From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <x86@kernel.org>,
Kiryl Shutsemau <kas@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
"Namhyung Kim" <namhyung@kernel.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>,
<kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org>,
Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 08/16] KVM: x86: Move bulk of emergency virtualizaton logic to virt subsystem
Date: Thu, 26 Feb 2026 16:55:53 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aaAKmdrKMjKFKM43@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260214012702.2368778-9-seanjc@google.com>
On Fri, Feb 13, 2026 at 05:26:54PM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>Move the majority of the code related to disabling hardware virtualization
>in emergency from KVM into the virt subsystem so that virt can take full
>ownership of the state of SVM/VMX. This will allow refcounting usage of
>SVM/VMX so that KVM and the TDX subsystem can enable VMX without stomping
>on each other.
>
>To route the emergency callback to the "right" vendor code, add to avoid
^^^ and
>-void cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization(void)
>-{
>- cpu_emergency_virt_cb *callback;
>-
>- /*
>- * IRQs must be disabled as KVM enables virtualization in hardware via
>- * function call IPIs, i.e. IRQs need to be disabled to guarantee
>- * virtualization stays disabled.
>- */
>- lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
>-
>- rcu_read_lock();
>- callback = rcu_dereference(cpu_emergency_virt_callback);
>- if (callback)
>- callback();
>- rcu_read_unlock();
...
>+static void x86_virt_invoke_kvm_emergency_callback(void)
>+{
>+ cpu_emergency_virt_cb *kvm_callback;
>+
>+ kvm_callback = rcu_dereference(kvm_emergency_callback);
>+ if (kvm_callback)
>+ kvm_callback();
The RCU lock is dropped here. I assume this is intentional since the function
is only called with IRQs disabled, in which case the RCU lock isn't needed.
<snip>
>+int x86_virt_emergency_disable_virtualization_cpu(void)
>+{
>+ /* Ensure the !feature check can't get false positives. */
>+ BUILD_BUG_ON(!X86_FEATURE_SVM || !X86_FEATURE_VMX);
>+
>+ if (!virt_ops.feature)
>+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>+
>+ /*
>+ * IRQs must be disabled as virtualization is enabled in hardware via
>+ * function call IPIs, i.e. IRQs need to be disabled to guarantee
>+ * virtualization stays disabled.
>+ */
The comment is stale. Since this patch just moves the comment, it should be
fine to keep it as-is and fix it in a separate series.
>+ lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
>+
>+ /*
>+ * Do the NMI shootdown even if virtualization is off on _this_ CPU, as
>+ * other CPUs may have virtualization enabled.
>+ *
>+ * TODO: Track whether or not virtualization might be enabled on other
>+ * CPUs? May not be worth avoiding the NMI shootdown...
>+ */
>+ virt_ops.emergency_disable_virtualization_cpu();
>+ return 0;
>+}
>+
> void __init x86_virt_init(void)
> {
>- x86_vmx_init();
>+ /*
>+ * Attempt to initialize both SVM and VMX, and simply use whichever one
>+ * is present. Rsefuse to enable/use SVM or VMX if both are somehow
^^^^^^^ Refuse
LGTM aside from the two typos above.
Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-02-26 8:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-14 1:26 [PATCH v3 00/16] KVM: x86/tdx: Have TDX handle VMXON during bringup Sean Christopherson
2026-02-14 1:26 ` [PATCH v3 01/16] KVM: x86: Move kvm_rebooting to x86 Sean Christopherson
2026-02-14 1:26 ` [PATCH v3 02/16] KVM: VMX: Move architectural "vmcs" and "vmcs_hdr" structures to public vmx.h Sean Christopherson
2026-02-14 1:26 ` [PATCH v3 03/16] KVM: x86: Move "kvm_rebooting" to kernel as "virt_rebooting" Sean Christopherson
2026-02-14 1:26 ` [PATCH v3 04/16] KVM: VMX: Unconditionally allocate root VMCSes during boot CPU bringup Sean Christopherson
2026-02-14 1:26 ` [PATCH v3 05/16] x86/virt: Force-clear X86_FEATURE_VMX if configuring root VMCS fails Sean Christopherson
2026-02-16 20:53 ` dan.j.williams
2026-02-17 16:31 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-02-14 1:26 ` [PATCH v3 06/16] KVM: VMX: Move core VMXON enablement to kernel Sean Christopherson
2026-02-26 22:32 ` Dave Hansen
2026-02-14 1:26 ` [PATCH v3 07/16] KVM: SVM: Move core EFER.SVME " Sean Christopherson
2026-02-26 7:40 ` Chao Gao
2026-02-26 23:43 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-02-14 1:26 ` [PATCH v3 08/16] KVM: x86: Move bulk of emergency virtualizaton logic to virt subsystem Sean Christopherson
2026-02-26 8:55 ` Chao Gao [this message]
2026-02-14 1:26 ` [PATCH v3 09/16] x86/virt: Add refcounting of VMX/SVM usage to support multiple in-kernel users Sean Christopherson
2026-02-27 11:26 ` Chao Gao
2026-02-14 1:26 ` [PATCH v3 10/16] x86/virt/tdx: Drop the outdated requirement that TDX be enabled in IRQ context Sean Christopherson
2026-02-17 11:29 ` Huang, Kai
2026-02-17 15:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-02-17 20:30 ` Huang, Kai
2026-02-14 1:26 ` [PATCH v3 11/16] KVM: x86/tdx: Do VMXON and TDX-Module initialization during subsys init Sean Christopherson
2026-02-26 22:35 ` Dave Hansen
2026-02-27 11:28 ` Chao Gao
2026-02-14 1:26 ` [PATCH v3 12/16] x86/virt/tdx: Tag a pile of functions as __init, and globals as __ro_after_init Sean Christopherson
2026-02-14 1:26 ` [PATCH v3 13/16] x86/virt/tdx: KVM: Consolidate TDX CPU hotplug handling Sean Christopherson
2026-02-14 1:27 ` [PATCH v3 14/16] x86/virt/tdx: Use ida_is_empty() to detect if any TDs may be running Sean Christopherson
2026-02-14 1:27 ` [PATCH v3 15/16] KVM: Bury kvm_{en,dis}able_virtualization() in kvm_main.c once more Sean Christopherson
2026-02-14 1:27 ` [PATCH v3 16/16] KVM: TDX: Fold tdx_bringup() into tdx_hardware_setup() Sean Christopherson
2026-02-16 23:00 ` [PATCH v3 00/16] KVM: x86/tdx: Have TDX handle VMXON during bringup dan.j.williams
2026-02-25 14:38 ` Chao Gao
2026-03-03 21:39 ` Sagi Shahar
2026-03-04 0:06 ` Sagi Shahar
2026-03-05 17:08 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 18:50 ` dan.j.williams
2026-03-05 18:54 ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-05 19:07 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 19:08 ` Sean Christopherson
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=aaAKmdrKMjKFKM43@intel.com \
--to=chao.gao@intel.com \
--cc=acme@kernel.org \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=dan.j.williams@intel.com \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=kas@kernel.org \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-coco@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=namhyung@kernel.org \
--cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=seanjc@google.com \
--cc=tglx@kernel.org \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
--cc=yilun.xu@linux.intel.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox