From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 96410314A64; Tue, 3 Mar 2026 21:30:48 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1772573448; cv=none; b=pSCRFlvoobNUxNGctx/xDJEV7io1kM3ZW7dqf2OHBKeeyD5uARfPHI2C42ZxT7BTeQ0T0MRZHIcJ3gOnGPMdvq05j0HDOZHF18O8nQlN76hC6FFuMXBNfTtGd5nOY6JRex5jKVgYmkJ8Sj3tVWCiv9v0it0fEzSdaAMIRv4OR8Q= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1772573448; c=relaxed/simple; bh=4c0TFwH2b+pC4Fu9mQ0jIAlqb8vgIoFBsfbu1qKF5Ho=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=ma4pvVIarc46eOr+6amrPcOGZ0Nnk1WmTJVhThj6HKyO1X/A57NT7SiSaaEaUZ2vNAFweuntXQRa906t8FyIsEJR7bVNDHEwaAmCoIZQ8AgxzKQ9CpBkol/EEi3T/gr9CotaNx1jAzdizLw41ZLpVyguZ/WvR1T2SReBqTCDTo8= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=tdPm33CT; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="tdPm33CT" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 9A827C116C6; Tue, 3 Mar 2026 21:30:47 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1772573448; bh=4c0TFwH2b+pC4Fu9mQ0jIAlqb8vgIoFBsfbu1qKF5Ho=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=tdPm33CT9vKuaJdE08c73fl9+Ivp84fXqk9CB4KIxnEWBRibooUEe5ecWwnDvIbpf cph3GW5+3KlfuIeVn7KOel/x9D9EBKlWkPi5Z2mmWX1xwOPvesx1I9anh9sY8fRIC1 3gIMU5bR3ENXKHjeoFsY9q7FSGc5xgAEX35C+m3t1m+UORHn7zrySlnIx/HaIZAwqx XhQxj3pke+Hpam0NBTJBelZfWdCWpnFr+sj/Ik4hciMX/b0DltBElCEKC2S3mNbLZ0 Hcl2DARBS6X6SdtT764dgWurtfm/HXVKZdjFHYYhdnz7UXw+pfoHqxqrRfFu7JDLli vaxlpmCtXDsXA== Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2026 23:30:43 +0200 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Mimi Zohar Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, Chris Fenner , Jonathan McDowell , Eric Biggers , James Bottomley , David Howells , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , "open list:KEYS-TRUSTED" , "open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM" , open list , Roberto Sassu Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 01/11] KEYS: trusted: Use get_random-fallback for TPM Message-ID: References: <20260125192526.782202-1-jarkko@kernel.org> <20260125192526.782202-2-jarkko@kernel.org> <06a08cbbe47111a1795e5dcd42fb8cc4be643a72.camel@linux.ibm.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <06a08cbbe47111a1795e5dcd42fb8cc4be643a72.camel@linux.ibm.com> On Fri, Feb 20, 2026 at 01:04:30PM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote: > [Cc: Chris Fenner, Jonathan McDowell, Roberto] > > On Sun, 2026-01-25 at 21:25 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > 1. tpm2_get_random() is costly when TCG_TPM2_HMAC is enabled and thus its > > use should be pooled rather than directly used. This both reduces > > latency and improves its predictability. > > If the concern is the latency of encrypting the bus session, please remember > that: > > - Not all environments expose the TPM bus to sniffing. > - The current TPM trusted keys design is based on TPM RNG, but already allows it > to be replaced with the kernel RNG via the "trusted_rng=kernel" boot command > line option. > - The proposed patch removes that possibility for no reason. > > Mimi & Elaine I'm keeping this patch set in queue branch, possibly picking patches to some other patch set or they are available for picking to other patch sets. BR, Jarkko