheng <chengkev@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h     | 2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 6 ++++++
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h
index fb3dab4b5a53e..ff4f9b0a01ff7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ enum x86_intercept_stage;
 struct x86_exception {
 	u8 vector;
 	bool error_code_valid;
-	u16 error_code;
+	u64 error_code;
 	bool nested_page_fault;
 	u64 address; /* cr2 or nested page fault gpa */
 	u8 async_page_fault;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
index 901cd2bd40b84..37eba7dafd14f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
@@ -317,6 +317,12 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,
 	const int write_fault = access & PFERR_WRITE_MASK;
 	const int user_fault  = access & PFERR_USER_MASK;
 	const int fetch_fault = access & PFERR_FETCH_MASK;
+	/*
+	 * Note! Track the error_code that's common to legacy shadow paging
+	 * and NPT shadow paging as a u16 to guard against unintentionally
+	 * setting any of bits 63:16.  Architecturally, the #PF error code is
+	 * 32 bits, and Intel CPUs don't support settings bits 31:16.
+	 */
 	u16 errcode = 0;
 	gpa_t real_gpa;
 	gfn_t gfn;
-- 
2.53.0.414.gf7e9f6c205-goog

[PATCH V2 2/4] KVM: SVM: Fix nested NPF injection to set PFERR_GUEST_{PAGE,FINAL}_MASK

[Kevin Cheng]

When KVM emulates an instruction for L2 and encounters a nested page
fault (e.g., during string I/O emulation), nested_svm_inject_npf_exit()
injects an NPF to L1. However, the code incorrectly hardcodes
(1ULL << 32) for exit_info_1's upper bits when the original exit was
not an NPF. This always sets PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK even when the fault
occurred on a page table page, preventing L1 from correctly identifying
the cause of the fault.

Set PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK in the error code when a nested page fault
occurs during a guest page table walk, and PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK when
the fault occurs on the final GPA-to-HPA translation.

Widen error_code in struct x86_exception from u16 to u64 to accommodate
the PFERR_GUEST_* bits (bits 32 and 33).

Update nested_svm_inject_npf_exit() to use fault->error_code directly
instead of hardcoding the upper bits. Also add a WARN_ON_ONCE if neither
PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK nor PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK is set, as this would
indicate a bug in the page fault handling code.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Cheng <chengkev@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h  | 22 ++++++++++------------
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c       | 19 +++++++++++++------
 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index ff07c45e3c731..454f84660edfc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -280,6 +280,8 @@ enum x86_intercept_stage;
 #define PFERR_GUEST_RMP_MASK	BIT_ULL(31)
 #define PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK	BIT_ULL(32)
 #define PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK	BIT_ULL(33)
+#define PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK \
+	(PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK | PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK)
 #define PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK	BIT_ULL(34)
 #define PFERR_GUEST_SIZEM_MASK	BIT_ULL(35)
 #define PFERR_GUEST_VMPL_MASK	BIT_ULL(36)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
index 37eba7dafd14f..f148c92b606ba 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
@@ -385,18 +385,12 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,
 		real_gpa = kvm_translate_gpa(vcpu, mmu, gfn_to_gpa(table_gfn),
 					     nested_access, &walker->fault);
 
-		/*
-		 * FIXME: This can happen if emulation (for of an INS/OUTS
-		 * instruction) triggers a nested page fault.  The exit
-		 * qualification / exit info field will incorrectly have
-		 * "guest page access" as the nested page fault's cause,
-		 * instead of "guest page structure access".  To fix this,
-		 * the x86_exception struct should be augmented with enough
-		 * information to fix the exit_qualification or exit_info_1
-		 * fields.
-		 */
-		if (unlikely(real_gpa == INVALID_GPA))
+		if (unlikely(real_gpa == INVALID_GPA)) {
+#if PTTYPE != PTTYPE_EPT
+			walker->fault.error_code |= PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK;
+#endif
 			return 0;
+		}
 
 		slot = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(real_gpa));
 		if (!kvm_is_visible_memslot(slot))
@@ -452,8 +446,12 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,
 #endif
 
 	real_gpa = kvm_translate_gpa(vcpu, mmu, gfn_to_gpa(gfn), access, &walker->fault);
-	if (real_gpa == INVALID_GPA)
+	if (real_gpa == INVALID_GPA) {
+#if PTTYPE != PTTYPE_EPT
+		walker->fault.error_code |= PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK;
+#endif
 		return 0;
+	}
 
 	walker->gfn = real_gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
index de90b104a0dd5..1013e814168b5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
@@ -40,18 +40,25 @@ static void nested_svm_inject_npf_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb;
 
 	if (vmcb->control.exit_code != SVM_EXIT_NPF) {
-		/*
-		 * TODO: track the cause of the nested page fault, and
-		 * correctly fill in the high bits of exit_info_1.
-		 */
-		vmcb->control.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_NPF;
-		vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = (1ULL << 32);
+		vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = fault->error_code;
 		vmcb->control.exit_info_2 = fault->address;
 	}
 
+	vmcb->control.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_NPF;
 	vmcb->control.exit_info_1 &= ~0xffffffffULL;
 	vmcb->control.exit_info_1 |= fault->error_code;
 
+	/*
+	 * All nested page faults should be annotated as occurring on the
+	 * final translation *or* the page walk. Arbitrarily choose "final"
+	 * if KVM is buggy and enumerated both or neither.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(hweight64(vmcb->control.exit_info_1 &
+				   PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK) != 1)) {
+		vmcb->control.exit_info_1 &= ~PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK;
+		vmcb->control.exit_info_1 |= PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK;
+	}
+
 	nested_svm_vmexit(svm);
 }
 
-- 
2.53.0.414.gf7e9f6c205-goog

Re: [PATCH V2 2/4] KVM: SVM: Fix nested NPF injection to set PFERR_GUEST_{PAGE,FINAL}_MASK

[Sean Christopherson]

On Tue, Feb 24, 2026, Kevin Cheng wrote:
> When KVM emulates an instruction for L2 and encounters a nested page
> fault (e.g., during string I/O emulation), nested_svm_inject_npf_exit()
> injects an NPF to L1. However, the code incorrectly hardcodes
> (1ULL << 32) for exit_info_1's upper bits when the original exit was
> not an NPF. This always sets PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK even when the fault
> occurred on a page table page, preventing L1 from correctly identifying
> the cause of the fault.
> 
> Set PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK in the error code when a nested page fault
> occurs during a guest page table walk, and PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK when
> the fault occurs on the final GPA-to-HPA translation.
> 
> Widen error_code in struct x86_exception from u16 to u64 to accommodate
> the PFERR_GUEST_* bits (bits 32 and 33).

Stale comment as this was moved to a separate patch.

> Update nested_svm_inject_npf_exit() to use fault->error_code directly
> instead of hardcoding the upper bits. Also add a WARN_ON_ONCE if neither
> PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK nor PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK is set, as this would
> indicate a bug in the page fault handling code.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kevin Cheng <chengkev@google.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  2 ++
>  arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h  | 22 ++++++++++------------
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c       | 19 +++++++++++++------
>  3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> index ff07c45e3c731..454f84660edfc 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> @@ -280,6 +280,8 @@ enum x86_intercept_stage;
>  #define PFERR_GUEST_RMP_MASK	BIT_ULL(31)
>  #define PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK	BIT_ULL(32)
>  #define PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK	BIT_ULL(33)
> +#define PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK \
> +	(PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK | PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK)
>  #define PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK	BIT_ULL(34)
>  #define PFERR_GUEST_SIZEM_MASK	BIT_ULL(35)
>  #define PFERR_GUEST_VMPL_MASK	BIT_ULL(36)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
> index 37eba7dafd14f..f148c92b606ba 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
> @@ -385,18 +385,12 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,
>  		real_gpa = kvm_translate_gpa(vcpu, mmu, gfn_to_gpa(table_gfn),
>  					     nested_access, &walker->fault);
>  
> -		/*
> -		 * FIXME: This can happen if emulation (for of an INS/OUTS
> -		 * instruction) triggers a nested page fault.  The exit
> -		 * qualification / exit info field will incorrectly have
> -		 * "guest page access" as the nested page fault's cause,
> -		 * instead of "guest page structure access".  To fix this,
> -		 * the x86_exception struct should be augmented with enough
> -		 * information to fix the exit_qualification or exit_info_1
> -		 * fields.
> -		 */
> -		if (unlikely(real_gpa == INVALID_GPA))
> +		if (unlikely(real_gpa == INVALID_GPA)) {
> +#if PTTYPE != PTTYPE_EPT

I would rather swap the order of patches two and three, so that we end up with
a "positive" if-statement.  I.e. add EPT first so that we get (spoiler alert):

#if PTTYPE == PTTYPE_EPT
			walker->fault.exit_qualification |= EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID;
#else
			walker->fault.error_code |= PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK;
#endif

> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
> index de90b104a0dd5..1013e814168b5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
> @@ -40,18 +40,25 @@ static void nested_svm_inject_npf_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>  	struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb;
>  
>  	if (vmcb->control.exit_code != SVM_EXIT_NPF) {
> -		/*
> -		 * TODO: track the cause of the nested page fault, and
> -		 * correctly fill in the high bits of exit_info_1.
> -		 */
> -		vmcb->control.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_NPF;
> -		vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = (1ULL << 32);
> +		vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = fault->error_code;
>  		vmcb->control.exit_info_2 = fault->address;
>  	}
>  
> +	vmcb->control.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_NPF;
>  	vmcb->control.exit_info_1 &= ~0xffffffffULL;
>  	vmcb->control.exit_info_1 |= fault->error_code;
>  
> +	/*
> +	 * All nested page faults should be annotated as occurring on the
> +	 * final translation *or* the page walk. Arbitrarily choose "final"
> +	 * if KVM is buggy and enumerated both or neither.
> +	 */
> +	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(hweight64(vmcb->control.exit_info_1 &
> +				   PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK) != 1)) {
> +		vmcb->control.exit_info_1 &= ~PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK;
> +		vmcb->control.exit_info_1 |= PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK;
> +	}

This is all kinds of messy.  KVM _appears_ to still rely on the hardware-reported
address + error_code

	if (vmcb->control.exit_code != SVM_EXIT_NPF) {
		vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = fault->error_code;
		vmcb->control.exit_info_2 = fault->address;
	}

But then drops bits 31:0 in favor of the fault error code.  Then even more
bizarrely, bitwise-ORs bits 63:32 and WARNs if multiple bits in
PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK are set.  In practice, the bitwise-OR of 63:32 is
_only_ going to affect PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK, because the other defined
bits are all specific to SNP, and KVM doesn't support nested virtualization for
SEV+.

So I don't understand why this isn't simply:

	vmcb->control.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_NPF;
	vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = fault->error_code;

	/*
	 * All nested page faults should be annotated as occurring on the
	 * final translation *or* the page walk. Arbitrarily choose "final"
	 * if KVM is buggy and enumerated both or neither.
	 */
	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(hweight64(vmcb->control.exit_info_1 &
				   PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK) != 1)) {
		vmcb->control.exit_info_1 &= ~PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK;
		vmcb->control.exit_info_1 |= PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK;
	}

Which would more or less align with the proposed nEPT handling.

> +
>  	nested_svm_vmexit(svm);
>  }
>  
> -- 
> 2.53.0.414.gf7e9f6c205-goog
> 

Re: [PATCH V2 2/4] KVM: SVM: Fix nested NPF injection to set PFERR_GUEST_{PAGE,FINAL}_MASK

[Sean Christopherson]

On Tue, Feb 24, 2026, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
> > index 37eba7dafd14f..f148c92b606ba 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
> > @@ -385,18 +385,12 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,
> >  		real_gpa = kvm_translate_gpa(vcpu, mmu, gfn_to_gpa(table_gfn),
> >  					     nested_access, &walker->fault);
> >  
> > -		/*
> > -		 * FIXME: This can happen if emulation (for of an INS/OUTS
> > -		 * instruction) triggers a nested page fault.  The exit
> > -		 * qualification / exit info field will incorrectly have
> > -		 * "guest page access" as the nested page fault's cause,
> > -		 * instead of "guest page structure access".  To fix this,
> > -		 * the x86_exception struct should be augmented with enough
> > -		 * information to fix the exit_qualification or exit_info_1
> > -		 * fields.
> > -		 */
> > -		if (unlikely(real_gpa == INVALID_GPA))
> > +		if (unlikely(real_gpa == INVALID_GPA)) {
> > +#if PTTYPE != PTTYPE_EPT
> 
> I would rather swap the order of patches two and three, so that we end up with
> a "positive" if-statement.  I.e. add EPT first so that we get (spoiler alert):
> 
> #if PTTYPE == PTTYPE_EPT
> 			walker->fault.exit_qualification |= EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID;
> #else
> 			walker->fault.error_code |= PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK;
> #endif

Scratch this comment, I got my walkers confused.

Re: [PATCH V2 2/4] KVM: SVM: Fix nested NPF injection to set PFERR_GUEST_{PAGE,FINAL}_MASK

[Kevin Cheng]

On Tue, Feb 24, 2026 at 11:42 AM Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Feb 24, 2026, Kevin Cheng wrote:
> > When KVM emulates an instruction for L2 and encounters a nested page
> > fault (e.g., during string I/O emulation), nested_svm_inject_npf_exit()
> > injects an NPF to L1. However, the code incorrectly hardcodes
> > (1ULL << 32) for exit_info_1's upper bits when the original exit was
> > not an NPF. This always sets PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK even when the fault
> > occurred on a page table page, preventing L1 from correctly identifying
> > the cause of the fault.
> >
> > Set PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK in the error code when a nested page fault
> > occurs during a guest page table walk, and PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK when
> > the fault occurs on the final GPA-to-HPA translation.
> >
> > Widen error_code in struct x86_exception from u16 to u64 to accommodate
> > the PFERR_GUEST_* bits (bits 32 and 33).
>
> Stale comment as this was moved to a separate patch.
>
> > Update nested_svm_inject_npf_exit() to use fault->error_code directly
> > instead of hardcoding the upper bits. Also add a WARN_ON_ONCE if neither
> > PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK nor PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK is set, as this would
> > indicate a bug in the page fault handling code.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Kevin Cheng <chengkev@google.com>
> > ---
> >  arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  2 ++
> >  arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h  | 22 ++++++++++------------
> >  arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c       | 19 +++++++++++++------
> >  3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> > index ff07c45e3c731..454f84660edfc 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> > @@ -280,6 +280,8 @@ enum x86_intercept_stage;
> >  #define PFERR_GUEST_RMP_MASK BIT_ULL(31)
> >  #define PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK       BIT_ULL(32)
> >  #define PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK        BIT_ULL(33)
> > +#define PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK \
> > +     (PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK | PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK)
> >  #define PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK BIT_ULL(34)
> >  #define PFERR_GUEST_SIZEM_MASK       BIT_ULL(35)
> >  #define PFERR_GUEST_VMPL_MASK        BIT_ULL(36)
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
> > index 37eba7dafd14f..f148c92b606ba 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
> > @@ -385,18 +385,12 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,
> >               real_gpa = kvm_translate_gpa(vcpu, mmu, gfn_to_gpa(table_gfn),
> >                                            nested_access, &walker->fault);
> >
> > -             /*
> > -              * FIXME: This can happen if emulation (for of an INS/OUTS
> > -              * instruction) triggers a nested page fault.  The exit
> > -              * qualification / exit info field will incorrectly have
> > -              * "guest page access" as the nested page fault's cause,
> > -              * instead of "guest page structure access".  To fix this,
> > -              * the x86_exception struct should be augmented with enough
> > -              * information to fix the exit_qualification or exit_info_1
> > -              * fields.
> > -              */
> > -             if (unlikely(real_gpa == INVALID_GPA))
> > +             if (unlikely(real_gpa == INVALID_GPA)) {
> > +#if PTTYPE != PTTYPE_EPT
>
> I would rather swap the order of patches two and three, so that we end up with
> a "positive" if-statement.  I.e. add EPT first so that we get (spoiler alert):
>
> #if PTTYPE == PTTYPE_EPT
>                         walker->fault.exit_qualification |= EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID;
> #else
>                         walker->fault.error_code |= PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK;
> #endif
>
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
> > index de90b104a0dd5..1013e814168b5 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
> > @@ -40,18 +40,25 @@ static void nested_svm_inject_npf_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> >       struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb;
> >
> >       if (vmcb->control.exit_code != SVM_EXIT_NPF) {
> > -             /*
> > -              * TODO: track the cause of the nested page fault, and
> > -              * correctly fill in the high bits of exit_info_1.
> > -              */
> > -             vmcb->control.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_NPF;
> > -             vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = (1ULL << 32);
> > +             vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = fault->error_code;
> >               vmcb->control.exit_info_2 = fault->address;
> >       }
> >
> > +     vmcb->control.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_NPF;
> >       vmcb->control.exit_info_1 &= ~0xffffffffULL;
> >       vmcb->control.exit_info_1 |= fault->error_code;
> >
> > +     /*
> > +      * All nested page faults should be annotated as occurring on the
> > +      * final translation *or* the page walk. Arbitrarily choose "final"
> > +      * if KVM is buggy and enumerated both or neither.
> > +      */
> > +     if (WARN_ON_ONCE(hweight64(vmcb->control.exit_info_1 &
> > +                                PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK) != 1)) {
> > +             vmcb->control.exit_info_1 &= ~PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK;
> > +             vmcb->control.exit_info_1 |= PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK;
> > +     }
>
> This is all kinds of messy.  KVM _appears_ to still rely on the hardware-reported
> address + error_code
>
>         if (vmcb->control.exit_code != SVM_EXIT_NPF) {
>                 vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = fault->error_code;
>                 vmcb->control.exit_info_2 = fault->address;
>         }
>
> But then drops bits 31:0 in favor of the fault error code.  Then even more
> bizarrely, bitwise-ORs bits 63:32 and WARNs if multiple bits in
> PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK are set.  In practice, the bitwise-OR of 63:32 is
> _only_ going to affect PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK, because the other defined
> bits are all specific to SNP, and KVM doesn't support nested virtualization for
> SEV+.
>
> So I don't understand why this isn't simply:
>
>         vmcb->control.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_NPF;
>         vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = fault->error_code;
>

Hmmm yes I do think it can be replaced by this but we would also need
to grab the address from the walker. So

        vmcb->control.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_NPF;
        vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = fault->error_code;
        vmcb->control.exit_info_2 = fault->address;

For example, in the selftest that I wrote we should be populating the
exit_info_2 with the faulting address from the walker, not the
original hardware reported address which is related to IO.

>         /*
>          * All nested page faults should be annotated as occurring on the
>          * final translation *or* the page walk. Arbitrarily choose "final"
>          * if KVM is buggy and enumerated both or neither.
>          */
>         if (WARN_ON_ONCE(hweight64(vmcb->control.exit_info_1 &
>                                    PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK) != 1)) {
>                 vmcb->control.exit_info_1 &= ~PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK;
>                 vmcb->control.exit_info_1 |= PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK;
>         }
>
> Which would more or less align with the proposed nEPT handling.
>
> > +
> >       nested_svm_vmexit(svm);
> >  }
> >
> > --
> > 2.53.0.414.gf7e9f6c205-goog
> >

Re: [PATCH V2 2/4] KVM: SVM: Fix nested NPF injection to set PFERR_GUEST_{PAGE,FINAL}_MASK

[Sean Christopherson]

On Wed, Mar 04, 2026, Kevin Cheng wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 24, 2026 at 11:42 AM Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> wrote:
> > This is all kinds of messy.  KVM _appears_ to still rely on the hardware-reported
> > address + error_code
> >
> >         if (vmcb->control.exit_code != SVM_EXIT_NPF) {
> >                 vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = fault->error_code;
> >                 vmcb->control.exit_info_2 = fault->address;
> >         }
> >
> > But then drops bits 31:0 in favor of the fault error code.  Then even more
> > bizarrely, bitwise-ORs bits 63:32 and WARNs if multiple bits in
> > PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK are set.  In practice, the bitwise-OR of 63:32 is
> > _only_ going to affect PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK, because the other defined
> > bits are all specific to SNP, and KVM doesn't support nested virtualization for
> > SEV+.
> >
> > So I don't understand why this isn't simply:
> >
> >         vmcb->control.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_NPF;
> >         vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = fault->error_code;
> >
> 
> Hmmm yes I do think it can be replaced by this but we would also need
> to grab the address from the walker. So
> 
>         vmcb->control.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_NPF;
>         vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = fault->error_code;
>         vmcb->control.exit_info_2 = fault->address;
> 
> For example, in the selftest that I wrote we should be populating the
> exit_info_2 with the faulting address from the walker, not the
> original hardware reported address which is related to IO.

Yeah, sorry for the confusion.  I wasn't saying _don't_ include the address, I
was just pointing out that the error_code handling can be much simpler.

Re: [PATCH V2 2/4] KVM: SVM: Fix nested NPF injection to set PFERR_GUEST_{PAGE,FINAL}_MASK

[Kevin Cheng]

On Tue, Feb 24, 2026 at 11:42 AM Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Feb 24, 2026, Kevin Cheng wrote:
> > When KVM emulates an instruction for L2 and encounters a nested page
> > fault (e.g., during string I/O emulation), nested_svm_inject_npf_exit()
> > injects an NPF to L1. However, the code incorrectly hardcodes
> > (1ULL << 32) for exit_info_1's upper bits when the original exit was
> > not an NPF. This always sets PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK even when the fault
> > occurred on a page table page, preventing L1 from correctly identifying
> > the cause of the fault.
> >
> > Set PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK in the error code when a nested page fault
> > occurs during a guest page table walk, and PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK when
> > the fault occurs on the final GPA-to-HPA translation.
> >
> > Widen error_code in struct x86_exception from u16 to u64 to accommodate
> > the PFERR_GUEST_* bits (bits 32 and 33).
>
> Stale comment as this was moved to a separate patch.
>
> > Update nested_svm_inject_npf_exit() to use fault->error_code directly
> > instead of hardcoding the upper bits. Also add a WARN_ON_ONCE if neither
> > PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK nor PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK is set, as this would
> > indicate a bug in the page fault handling code.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Kevin Cheng <chengkev@google.com>
> > ---
> >  arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  2 ++
> >  arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h  | 22 ++++++++++------------
> >  arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c       | 19 +++++++++++++------
> >  3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> > index ff07c45e3c731..454f84660edfc 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> > @@ -280,6 +280,8 @@ enum x86_intercept_stage;
> >  #define PFERR_GUEST_RMP_MASK BIT_ULL(31)
> >  #define PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK       BIT_ULL(32)
> >  #define PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK        BIT_ULL(33)
> > +#define PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK \
> > +     (PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK | PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK)
> >  #define PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK BIT_ULL(34)
> >  #define PFERR_GUEST_SIZEM_MASK       BIT_ULL(35)
> >  #define PFERR_GUEST_VMPL_MASK        BIT_ULL(36)
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
> > index 37eba7dafd14f..f148c92b606ba 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
> > @@ -385,18 +385,12 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,
> >               real_gpa = kvm_translate_gpa(vcpu, mmu, gfn_to_gpa(table_gfn),
> >                                            nested_access, &walker->fault);
> >
> > -             /*
> > -              * FIXME: This can happen if emulation (for of an INS/OUTS
> > -              * instruction) triggers a nested page fault.  The exit
> > -              * qualification / exit info field will incorrectly have
> > -              * "guest page access" as the nested page fault's cause,
> > -              * instead of "guest page structure access".  To fix this,
> > -              * the x86_exception struct should be augmented with enough
> > -              * information to fix the exit_qualification or exit_info_1
> > -              * fields.
> > -              */
> > -             if (unlikely(real_gpa == INVALID_GPA))
> > +             if (unlikely(real_gpa == INVALID_GPA)) {
> > +#if PTTYPE != PTTYPE_EPT
>
> I would rather swap the order of patches two and three, so that we end up with
> a "positive" if-statement.  I.e. add EPT first so that we get (spoiler alert):
>
> #if PTTYPE == PTTYPE_EPT
>                         walker->fault.exit_qualification |= EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID;
> #else
>                         walker->fault.error_code |= PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK;
> #endif
>
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
> > index de90b104a0dd5..1013e814168b5 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
> > @@ -40,18 +40,25 @@ static void nested_svm_inject_npf_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> >       struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb;
> >
> >       if (vmcb->control.exit_code != SVM_EXIT_NPF) {
> > -             /*
> > -              * TODO: track the cause of the nested page fault, and
> > -              * correctly fill in the high bits of exit_info_1.
> > -              */
> > -             vmcb->control.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_NPF;
> > -             vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = (1ULL << 32);
> > +             vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = fault->error_code;
> >               vmcb->control.exit_info_2 = fault->address;
> >       }
> >
> > +     vmcb->control.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_NPF;
> >       vmcb->control.exit_info_1 &= ~0xffffffffULL;
> >       vmcb->control.exit_info_1 |= fault->error_code;
> >
> > +     /*
> > +      * All nested page faults should be annotated as occurring on the
> > +      * final translation *or* the page walk. Arbitrarily choose "final"
> > +      * if KVM is buggy and enumerated both or neither.
> > +      */
> > +     if (WARN_ON_ONCE(hweight64(vmcb->control.exit_info_1 &
> > +                                PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK) != 1)) {
> > +             vmcb->control.exit_info_1 &= ~PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK;
> > +             vmcb->control.exit_info_1 |= PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK;
> > +     }
>
> This is all kinds of messy.  KVM _appears_ to still rely on the hardware-reported
> address + error_code
>
>         if (vmcb->control.exit_code != SVM_EXIT_NPF) {
>                 vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = fault->error_code;
>                 vmcb->control.exit_info_2 = fault->address;
>         }
>
> But then drops bits 31:0 in favor of the fault error code.  Then even more
> bizarrely, bitwise-ORs bits 63:32 and WARNs if multiple bits in
> PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK are set.  In practice, the bitwise-OR of 63:32 is
> _only_ going to affect PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK, because the other defined
> bits are all specific to SNP, and KVM doesn't support nested virtualization for
> SEV+.
>
> So I don't understand why this isn't simply:
>
>         vmcb->control.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_NPF;
>         vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = fault->error_code;

The issue with this is that the PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK bits are
not set in the walker fault error code for hardware reported NPFs
(non-emulator faults).

The active mmu after an NPF exit from L2 is the guest_mmu. In
walk_addr_generic, we only set the PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK bits
in the fault error code if kvm_translate_gpa returns INVALID_GPA (i.e.
when mmu == &vcpu->arch.nested_mmu and the translation fails).
Otherwise, kvm_translate_gpa just returns the gpa and we don't set the
PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK bits in the fault error code.

Even when we NPF exit from L2, the hardware-reported exit_info[31:0]
isn't accurate which is why we drop 31:0 in favor of the fault error
code. I observed the hardware error code vs fault error code while
running the KUTs (specifically the tests that expect faults) in
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260312200308.3089379-9-chengkev@google.com/
and they were not as expected. I believe I saw different error codes
because the entry existed in L1's NPT, but not yet in L0's NPT? The
hardware-reported error code usually did not reflect the L1 NPT page
permission restrictions, only the type of access/op that caused the
fault. Additionally, the present bit was not set.

If L2 has never accessed a GPA present in the L1 NPT with restricted
permissions, we could see differing error codes between hardware and
the fault error codes. I think that is why the code before my change
dropped bits 31:0 in favor of the walker fault error code. I'm not
entirely sure though so I could be wrong.

Since the guest_mmu walker can't know whether the GPA it's translating
is a page table page or a final page, I think we are stuck with
combining bits 63:32 from the hardware reported error code and 31:0 of
the fault error code for the non-emulator NPF injection case.

>
>         /*
>          * All nested page faults should be annotated as occurring on the
>          * final translation *or* the page walk. Arbitrarily choose "final"
>          * if KVM is buggy and enumerated both or neither.
>          */
>         if (WARN_ON_ONCE(hweight64(vmcb->control.exit_info_1 &
>                                    PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK) != 1)) {
>                 vmcb->control.exit_info_1 &= ~PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK;
>                 vmcb->control.exit_info_1 |= PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK;
>         }
>
> Which would more or less align with the proposed nEPT handling.
>
> > +
> >       nested_svm_vmexit(svm);
> >  }
> >
> > --
> > 2.53.0.414.gf7e9f6c205-goog
> >

Re: [PATCH V2 2/4] KVM: SVM: Fix nested NPF injection to set PFERR_GUEST_{PAGE,FINAL}_MASK

[Kevin Cheng]

On Fri, Mar 13, 2026 at 12:50 AM Kevin Cheng <chengkev@google.com> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Feb 24, 2026 at 11:42 AM Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, Feb 24, 2026, Kevin Cheng wrote:
> > > When KVM emulates an instruction for L2 and encounters a nested page
> > > fault (e.g., during string I/O emulation), nested_svm_inject_npf_exit()
> > > injects an NPF to L1. However, the code incorrectly hardcodes
> > > (1ULL << 32) for exit_info_1's upper bits when the original exit was
> > > not an NPF. This always sets PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK even when the fault
> > > occurred on a page table page, preventing L1 from correctly identifying
> > > the cause of the fault.
> > >
> > > Set PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK in the error code when a nested page fault
> > > occurs during a guest page table walk, and PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK when
> > > the fault occurs on the final GPA-to-HPA translation.
> > >
> > > Widen error_code in struct x86_exception from u16 to u64 to accommodate
> > > the PFERR_GUEST_* bits (bits 32 and 33).
> >
> > Stale comment as this was moved to a separate patch.
> >
> > > Update nested_svm_inject_npf_exit() to use fault->error_code directly
> > > instead of hardcoding the upper bits. Also add a WARN_ON_ONCE if neither
> > > PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK nor PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK is set, as this would
> > > indicate a bug in the page fault handling code.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Kevin Cheng <chengkev@google.com>
> > > ---
> > >  arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  2 ++
> > >  arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h  | 22 ++++++++++------------
> > >  arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c       | 19 +++++++++++++------
> > >  3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> > > index ff07c45e3c731..454f84660edfc 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> > > @@ -280,6 +280,8 @@ enum x86_intercept_stage;
> > >  #define PFERR_GUEST_RMP_MASK BIT_ULL(31)
> > >  #define PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK       BIT_ULL(32)
> > >  #define PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK        BIT_ULL(33)
> > > +#define PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK \
> > > +     (PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK | PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK)
> > >  #define PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK BIT_ULL(34)
> > >  #define PFERR_GUEST_SIZEM_MASK       BIT_ULL(35)
> > >  #define PFERR_GUEST_VMPL_MASK        BIT_ULL(36)
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
> > > index 37eba7dafd14f..f148c92b606ba 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
> > > @@ -385,18 +385,12 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,
> > >               real_gpa = kvm_translate_gpa(vcpu, mmu, gfn_to_gpa(table_gfn),
> > >                                            nested_access, &walker->fault);
> > >
> > > -             /*
> > > -              * FIXME: This can happen if emulation (for of an INS/OUTS
> > > -              * instruction) triggers a nested page fault.  The exit
> > > -              * qualification / exit info field will incorrectly have
> > > -              * "guest page access" as the nested page fault's cause,
> > > -              * instead of "guest page structure access".  To fix this,
> > > -              * the x86_exception struct should be augmented with enough
> > > -              * information to fix the exit_qualification or exit_info_1
> > > -              * fields.
> > > -              */
> > > -             if (unlikely(real_gpa == INVALID_GPA))
> > > +             if (unlikely(real_gpa == INVALID_GPA)) {
> > > +#if PTTYPE != PTTYPE_EPT
> >
> > I would rather swap the order of patches two and three, so that we end up with
> > a "positive" if-statement.  I.e. add EPT first so that we get (spoiler alert):
> >
> > #if PTTYPE == PTTYPE_EPT
> >                         walker->fault.exit_qualification |= EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID;
> > #else
> >                         walker->fault.error_code |= PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK;
> > #endif
> >
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
> > > index de90b104a0dd5..1013e814168b5 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
> > > @@ -40,18 +40,25 @@ static void nested_svm_inject_npf_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> > >       struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb;
> > >
> > >       if (vmcb->control.exit_code != SVM_EXIT_NPF) {
> > > -             /*
> > > -              * TODO: track the cause of the nested page fault, and
> > > -              * correctly fill in the high bits of exit_info_1.
> > > -              */
> > > -             vmcb->control.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_NPF;
> > > -             vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = (1ULL << 32);
> > > +             vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = fault->error_code;
> > >               vmcb->control.exit_info_2 = fault->address;
> > >       }
> > >
> > > +     vmcb->control.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_NPF;
> > >       vmcb->control.exit_info_1 &= ~0xffffffffULL;
> > >       vmcb->control.exit_info_1 |= fault->error_code;
> > >
> > > +     /*
> > > +      * All nested page faults should be annotated as occurring on the
> > > +      * final translation *or* the page walk. Arbitrarily choose "final"
> > > +      * if KVM is buggy and enumerated both or neither.
> > > +      */
> > > +     if (WARN_ON_ONCE(hweight64(vmcb->control.exit_info_1 &
> > > +                                PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK) != 1)) {
> > > +             vmcb->control.exit_info_1 &= ~PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK;
> > > +             vmcb->control.exit_info_1 |= PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK;
> > > +     }
> >
> > This is all kinds of messy.  KVM _appears_ to still rely on the hardware-reported
> > address + error_code
> >
> >         if (vmcb->control.exit_code != SVM_EXIT_NPF) {
> >                 vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = fault->error_code;
> >                 vmcb->control.exit_info_2 = fault->address;
> >         }
> >
> > But then drops bits 31:0 in favor of the fault error code.  Then even more
> > bizarrely, bitwise-ORs bits 63:32 and WARNs if multiple bits in
> > PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK are set.  In practice, the bitwise-OR of 63:32 is
> > _only_ going to affect PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK, because the other defined
> > bits are all specific to SNP, and KVM doesn't support nested virtualization for
> > SEV+.
> >
> > So I don't understand why this isn't simply:
> >
> >         vmcb->control.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_NPF;
> >         vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = fault->error_code;
>
> The issue with this is that the PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK bits are
> not set in the walker fault error code for hardware reported NPFs
> (non-emulator faults).
>
> The active mmu after an NPF exit from L2 is the guest_mmu. In
> walk_addr_generic, we only set the PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK bits
> in the fault error code if kvm_translate_gpa returns INVALID_GPA (i.e.
> when mmu == &vcpu->arch.nested_mmu and the translation fails).
> Otherwise, kvm_translate_gpa just returns the gpa and we don't set the
> PFERR_GUEST_FAULT_STAGE_MASK bits in the fault error code.
>
> Even when we NPF exit from L2, the hardware-reported exit_info[31:0]
> isn't accurate which is why we drop 31:0 in favor of the fault error
> code. I observed the hardware error code vs fault error code while
> running the KUTs (specifically the tests that expect faults) in
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260312200308.3089379-9-chengkev@google.com/
> and they were not as expected. I believe I saw different error codes
> because the entry existed in L1's NPT, but not yet in L0's NPT? The
> hardware-reported error code usually did not reflect the L1 NPT page
> permission restrictions, only the type of access/op that caused the
> fault. Additionally, the present bit was not set.
>
> If L2 has never accessed a GPA present in the L1 NPT with restricted
> permissions, we could see differing error codes between hardware and
> the fault error codes. I think that is why the code before my change
> dropped bits 31:0 in favor of the walker fault error code. I'm not
> entirely sure though so I could be wrong.
>
> Since the guest_mmu walker can't know whether the GPA it's translating
> is a page table page or a final page, I think we are stuck with
> combining bits 63:32 from the hardware reported error code and 31:0 of
> the fault error code for the non-emulator NPF injection case.
>

Oops this was already pointed out in
https://lore.kernel.org/all/aZ4J0flo0SwjAWgW@google.com/ lol

[PATCH V2 3/4] KVM: VMX: Don't consult original exit qualification for nested EPT violation injection

[Kevin Cheng]

Remove the OR of EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID and
EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED from the hardware exit qualification when
injecting a synthesized EPT violation to L1. The hardware exit
qualification reflects the original VM exit, which may not be an EPT
violation at all, e.g. if KVM is emulating an I/O instruction and the
memory operand's translation through L1's EPT fails. In that case, bits
7-8 of the exit qualification have completely different semantics (or
are simply zero), and OR'ing them into the injected EPT violation
corrupts the GVA_IS_VALID/GVA_TRANSLATED information.

Even when the original exit is an EPT violation, the hardware bits may
not match the current fault. For example, if an EPT violation happened
while walking L2's page tables, it's possible that the EPT violation
injected by KVM into L1 is for the final address translation, if L1
already had the mappings for L2's page tables in its EPTs but KVM did
not have shadow EPTs for them.

Populate EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID and EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED
directly in the page table walker at the kvm_translate_gpa() failure
sites, mirroring the existing PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK and
PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK population for NPT.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Cheng <chengkev@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 16 +++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c      |  3 ---
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
index f148c92b606ba..a084b5e50effc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
@@ -386,8 +386,19 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,
 					     nested_access, &walker->fault);
 
 		if (unlikely(real_gpa == INVALID_GPA)) {
+			/*
+			 * Unconditionally set the NPF error_code bits and
+			 * EPT exit_qualification bits for nested page
+			 * faults.  The walker doesn't know whether L1 uses
+			 * NPT or EPT, and each injection handler consumes
+			 * only the field it cares about (error_code for
+			 * NPF, exit_qualification for EPT violations), so
+			 * setting both is harmless.
+			 */
 #if PTTYPE != PTTYPE_EPT
 			walker->fault.error_code |= PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK;
+			walker->fault.exit_qualification |=
+				EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID;
 #endif
 			return 0;
 		}
@@ -449,6 +460,9 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,
 	if (real_gpa == INVALID_GPA) {
 #if PTTYPE != PTTYPE_EPT
 		walker->fault.error_code |= PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK;
+		walker->fault.exit_qualification |=
+			EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID |
+			EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED;
 #endif
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -496,7 +510,7 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,
 	 * [2:0] - Derive from the access bits. The exit_qualification might be
 	 *         out of date if it is serving an EPT misconfiguration.
 	 * [5:3] - Calculated by the page walk of the guest EPT page tables
-	 * [7:8] - Derived from [7:8] of real exit_qualification
+	 * [7:8] - Set at the kvm_translate_gpa() call sites above
 	 *
 	 * The other bits are set to 0.
 	 */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
index 248635da67661..6a167b1d51595 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
@@ -444,9 +444,6 @@ static void nested_ept_inject_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 			exit_qualification = 0;
 		} else {
 			exit_qualification = fault->exit_qualification;
-			exit_qualification |= vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu) &
-					      (EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID |
-					       EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED);
 			vm_exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION;
 		}
 
-- 
2.53.0.414.gf7e9f6c205-goog

Re: [PATCH V2 3/4] KVM: VMX: Don't consult original exit qualification for nested EPT violation injection

[Sean Christopherson]

On Tue, Feb 24, 2026, Kevin Cheng wrote:
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 16 +++++++++++++++-
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c      |  3 ---
>  2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
> index f148c92b606ba..a084b5e50effc 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
> @@ -386,8 +386,19 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,
>  					     nested_access, &walker->fault);
>  
>  		if (unlikely(real_gpa == INVALID_GPA)) {
> +			/*
> +			 * Unconditionally set the NPF error_code bits and
> +			 * EPT exit_qualification bits for nested page
> +			 * faults.  The walker doesn't know whether L1 uses
> +			 * NPT or EPT, and each injection handler consumes
> +			 * only the field it cares about (error_code for
> +			 * NPF, exit_qualification for EPT violations), so
> +			 * setting both is harmless.
> +			 */
>  #if PTTYPE != PTTYPE_EPT
>  			walker->fault.error_code |= PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK;
> +			walker->fault.exit_qualification |=
> +				EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID;

This looks all kinds of wrong.  Shouldn't it be?

#if PTTYPE == PTTYPE_EPT
			walker->fault.exit_qualification |= EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID;
#else
			walker->fault.error_code |= PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK;
#endif

Ooooh, right, never mind, this is the case where KVM detects a fault on the
L2 GPA => L1 GPA translation when walking L2 GVA=>GPA.

This is very counter-intuitive, and unconditionally setting both is rather ugly.
To address both, what if we peek at the guest_mmu to determine whether the fault
is EPT vs. NPT?  E.g.

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 3911ac9bddfd..db43560ba6f8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -5263,6 +5263,9 @@ static bool sync_mmio_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep, gfn_t gfn,
        return false;
 }
 
+static bool kvm_nested_fault_is_ept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+                                   struct x86_exception *exception);
+
 #define PTTYPE_EPT 18 /* arbitrary */
 #define PTTYPE PTTYPE_EPT
 #include "paging_tmpl.h"
@@ -5276,6 +5279,13 @@ static bool sync_mmio_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep, gfn_t gfn,
 #include "paging_tmpl.h"
 #undef PTTYPE
 
+static bool kvm_nested_fault_is_ept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+                                   struct x86_exception *exception)
+{
+       WARN_ON_ONCE(!exception->nested_page_fault);
+       return vcpu->arch.guest_mmu.page_fault == ept_page_fault;
+}
+
 static void __reset_rsvds_bits_mask(struct rsvd_bits_validate *rsvd_check,
                                    u64 pa_bits_rsvd, int level, bool nx,
                                    bool gbpages, bool pse, bool amd)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
index a084b5e50eff..0c9ce7a4815b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
@@ -387,19 +387,14 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,
 
                if (unlikely(real_gpa == INVALID_GPA)) {
                        /*
-                        * Unconditionally set the NPF error_code bits and
-                        * EPT exit_qualification bits for nested page
-                        * faults.  The walker doesn't know whether L1 uses
-                        * NPT or EPT, and each injection handler consumes
-                        * only the field it cares about (error_code for
-                        * NPF, exit_qualification for EPT violations), so
-                        * setting both is harmless.
+                        * Set EPT Violation flags even if the fault is an
+                        * EPT Misconfig, fault.exit_qualification is ignored
+                        * for EPT Misconfigs.
                         */
-#if PTTYPE != PTTYPE_EPT
-                       walker->fault.error_code |= PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK;
-                       walker->fault.exit_qualification |=
-                               EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID;
-#endif
+                       if (kvm_nested_fault_is_ept(vcpu, &walker->fault))
+                               walker->fault.exit_qualification |= EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID;
+                       else
+                               walker->fault.error_code |= PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK;
                        return 0;
                }
 
@@ -458,12 +453,11 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,
 
        real_gpa = kvm_translate_gpa(vcpu, mmu, gfn_to_gpa(gfn), access, &walker->fault);
        if (real_gpa == INVALID_GPA) {
-#if PTTYPE != PTTYPE_EPT
-               walker->fault.error_code |= PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK;
-               walker->fault.exit_qualification |=
-                       EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID |
-                       EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED;
-#endif
+               if (kvm_nested_fault_is_ept(vcpu, &walker->fault))
+                       walker->fault.exit_qualification |= EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID |
+                                                           EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED;
+               else
+                       walker->fault.error_code |= PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK;
                return 0;
        }
 
>  #endif
>  			return 0;
>  		}
> @@ -449,6 +460,9 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,
>  	if (real_gpa == INVALID_GPA) {
>  #if PTTYPE != PTTYPE_EPT
>  		walker->fault.error_code |= PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK;
> +		walker->fault.exit_qualification |=
> +			EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID |
> +			EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED;
>  #endif
>  		return 0;
>  	}
> @@ -496,7 +510,7 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,
>  	 * [2:0] - Derive from the access bits. The exit_qualification might be
>  	 *         out of date if it is serving an EPT misconfiguration.
>  	 * [5:3] - Calculated by the page walk of the guest EPT page tables
> -	 * [7:8] - Derived from [7:8] of real exit_qualification
> +	 * [7:8] - Set at the kvm_translate_gpa() call sites above
>  	 *
>  	 * The other bits are set to 0.
>  	 */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> index 248635da67661..6a167b1d51595 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> @@ -444,9 +444,6 @@ static void nested_ept_inject_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>  			exit_qualification = 0;
>  		} else {
>  			exit_qualification = fault->exit_qualification;
> -			exit_qualification |= vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu) &
> -					      (EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID |
> -					       EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED);

Hmm, this isn't quite correct.  If KVM injects an EPT Violation (or a #NPF) when
handling an EPT Violation (or #NPF) from L2, then KVM _should_ follow hardware.

Aha!  I think the easiest way to deal with that is to flag nested page faults
that were the result of walking L1's TDP when handling an L2 TDP page fault, and
then let vendor code extract the fault information out of hardaware.

Alternatively, we could plumb in VMX's EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID as a synthetic
error code, but I think that be harder to follow overall, especially for VMX.

@@ -799,8 +793,10 @@ static int FNAME(page_fault)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault
         * The page is not mapped by the guest.  Let the guest handle it.
         */
        if (!r) {
-               if (!fault->prefetch)
+               if (!fault->prefetch) {
+                       walker.fault.hardware_nested_page_fault = walker.fault.nested_page_fault;
                        kvm_inject_emulated_page_fault(vcpu, &walker.fault);
+               }
 
                return RET_PF_RETRY;
        }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
index 6a167b1d5159..9e7d541d256b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
@@ -443,8 +443,13 @@ static void nested_ept_inject_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
                        vm_exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG;
                        exit_qualification = 0;
                } else {
-                       exit_qualification = fault->exit_qualification;
                        vm_exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION;
+
+                       exit_qualification = fault->exit_qualification;
+                       if (fault->hardware_nested_page_fault)
+                               exit_qualification |= vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu) &
+                                                     (EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID |
+                                                      EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED);
                }
 
                /*




>  			vm_exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION;
>  		}
>  
> -- 
> 2.53.0.414.gf7e9f6c205-goog
> 

Re: [PATCH V2 3/4] KVM: VMX: Don't consult original exit qualification for nested EPT violation injection

[Yosry Ahmed]

> > @@ -496,7 +510,7 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,
> >        * [2:0] - Derive from the access bits. The exit_qualification might be
> >        *         out of date if it is serving an EPT misconfiguration.
> >        * [5:3] - Calculated by the page walk of the guest EPT page tables
> > -      * [7:8] - Derived from [7:8] of real exit_qualification
> > +      * [7:8] - Set at the kvm_translate_gpa() call sites above
> >        *
> >        * The other bits are set to 0.
> >        */
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> > index 248635da67661..6a167b1d51595 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> > @@ -444,9 +444,6 @@ static void nested_ept_inject_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> >                       exit_qualification = 0;
> >               } else {
> >                       exit_qualification = fault->exit_qualification;
> > -                     exit_qualification |= vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu) &
> > -                                           (EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID |
> > -                                            EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED);
>
> Hmm, this isn't quite correct.  If KVM injects an EPT Violation (or a #NPF) when
> handling an EPT Violation (or #NPF) from L2, then KVM _should_ follow hardware.
>
> Aha!  I think the easiest way to deal with that is to flag nested page faults
> that were the result of walking L1's TDP when handling an L2 TDP page fault, and
> then let vendor code extract the fault information out of hardaware.

Is it not possible that KVM gets an EPT Violation (or a #NPF) on an L2
memory access while the CPU is walking L2's page tables, then KVM
walks L1's TDP and finds mappings for the L2 page tables but not the
final translation? Or will KVM always just fixup the immediate EPT
Violation (or #NPF) by inserting a shadow mapping of L2's page tables
and retry the instruction immediately?

Re: [PATCH V2 3/4] KVM: VMX: Don't consult original exit qualification for nested EPT violation injection

[Sean Christopherson]

On Tue, Feb 24, 2026, Yosry Ahmed wrote:
> > > @@ -496,7 +510,7 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,
> > >        * [2:0] - Derive from the access bits. The exit_qualification might be
> > >        *         out of date if it is serving an EPT misconfiguration.
> > >        * [5:3] - Calculated by the page walk of the guest EPT page tables
> > > -      * [7:8] - Derived from [7:8] of real exit_qualification
> > > +      * [7:8] - Set at the kvm_translate_gpa() call sites above
> > >        *
> > >        * The other bits are set to 0.
> > >        */
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> > > index 248635da67661..6a167b1d51595 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> > > @@ -444,9 +444,6 @@ static void nested_ept_inject_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> > >                       exit_qualification = 0;
> > >               } else {
> > >                       exit_qualification = fault->exit_qualification;
> > > -                     exit_qualification |= vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu) &
> > > -                                           (EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID |
> > > -                                            EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED);
> >
> > Hmm, this isn't quite correct.  If KVM injects an EPT Violation (or a #NPF) when
> > handling an EPT Violation (or #NPF) from L2, then KVM _should_ follow hardware.
> >
> > Aha!  I think the easiest way to deal with that is to flag nested page faults
> > that were the result of walking L1's TDP when handling an L2 TDP page fault, and
> > then let vendor code extract the fault information out of hardaware.
> 
> Is it not possible that KVM gets an EPT Violation (or a #NPF) on an L2
> memory access while the CPU is walking L2's page tables, then KVM
> walks L1's TDP and finds mappings for the L2 page tables but not the
> final translation? Or will KVM always just fixup the immediate EPT
> Violation (or #NPF) by inserting a shadow mapping of L2's page tables
> and retry the instruction immediately?

The latter, assuming by "shadow mapping of L2's page tables" out meant "installing
a shadow mapping of the faulting L2 GPA according to L1's TDP page tables".

I.e. when servicing an L2 TDP fault, KVM is only resolving the fault for the reported
L2 GPA, _not_ the originating L2 GVA (if there is one).

Re: [PATCH V2 3/4] KVM: VMX: Don't consult original exit qualification for nested EPT violation injection

[Yosry Ahmed]

On Tue, Feb 24, 2026 at 11:37 AM Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Feb 24, 2026, Yosry Ahmed wrote:
> > > > @@ -496,7 +510,7 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,
> > > >        * [2:0] - Derive from the access bits. The exit_qualification might be
> > > >        *         out of date if it is serving an EPT misconfiguration.
> > > >        * [5:3] - Calculated by the page walk of the guest EPT page tables
> > > > -      * [7:8] - Derived from [7:8] of real exit_qualification
> > > > +      * [7:8] - Set at the kvm_translate_gpa() call sites above
> > > >        *
> > > >        * The other bits are set to 0.
> > > >        */
> > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> > > > index 248635da67661..6a167b1d51595 100644
> > > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> > > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> > > > @@ -444,9 +444,6 @@ static void nested_ept_inject_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> > > >                       exit_qualification = 0;
> > > >               } else {
> > > >                       exit_qualification = fault->exit_qualification;
> > > > -                     exit_qualification |= vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu) &
> > > > -                                           (EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID |
> > > > -                                            EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED);
> > >
> > > Hmm, this isn't quite correct.  If KVM injects an EPT Violation (or a #NPF) when
> > > handling an EPT Violation (or #NPF) from L2, then KVM _should_ follow hardware.
> > >
> > > Aha!  I think the easiest way to deal with that is to flag nested page faults
> > > that were the result of walking L1's TDP when handling an L2 TDP page fault, and
> > > then let vendor code extract the fault information out of hardaware.
> >
> > Is it not possible that KVM gets an EPT Violation (or a #NPF) on an L2
> > memory access while the CPU is walking L2's page tables, then KVM
> > walks L1's TDP and finds mappings for the L2 page tables but not the
> > final translation? Or will KVM always just fixup the immediate EPT
> > Violation (or #NPF) by inserting a shadow mapping of L2's page tables
> > and retry the instruction immediately?
>
> The latter, assuming by "shadow mapping of L2's page tables" out meant "installing
> a shadow mapping of the faulting L2 GPA according to L1's TDP page tables".
>
> I.e. when servicing an L2 TDP fault, KVM is only resolving the fault for the reported
> L2 GPA, _not_ the originating L2 GVA (if there is one).

I see. Does this need special handling when forwarding #NPFs to L1 as
well? Or will fault->error_code have the HW fault bits in
nested_svm_inject_npf_exit() in this case?

Re: [PATCH V2 3/4] KVM: VMX: Don't consult original exit qualification for nested EPT violation injection

[Sean Christopherson]

On Tue, Feb 24, 2026, Yosry Ahmed wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 24, 2026 at 11:37 AM Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, Feb 24, 2026, Yosry Ahmed wrote:
> > > > > @@ -496,7 +510,7 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,
> > > > >        * [2:0] - Derive from the access bits. The exit_qualification might be
> > > > >        *         out of date if it is serving an EPT misconfiguration.
> > > > >        * [5:3] - Calculated by the page walk of the guest EPT page tables
> > > > > -      * [7:8] - Derived from [7:8] of real exit_qualification
> > > > > +      * [7:8] - Set at the kvm_translate_gpa() call sites above
> > > > >        *
> > > > >        * The other bits are set to 0.
> > > > >        */
> > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> > > > > index 248635da67661..6a167b1d51595 100644
> > > > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> > > > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> > > > > @@ -444,9 +444,6 @@ static void nested_ept_inject_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> > > > >                       exit_qualification = 0;
> > > > >               } else {
> > > > >                       exit_qualification = fault->exit_qualification;
> > > > > -                     exit_qualification |= vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu) &
> > > > > -                                           (EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID |
> > > > > -                                            EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED);
> > > >
> > > > Hmm, this isn't quite correct.  If KVM injects an EPT Violation (or a #NPF) when
> > > > handling an EPT Violation (or #NPF) from L2, then KVM _should_ follow hardware.
> > > >
> > > > Aha!  I think the easiest way to deal with that is to flag nested page faults
> > > > that were the result of walking L1's TDP when handling an L2 TDP page fault, and
> > > > then let vendor code extract the fault information out of hardaware.
> > >
> > > Is it not possible that KVM gets an EPT Violation (or a #NPF) on an L2
> > > memory access while the CPU is walking L2's page tables, then KVM
> > > walks L1's TDP and finds mappings for the L2 page tables but not the
> > > final translation? Or will KVM always just fixup the immediate EPT
> > > Violation (or #NPF) by inserting a shadow mapping of L2's page tables
> > > and retry the instruction immediately?
> >
> > The latter, assuming by "shadow mapping of L2's page tables" out meant "installing
> > a shadow mapping of the faulting L2 GPA according to L1's TDP page tables".
> >
> > I.e. when servicing an L2 TDP fault, KVM is only resolving the fault for the reported
> > L2 GPA, _not_ the originating L2 GVA (if there is one).
> 
> I see. Does this need special handling when forwarding #NPFs to L1 as
> well? Or will fault->error_code have the HW fault bits in
> nested_svm_inject_npf_exit() in this case?

Yes, sorry for not making that it explicit.  nested_svm_inject_npf_exit() would
also need to consult hardware_nested_page_fault.

[PATCH V2 4/4] KVM: selftests: Add nested page fault injection test

[Kevin Cheng]

Add a test that exercises nested page fault injection during L2
execution. L2 executes I/O string instructions (OUTSB/INSB) that access
memory restricted in L1's nested page tables (NPT/EPT), triggering a
nested page fault that L0 must inject to L1.

The test supports both AMD SVM (NPF) and Intel VMX (EPT violation) and
verifies that:
  - The exit reason is an NPF/EPT violation
  - The access type and permission bits are correct
  - The faulting GPA is correct

Three test cases are implemented:
  - Unmap the final data page (final translation fault, OUTSB read)
  - Unmap a PT page (page walk fault, OUTSB read)
  - Write-protect the final data page (protection violation, INSB write)
  - Write-protect a PT page (protection violation on A/D update, OUTSB
    read)

Signed-off-by: Kevin Cheng <chengkev@google.com>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm      |   1 +
 .../selftests/kvm/x86/nested_npf_test.c       | 374 ++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 375 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/nested_npf_test.c

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm
index fdec90e854671..55703d6be5e7a 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm
@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86 += x86/nested_dirty_log_test
 TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86 += x86/nested_emulation_test
 TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86 += x86/nested_exceptions_test
 TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86 += x86/nested_invalid_cr3_test
+TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86 += x86/nested_npf_test
 TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86 += x86/nested_set_state_test
 TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86 += x86/nested_tsc_adjust_test
 TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86 += x86/nested_tsc_scaling_test
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/nested_npf_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/nested_npf_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..7725e5dc3a386
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/nested_npf_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,374 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2025, Google, Inc.
+ */
+
+#include "test_util.h"
+#include "kvm_util.h"
+#include "processor.h"
+#include "svm_util.h"
+#include "vmx.h"
+
+#define L2_GUEST_STACK_SIZE 64
+
+#define EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_READ		BIT(0)
+#define EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_WRITE		BIT(1)
+#define EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_INSTR		BIT(2)
+#define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_READ		BIT(3)
+#define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_WRITE	BIT(4)
+#define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_EXEC		BIT(5)
+#define EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID	BIT(7)
+#define EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED	BIT(8)
+
+enum test_type {
+	TEST_FINAL_PAGE_UNMAPPED,	    /* Final data page not present */
+	TEST_PT_PAGE_UNMAPPED,		    /* Page table page not present */
+	TEST_FINAL_PAGE_WRITE_PROTECTED,    /* Final data page read-only */
+	TEST_PT_PAGE_WRITE_PROTECTED,	    /* Page table page read-only */
+};
+
+static vm_vaddr_t l2_test_page;
+static void (*l2_entry)(void);
+
+#define TEST_IO_PORT 0x80
+#define TEST1_VADDR 0x8000000ULL
+#define TEST2_VADDR 0x10000000ULL
+#define TEST3_VADDR 0x18000000ULL
+#define TEST4_VADDR 0x20000000ULL
+
+/*
+ * L2 executes OUTS reading from l2_test_page, triggering a nested page
+ * fault on the read access.
+ */
+static void l2_guest_code_outs(void)
+{
+	asm volatile("outsb" ::"S"(l2_test_page), "d"(TEST_IO_PORT) : "memory");
+	GUEST_FAIL("L2 should not reach here");
+}
+
+/*
+ * L2 executes INS writing to l2_test_page, triggering a nested page
+ * fault on the write access.
+ */
+static void l2_guest_code_ins(void)
+{
+	asm volatile("insb" ::"D"(l2_test_page), "d"(TEST_IO_PORT) : "memory");
+	GUEST_FAIL("L2 should not reach here");
+}
+
+static void l1_vmx_code(struct vmx_pages *vmx, uint64_t expected_fault_gpa,
+			 uint64_t test_type)
+{
+	unsigned long l2_guest_stack[L2_GUEST_STACK_SIZE];
+	uint64_t exit_qual;
+
+	GUEST_ASSERT(vmx->vmcs_gpa);
+	GUEST_ASSERT(prepare_for_vmx_operation(vmx));
+	GUEST_ASSERT(load_vmcs(vmx));
+
+	prepare_vmcs(vmx, l2_entry, &l2_guest_stack[L2_GUEST_STACK_SIZE]);
+
+	GUEST_ASSERT(!vmlaunch());
+
+	/* Verify we got an EPT violation exit */
+	__GUEST_ASSERT(vmreadz(VM_EXIT_REASON) == EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION,
+		       "Expected EPT violation (0x%x), got 0x%lx",
+		       EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION,
+		       vmreadz(VM_EXIT_REASON));
+
+	exit_qual = vmreadz(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
+
+	switch (test_type) {
+	case TEST_FINAL_PAGE_UNMAPPED:
+		/* Read access, final translation, page not present */
+		__GUEST_ASSERT(exit_qual & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_READ,
+			       "Expected ACC_READ set, exit_qual 0x%lx",
+			       exit_qual);
+		__GUEST_ASSERT(exit_qual & EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID,
+			       "Expected GVA_IS_VALID set, exit_qual 0x%lx",
+			       exit_qual);
+		__GUEST_ASSERT(exit_qual & EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED,
+			       "Expected GVA_TRANSLATED set, exit_qual 0x%lx",
+			       exit_qual);
+		break;
+	case TEST_PT_PAGE_UNMAPPED:
+		/* Read access, page walk fault, page not present */
+		__GUEST_ASSERT(exit_qual & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_READ,
+			       "Expected ACC_READ set, exit_qual 0x%lx",
+			       exit_qual);
+		__GUEST_ASSERT(exit_qual & EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID,
+			       "Expected GVA_IS_VALID set, exit_qual 0x%lx",
+			       exit_qual);
+		__GUEST_ASSERT(!(exit_qual & EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED),
+			       "Expected GVA_TRANSLATED clear, exit_qual 0x%lx",
+			       exit_qual);
+		break;
+	case TEST_FINAL_PAGE_WRITE_PROTECTED:
+		/* Write access, final translation, page present but read-only */
+		__GUEST_ASSERT(exit_qual & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_WRITE,
+			       "Expected ACC_WRITE set, exit_qual 0x%lx",
+			       exit_qual);
+		__GUEST_ASSERT(exit_qual & EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_READ,
+			       "Expected PROT_READ set, exit_qual 0x%lx",
+			       exit_qual);
+		__GUEST_ASSERT(!(exit_qual & EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_WRITE),
+			       "Expected PROT_WRITE clear, exit_qual 0x%lx",
+			       exit_qual);
+		__GUEST_ASSERT(exit_qual & EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID,
+			       "Expected GVA_IS_VALID set, exit_qual 0x%lx",
+			       exit_qual);
+		__GUEST_ASSERT(exit_qual & EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED,
+			       "Expected GVA_TRANSLATED set, exit_qual 0x%lx",
+			       exit_qual);
+		break;
+	case TEST_PT_PAGE_WRITE_PROTECTED:
+		/* Write access (A/D update), page walk, page present but read-only */
+		__GUEST_ASSERT(exit_qual & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_WRITE,
+			       "Expected ACC_WRITE set, exit_qual 0x%lx",
+			       exit_qual);
+		__GUEST_ASSERT(exit_qual & EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_READ,
+			       "Expected PROT_READ set, exit_qual 0x%lx",
+			       exit_qual);
+		__GUEST_ASSERT(!(exit_qual & EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_WRITE),
+			       "Expected PROT_WRITE clear, exit_qual 0x%lx",
+			       exit_qual);
+		__GUEST_ASSERT(exit_qual & EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID,
+			       "Expected GVA_IS_VALID set, exit_qual 0x%lx",
+			       exit_qual);
+		__GUEST_ASSERT(!(exit_qual & EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED),
+			       "Expected GVA_TRANSLATED clear, exit_qual 0x%lx",
+			       exit_qual);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	__GUEST_ASSERT(vmreadz(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS) == expected_fault_gpa,
+		       "Expected guest_physical_address = 0x%lx, got 0x%lx",
+		       expected_fault_gpa,
+		       vmreadz(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS));
+
+	GUEST_DONE();
+}
+
+static void l1_svm_code(struct svm_test_data *svm, uint64_t expected_fault_gpa,
+			 uint64_t test_type)
+{
+	unsigned long l2_guest_stack[L2_GUEST_STACK_SIZE];
+	struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb;
+	uint64_t exit_info_1;
+
+	generic_svm_setup(svm, l2_entry,
+			  &l2_guest_stack[L2_GUEST_STACK_SIZE]);
+
+	run_guest(vmcb, svm->vmcb_gpa);
+
+	/* Verify we got an NPF exit */
+	__GUEST_ASSERT(vmcb->control.exit_code == SVM_EXIT_NPF,
+		       "Expected NPF exit (0x%x), got 0x%lx", SVM_EXIT_NPF,
+		       vmcb->control.exit_code);
+
+	exit_info_1 = vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
+
+	switch (test_type) {
+	case TEST_FINAL_PAGE_UNMAPPED:
+		/* Read access, final translation, page not present */
+		__GUEST_ASSERT(exit_info_1 & PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK,
+			       "Expected GUEST_FINAL set, exit_info_1 0x%lx",
+			       (unsigned long)exit_info_1);
+		__GUEST_ASSERT(!(exit_info_1 & PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK),
+			       "Expected GUEST_PAGE clear, exit_info_1 0x%lx",
+			       (unsigned long)exit_info_1);
+		__GUEST_ASSERT(!(exit_info_1 & PFERR_PRESENT_MASK),
+			       "Expected PRESENT clear, exit_info_1 0x%lx",
+			       (unsigned long)exit_info_1);
+		break;
+	case TEST_PT_PAGE_UNMAPPED:
+		/* Read access, page walk fault, page not present */
+		__GUEST_ASSERT(exit_info_1 & PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK,
+			       "Expected GUEST_PAGE set, exit_info_1 0x%lx",
+			       (unsigned long)exit_info_1);
+		__GUEST_ASSERT(!(exit_info_1 & PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK),
+			       "Expected GUEST_FINAL clear, exit_info_1 0x%lx",
+			       (unsigned long)exit_info_1);
+		__GUEST_ASSERT(!(exit_info_1 & PFERR_PRESENT_MASK),
+			       "Expected PRESENT clear, exit_info_1 0x%lx",
+			       (unsigned long)exit_info_1);
+		break;
+	case TEST_FINAL_PAGE_WRITE_PROTECTED:
+		/* Write access, final translation, page present but read-only */
+		__GUEST_ASSERT(exit_info_1 & PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK,
+			       "Expected GUEST_FINAL set, exit_info_1 0x%lx",
+			       (unsigned long)exit_info_1);
+		__GUEST_ASSERT(!(exit_info_1 & PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK),
+			       "Expected GUEST_PAGE clear, exit_info_1 0x%lx",
+			       (unsigned long)exit_info_1);
+		__GUEST_ASSERT(exit_info_1 & PFERR_PRESENT_MASK,
+			       "Expected PRESENT set, exit_info_1 0x%lx",
+			       (unsigned long)exit_info_1);
+		__GUEST_ASSERT(exit_info_1 & PFERR_WRITE_MASK,
+			       "Expected WRITE set, exit_info_1 0x%lx",
+			       (unsigned long)exit_info_1);
+		break;
+	case TEST_PT_PAGE_WRITE_PROTECTED:
+		/* Write access (A/D update), page walk, page present but read-only */
+		__GUEST_ASSERT(exit_info_1 & PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK,
+			       "Expected GUEST_PAGE set, exit_info_1 0x%lx",
+			       (unsigned long)exit_info_1);
+		__GUEST_ASSERT(!(exit_info_1 & PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK),
+			       "Expected GUEST_FINAL clear, exit_info_1 0x%lx",
+			       (unsigned long)exit_info_1);
+		__GUEST_ASSERT(exit_info_1 & PFERR_PRESENT_MASK,
+			       "Expected PRESENT set, exit_info_1 0x%lx",
+			       (unsigned long)exit_info_1);
+		__GUEST_ASSERT(exit_info_1 & PFERR_WRITE_MASK,
+			       "Expected WRITE set, exit_info_1 0x%lx",
+			       (unsigned long)exit_info_1);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	__GUEST_ASSERT(vmcb->control.exit_info_2 == expected_fault_gpa,
+		       "Expected exit_info_2 = 0x%lx, got 0x%lx",
+		       expected_fault_gpa,
+		       vmcb->control.exit_info_2);
+
+	GUEST_DONE();
+}
+
+static void l1_guest_code(void *data, uint64_t expected_fault_gpa,
+			  uint64_t test_type)
+{
+	if (this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VMX))
+		l1_vmx_code(data, expected_fault_gpa, test_type);
+	else
+		l1_svm_code(data, expected_fault_gpa, test_type);
+}
+
+/* Returns the GPA of the PT page that maps @vaddr. */
+static uint64_t get_pt_gpa_for_vaddr(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t vaddr)
+{
+	uint64_t *pte;
+
+	pte = vm_get_pte(vm, vaddr);
+	TEST_ASSERT(pte && (*pte & 0x1), "PTE not present for vaddr 0x%lx",
+		    (unsigned long)vaddr);
+
+	return addr_hva2gpa(vm, (void *)((uint64_t)pte & ~0xFFFULL));
+}
+
+static void run_test(enum test_type type)
+{
+	vm_paddr_t expected_fault_gpa;
+	vm_vaddr_t nested_gva;
+
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	struct kvm_vm *vm;
+	struct ucall uc;
+
+	vm = vm_create_with_one_vcpu(&vcpu, l1_guest_code);
+	vm_enable_tdp(vm);
+
+	if (kvm_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VMX))
+		vcpu_alloc_vmx(vm, &nested_gva);
+	else
+		vcpu_alloc_svm(vm, &nested_gva);
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case TEST_FINAL_PAGE_UNMAPPED:
+		/*
+		 * Unmap the final data page from NPT/EPT. The guest page
+		 * table walk succeeds, but the final GPA->HPA translation
+		 * fails. L2 reads from the page via OUTS.
+		 */
+		l2_entry = l2_guest_code_outs;
+		l2_test_page = vm_vaddr_alloc(vm, vm->page_size, TEST1_VADDR);
+		expected_fault_gpa = addr_gva2gpa(vm, l2_test_page);
+		break;
+	case TEST_PT_PAGE_UNMAPPED:
+		/*
+		 * Unmap a page table page from NPT/EPT. The hardware page
+		 * table walk fails when translating the PT page's GPA
+		 * through NPT/EPT. L2 reads from the page via OUTS.
+		 */
+		l2_entry = l2_guest_code_outs;
+		l2_test_page = vm_vaddr_alloc(vm, vm->page_size, TEST2_VADDR);
+		expected_fault_gpa = get_pt_gpa_for_vaddr(vm, l2_test_page);
+		break;
+	case TEST_FINAL_PAGE_WRITE_PROTECTED:
+		/*
+		 * Write-protect the final data page in NPT/EPT.  The page
+		 * is present and readable, but not writable.  L2 writes to
+		 * the page via INS, triggering a protection violation.
+		 */
+		l2_entry = l2_guest_code_ins;
+		l2_test_page = vm_vaddr_alloc(vm, vm->page_size, TEST3_VADDR);
+		expected_fault_gpa = addr_gva2gpa(vm, l2_test_page);
+		break;
+	case TEST_PT_PAGE_WRITE_PROTECTED:
+		/*
+		 * Write-protect a page table page in NPT/EPT.  The page is
+		 * present and readable, but not writable.  The guest page
+		 * table walk needs write access to set A/D bits, so it
+		 * triggers a protection violation on the PT page.
+		 * L2 reads from the page via OUTS.
+		 */
+		l2_entry = l2_guest_code_outs;
+		l2_test_page = vm_vaddr_alloc(vm, vm->page_size, TEST4_VADDR);
+		expected_fault_gpa = get_pt_gpa_for_vaddr(vm, l2_test_page);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	tdp_identity_map_default_memslots(vm);
+
+	if (type == TEST_FINAL_PAGE_WRITE_PROTECTED ||
+	    type == TEST_PT_PAGE_WRITE_PROTECTED)
+		*tdp_get_pte(vm, expected_fault_gpa) &= ~PTE_WRITABLE_MASK(&vm->stage2_mmu);
+	else
+		*tdp_get_pte(vm, expected_fault_gpa) &= ~(PTE_PRESENT_MASK(&vm->stage2_mmu) |
+							   PTE_READABLE_MASK(&vm->stage2_mmu) |
+							   PTE_WRITABLE_MASK(&vm->stage2_mmu) |
+							   PTE_EXECUTABLE_MASK(&vm->stage2_mmu));
+
+	sync_global_to_guest(vm, l2_entry);
+	sync_global_to_guest(vm, l2_test_page);
+	vcpu_args_set(vcpu, 3, nested_gva, expected_fault_gpa, (uint64_t)type);
+
+	/*
+	 * For the INS-based write test, KVM emulates the instruction and
+	 * first reads from the I/O port, which exits to userspace.
+	 * Re-enter the guest so emulation can proceed to the memory
+	 * write, where the nested page fault is triggered.
+	 */
+	for (;;) {
+		vcpu_run(vcpu);
+
+		if (vcpu->run->exit_reason == KVM_EXIT_IO &&
+		    vcpu->run->io.port == TEST_IO_PORT &&
+		    vcpu->run->io.direction == KVM_EXIT_IO_IN) {
+			continue;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+
+	switch (get_ucall(vcpu, &uc)) {
+	case UCALL_DONE:
+		break;
+	case UCALL_ABORT:
+		REPORT_GUEST_ASSERT(uc);
+	default:
+		TEST_FAIL("Unexpected exit reason: %d", vcpu->run->exit_reason);
+	}
+
+	kvm_vm_free(vm);
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+	TEST_REQUIRE(kvm_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VMX) || kvm_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SVM));
+	TEST_REQUIRE(kvm_cpu_has_tdp());
+
+	run_test(TEST_FINAL_PAGE_UNMAPPED);
+	run_test(TEST_PT_PAGE_UNMAPPED);
+	run_test(TEST_FINAL_PAGE_WRITE_PROTECTED);
+	run_test(TEST_PT_PAGE_WRITE_PROTECTED);
+
+	return 0;
+}
-- 
2.53.0.414.gf7e9f6c205-goog

Re: [PATCH V2 4/4] KVM: selftests: Add nested page fault injection test

[Sean Christopherson]

On Tue, Feb 24, 2026, Kevin Cheng wrote:
> Add a test that exercises nested page fault injection during L2
> execution. L2 executes I/O string instructions (OUTSB/INSB) that access
> memory restricted in L1's nested page tables (NPT/EPT), triggering a
> nested page fault that L0 must inject to L1.
> 
> The test supports both AMD SVM (NPF) and Intel VMX (EPT violation) and
> verifies that:
>   - The exit reason is an NPF/EPT violation
>   - The access type and permission bits are correct
>   - The faulting GPA is correct
> 
> Three test cases are implemented:
>   - Unmap the final data page (final translation fault, OUTSB read)
>   - Unmap a PT page (page walk fault, OUTSB read)
>   - Write-protect the final data page (protection violation, INSB write)
>   - Write-protect a PT page (protection violation on A/D update, OUTSB
>     read)

Either in this test or in KUT, we need coverage for validating faults that are
reported by hardware, i.e. for faults that _don't_ go through the emulator.

E.g. there's this "todo" of sorts in KUT:

	case VMX_EPT_VIOLATION:
		/*
		 * Exit-qualifications are masked not to account for advanced
		 * VM-exit information. Once KVM supports this feature, this
		 * masking should be removed.
		 */
		exit_qual &= ~EPT_VLT_GUEST_MASK;


Or maybe both?  I generally prefer selftests for maintenance purposes, and you've
already written this test...

Re: [PATCH V2 4/4] KVM: selftests: Add nested page fault injection test

[Kevin Cheng]

On Tue, Feb 24, 2026 at 12:37 PM Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Feb 24, 2026, Kevin Cheng wrote:
> > Add a test that exercises nested page fault injection during L2
> > execution. L2 executes I/O string instructions (OUTSB/INSB) that access
> > memory restricted in L1's nested page tables (NPT/EPT), triggering a
> > nested page fault that L0 must inject to L1.
> >
> > The test supports both AMD SVM (NPF) and Intel VMX (EPT violation) and
> > verifies that:
> >   - The exit reason is an NPF/EPT violation
> >   - The access type and permission bits are correct
> >   - The faulting GPA is correct
> >
> > Three test cases are implemented:
> >   - Unmap the final data page (final translation fault, OUTSB read)
> >   - Unmap a PT page (page walk fault, OUTSB read)
> >   - Write-protect the final data page (protection violation, INSB write)
> >   - Write-protect a PT page (protection violation on A/D update, OUTSB
> >     read)
>
> Either in this test or in KUT, we need coverage for validating faults that are
> reported by hardware, i.e. for faults that _don't_ go through the emulator.
>
> E.g. there's this "todo" of sorts in KUT:
>
>         case VMX_EPT_VIOLATION:
>                 /*
>                  * Exit-qualifications are masked not to account for advanced
>                  * VM-exit information. Once KVM supports this feature, this
>                  * masking should be removed.
>                  */
>                 exit_qual &= ~EPT_VLT_GUEST_MASK;
>
>
> Or maybe both?  I generally prefer selftests for maintenance purposes, and you've
> already written this test...

Does https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260113003153.3344500-9-chengkev@google.com/
count :) These exercise nested_svm_inject_npf_exit()

Actually running these tests, I realized that the expected_fault is
incorrect in those KVM unit tests. Because PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK was
previously hardcorded, the KUTs had that set in the expected_fault.
However, with the NPF injection fixes, I will need to change the KUTs
to expect PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK to be set for the different test
cases which is actually the correct expectation.