From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Tycho Andersen <tycho@kernel.org>
Cc: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/4] selftests/kvm: check that SEV-ES VMs are allowed in SEV-SNP mode
Date: Wed, 25 Feb 2026 09:44:15 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aZ8077EfpxRGmT-O@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <aZ8xje-iM0_9ACie@tycho.pizza>
On Wed, Feb 25, 2026, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 24, 2026 at 10:02:28AM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > Hmm, I like the idea of clearing supported_vm_types. The wrinkle is that "legacy"
> > deployments that use KVM_SEV_INIT instead of KVM_SEV_INIT2 will use
> > KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM, and probably won't check for SEV and SEV_ES VM types.
>
> Does that matter?
Yes, but I don't think it matters so much that it's worth dealing with. For me,
being slightly nicer to userspace doesn't justify the risk of confusing KVM.
> If in the case of CiphertextHiding we would revoke KVM_X86_SEV_VM, users
> already couldn't start a VM anyway in the configuration.
>
> The firmware update is more tricky, but I don't think you can blame
> the kernel there...
Yeah, that's about where I'm at.
> > Alternatively, or in addition to, we could clear X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES. But clearing
> > SEV_ES while leaving X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP makes me nervous. KVM doesn't *currently*
> > check for any of those in kvm_cpu_caps, but that could change in the future. And
> > it's somewhat misleading, e.g. because sev_snp_guest() expects sev_es_guest() to
> > be true.
> >
> > Given that it doesn't make sense for KVM to actively prevent the admin from upgrading
> > the firmware, I think it's ok if KVM can't "gracefully" handle *every* case. E.g.
> > even if KVM clears X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES, userspace could have cached that information
> > at system boot.
> >
> > > > Hrm, I think we also neglected to communicate when SEV and SEV-ES are effectively
> > > > unusable, e.g. due to CipherTextHiding, so maybe we can kill two birds with one
> > > > stone? IIRC, we didn't bother enumerating the limitation with CipherTextHiding
> > > > because making SEV-ES unusable would require a deliberate act from the admin.
> > >
> > > We know these parameters at module load time so we could unset the
> > > supported bit, but...
> > >
> > > > "Update firmware" is also an deliberate act, but the side effect of SEV-ES being
> > > > disabled, not so much.
> > >
> > > since this could be a runtime thing via DOWNLOAD_FIRMWARE_EX at some
> > > point, I guess we need a new RUNTIME_STATUS ioctl or similar. Then the
> > > question is: does it live in /dev/sev, or /dev/kvm?
> >
> > Ugh. Yeah, updating supported_vm_types definitely seems like the least-awful
> > option.
>
> Since firmware update only happens on init right now, I think we can
> add a:
>
> int sev_firmware_supported_vm_types();
>
> that will do the feature detection from the ccp, and merge that with
> the results based on asid assignments during module init.
Ya, I don't have a better idea. Bleeding VM types into the CCP driver might be
a bit wonky, though I guess it is uAPI so it's certainly not a KVM-internal detail.
> We'll eventually need some callback into KVM to say say "hey the
> firmware got updated here's a new list of vm types".
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-02-25 17:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-23 16:28 [PATCH 0/4] Allow setting RAPL_DIS during SNP_INIT_EX Tycho Andersen
2026-02-23 16:28 ` [PATCH 1/4] selftests/kvm: allow retrieving underlying SEV firmware error Tycho Andersen
2026-02-23 16:28 ` [PATCH 2/4] selftests/kvm: check that SEV-ES VMs are allowed in SEV-SNP mode Tycho Andersen
2026-02-23 16:36 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-02-23 16:48 ` Tycho Andersen
2026-02-23 17:15 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-02-23 22:12 ` Tycho Andersen
2026-02-24 18:02 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-02-25 17:29 ` Tycho Andersen
2026-02-25 17:44 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2026-02-26 20:59 ` Tycho Andersen
2026-02-26 22:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-02-23 16:28 ` [PATCH 3/4] crypto/ccp: support setting RAPL_DIS in SNP_INIT_EX Tycho Andersen
2026-02-23 16:40 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-02-23 22:14 ` Tycho Andersen
2026-02-24 17:50 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-02-25 18:05 ` Tycho Andersen
2026-02-23 16:29 ` [PATCH 4/4] selftests/kvm: smoke test support for RAPL_DIS Tycho Andersen
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