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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Tycho Andersen <tycho@kernel.org>
Cc: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	 John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	 Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	 "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,  linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org,  linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/4] selftests/kvm: check that SEV-ES VMs are allowed in SEV-SNP mode
Date: Thu, 26 Feb 2026 14:28:03 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aaDI83LDFj9Be-sH@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <aaC0KGXmfhOMOrJ9@tycho.pizza>

On Thu, Feb 26, 2026, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 25, 2026 at 09:44:15AM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > Ya, I don't have a better idea.  Bleeding VM types into the CCP driver might be
> > a bit wonky, though I guess it is uAPI so it's certainly not a KVM-internal detail.
> 
> Turns out this approach breaks the selftests, which is at least one
> userspace:
> 
> # ./sev_init2_tests
> Random seed: 0x6b8b4567
> ==== Test Assertion Failure ====
>   x86/sev_init2_tests.c:141: have_sev_es == !!(kvm_check_cap(KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES) & BIT(KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM))
>   pid=12498 tid=12498 errno=0 - Success
>      1	0x0000000000402747: main at sev_init2_tests.c:141 (discriminator 2)
>      2	0x00007f9adae2a1c9: ?? ??:0
>      3	0x00007f9adae2a28a: ?? ??:0
>      4	0x0000000000402934: _start at ??:?
>   sev-es: KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES (15) does not match cpuid (checking 8)
> 
> As near as I can tell qemu doesn't do the same anywhere. SNP guests
> run fine, and SEV-ES says something reasonable:
> 
> qemu-system-x86_64: sev_launch_start: LAUNCH_START ret=1 fw_error=21 'Feature not supported'
> qemu-system-x86_64: sev_common_kvm_init: failed to create encryption context
> qemu-system-x86_64: failed to initialize kvm: Operation not permitted
> 
> Thoughts?

Breaking selftests is totally fine, they don't count as real users (the whole
point is to validate KVM behavior; if we weren't allowed to break selftests, we
literally couldn't fix a huge pile of KVM bugs).

Even if a real VMM has a similar sanity check, I wouldn't consider an assertion
firing to be a breaking flaw.  No matter what, the VMM won't be able to launch an
SEV-ES guest.

For selftests, something like this?

	have_sev_es = kvm_check_cap(KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES) & BIT(KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM);
	TEST_ASSERT(!have_sev_es || kvm_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES),
		    "sev-es: SEV_ES_VM supported without SEV_ES in CPUID");

	have_snp = kvm_check_cap(KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES) & BIT(KVM_X86_SNP_VM);
	TEST_ASSERT(!have_snp || kvm_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP),
		    "sev-snp: SNP_VM supported with SEV_SNP in CPUID");


  reply	other threads:[~2026-02-26 22:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-02-23 16:28 [PATCH 0/4] Allow setting RAPL_DIS during SNP_INIT_EX Tycho Andersen
2026-02-23 16:28 ` [PATCH 1/4] selftests/kvm: allow retrieving underlying SEV firmware error Tycho Andersen
2026-02-23 16:28 ` [PATCH 2/4] selftests/kvm: check that SEV-ES VMs are allowed in SEV-SNP mode Tycho Andersen
2026-02-23 16:36   ` Sean Christopherson
2026-02-23 16:48     ` Tycho Andersen
2026-02-23 17:15       ` Sean Christopherson
2026-02-23 22:12         ` Tycho Andersen
2026-02-24 18:02           ` Sean Christopherson
2026-02-25 17:29             ` Tycho Andersen
2026-02-25 17:44               ` Sean Christopherson
2026-02-26 20:59                 ` Tycho Andersen
2026-02-26 22:28                   ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2026-02-23 16:28 ` [PATCH 3/4] crypto/ccp: support setting RAPL_DIS in SNP_INIT_EX Tycho Andersen
2026-02-23 16:40   ` Sean Christopherson
2026-02-23 22:14     ` Tycho Andersen
2026-02-24 17:50       ` Sean Christopherson
2026-02-25 18:05         ` Tycho Andersen
2026-02-23 16:29 ` [PATCH 4/4] selftests/kvm: smoke test support for RAPL_DIS Tycho Andersen

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