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From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <x86@kernel.org>,
	Kiryl Shutsemau <kas@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	"Namhyung Kim" <namhyung@kernel.org>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>,
	<kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org>,
	Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 08/16] KVM: x86: Move bulk of emergency virtualizaton logic to virt subsystem
Date: Thu, 26 Feb 2026 16:55:53 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aaAKmdrKMjKFKM43@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260214012702.2368778-9-seanjc@google.com>

On Fri, Feb 13, 2026 at 05:26:54PM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>Move the majority of the code related to disabling hardware virtualization
>in emergency from KVM into the virt subsystem so that virt can take full
>ownership of the state of SVM/VMX.  This will allow refcounting usage of
>SVM/VMX so that KVM and the TDX subsystem can enable VMX without stomping
>on each other.
>
>To route the emergency callback to the "right" vendor code, add to avoid

							     ^^^ and

>-void cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization(void)
>-{
>-	cpu_emergency_virt_cb *callback;
>-
>-	/*
>-	 * IRQs must be disabled as KVM enables virtualization in hardware via
>-	 * function call IPIs, i.e. IRQs need to be disabled to guarantee
>-	 * virtualization stays disabled.
>-	 */
>-	lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
>-
>-	rcu_read_lock();
>-	callback = rcu_dereference(cpu_emergency_virt_callback);
>-	if (callback)
>-		callback();
>-	rcu_read_unlock();

...

>+static void x86_virt_invoke_kvm_emergency_callback(void)
>+{
>+	cpu_emergency_virt_cb *kvm_callback;
>+
>+	kvm_callback = rcu_dereference(kvm_emergency_callback);
>+	if (kvm_callback)
>+		kvm_callback();

The RCU lock is dropped here. I assume this is intentional since the function
is only called with IRQs disabled, in which case the RCU lock isn't needed.

<snip>

>+int x86_virt_emergency_disable_virtualization_cpu(void)
>+{
>+	/* Ensure the !feature check can't get false positives. */
>+	BUILD_BUG_ON(!X86_FEATURE_SVM || !X86_FEATURE_VMX);
>+
>+	if (!virt_ops.feature)
>+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>+
>+	/*
>+	 * IRQs must be disabled as virtualization is enabled in hardware via
>+	 * function call IPIs, i.e. IRQs need to be disabled to guarantee
>+	 * virtualization stays disabled.
>+	 */

The comment is stale. Since this patch just moves the comment, it should be
fine to keep it as-is and fix it in a separate series.

>+	lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
>+
>+	/*
>+	 * Do the NMI shootdown even if virtualization is off on _this_ CPU, as
>+	 * other CPUs may have virtualization enabled.
>+	 *
>+	 * TODO: Track whether or not virtualization might be enabled on other
>+	 *	 CPUs?  May not be worth avoiding the NMI shootdown...
>+	 */
>+	virt_ops.emergency_disable_virtualization_cpu();
>+	return 0;
>+}
>+
> void __init x86_virt_init(void)
> {
>-	x86_vmx_init();
>+	/*
>+	 * Attempt to initialize both SVM and VMX, and simply use whichever one
>+	 * is present.  Rsefuse to enable/use SVM or VMX if both are somehow

			^^^^^^^ Refuse

LGTM aside from the two typos above.

Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>

  reply	other threads:[~2026-02-26  8:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-02-14  1:26 [PATCH v3 00/16] KVM: x86/tdx: Have TDX handle VMXON during bringup Sean Christopherson
2026-02-14  1:26 ` [PATCH v3 01/16] KVM: x86: Move kvm_rebooting to x86 Sean Christopherson
2026-02-14  1:26 ` [PATCH v3 02/16] KVM: VMX: Move architectural "vmcs" and "vmcs_hdr" structures to public vmx.h Sean Christopherson
2026-02-14  1:26 ` [PATCH v3 03/16] KVM: x86: Move "kvm_rebooting" to kernel as "virt_rebooting" Sean Christopherson
2026-02-14  1:26 ` [PATCH v3 04/16] KVM: VMX: Unconditionally allocate root VMCSes during boot CPU bringup Sean Christopherson
2026-02-14  1:26 ` [PATCH v3 05/16] x86/virt: Force-clear X86_FEATURE_VMX if configuring root VMCS fails Sean Christopherson
2026-02-16 20:53   ` dan.j.williams
2026-02-17 16:31     ` Sean Christopherson
2026-02-14  1:26 ` [PATCH v3 06/16] KVM: VMX: Move core VMXON enablement to kernel Sean Christopherson
2026-02-26 22:32   ` Dave Hansen
2026-02-14  1:26 ` [PATCH v3 07/16] KVM: SVM: Move core EFER.SVME " Sean Christopherson
2026-02-26  7:40   ` Chao Gao
2026-02-26 23:43     ` Sean Christopherson
2026-02-14  1:26 ` [PATCH v3 08/16] KVM: x86: Move bulk of emergency virtualizaton logic to virt subsystem Sean Christopherson
2026-02-26  8:55   ` Chao Gao [this message]
2026-02-14  1:26 ` [PATCH v3 09/16] x86/virt: Add refcounting of VMX/SVM usage to support multiple in-kernel users Sean Christopherson
2026-02-27 11:26   ` Chao Gao
2026-02-14  1:26 ` [PATCH v3 10/16] x86/virt/tdx: Drop the outdated requirement that TDX be enabled in IRQ context Sean Christopherson
2026-02-17 11:29   ` Huang, Kai
2026-02-17 15:25     ` Sean Christopherson
2026-02-17 20:30       ` Huang, Kai
2026-02-14  1:26 ` [PATCH v3 11/16] KVM: x86/tdx: Do VMXON and TDX-Module initialization during subsys init Sean Christopherson
2026-02-26 22:35   ` Dave Hansen
2026-02-27 11:28   ` Chao Gao
2026-02-14  1:26 ` [PATCH v3 12/16] x86/virt/tdx: Tag a pile of functions as __init, and globals as __ro_after_init Sean Christopherson
2026-02-14  1:26 ` [PATCH v3 13/16] x86/virt/tdx: KVM: Consolidate TDX CPU hotplug handling Sean Christopherson
2026-02-14  1:27 ` [PATCH v3 14/16] x86/virt/tdx: Use ida_is_empty() to detect if any TDs may be running Sean Christopherson
2026-02-14  1:27 ` [PATCH v3 15/16] KVM: Bury kvm_{en,dis}able_virtualization() in kvm_main.c once more Sean Christopherson
2026-02-14  1:27 ` [PATCH v3 16/16] KVM: TDX: Fold tdx_bringup() into tdx_hardware_setup() Sean Christopherson
2026-02-16 23:00 ` [PATCH v3 00/16] KVM: x86/tdx: Have TDX handle VMXON during bringup dan.j.williams
2026-02-25 14:38 ` Chao Gao
2026-03-03 21:39 ` Sagi Shahar
2026-03-04  0:06   ` Sagi Shahar
2026-03-05 17:08 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 18:50   ` dan.j.williams
2026-03-05 18:54     ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-05 19:07       ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 19:08     ` Sean Christopherson

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