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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,  kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,  corbet@lwn.net,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	 dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org,
	 peterz@infradead.org, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com,
	hch@infradead.org,  sohil.mehta@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 12/22] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data
Date: Wed, 4 Mar 2026 08:42:36 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aahg_PgO5mwjArZ6@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <A7B34157-A5CA-430C-A459-E8E142951ECB@zytor.com>

On Thu, Jan 29, 2026, Xin Li wrote:
> > On Jan 29, 2026, at 9:21 AM, H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> wrote:
> > 
> >> Just to confirm, you are referring to requeueing an original event
> >> via vmx_complete_interrupts(), right?
> >> 
> >> Regardless of whether FRED or IDT is in use, the event payload is delivered
> >> into the appropriate guest state and then invalidated in
> >> kvm_deliver_exception_payload():
> >> 
> >>       1) CR2 for #PF
> >> 
> >>       2) DR6 for #DB
> >> 
> >>       3) guest_fpu.xfd_err for #NM (in handle_nm_fault_irqoff())
> >> 
> >> We should be able to recover the FRED event data from there.
> >> 
> >> Alternatively, we could drop the original event and allow the hardware to
> >> regenerate it upon resuming the guest.  However, this breaks #DB delivery,
> >> as debug exceptions sometimes are triggered post-instruction.
> >> 
> >> Sean, does it make sense to recover the FRED event data from guest CPU state?

No?  As Peter points out, the payload is tied to the exception and shouldn't
change.

> > I think some bits in DR6 are "sticky", and so unless the guest has
> > explicitly cleared DR6 the event data isn't necessarily derivable from DR6.
> > However, the FRED event data for #DB is directly based on the data already
> > reported by VTx (for exactly the same reason – knowing what the *currently
> > taken* trap represents.)
> 
> Yeah, it's important to keep in mind that DR6 bits are 'sticky'.
> 
> Regarding vmx_complete_interrupts(), when a VM migration occurs immediately
> following a VM exit with a valid original event saved in the VMCS, we can
> safely assume the guest DR6 state remains consistent with the original event
> data because there is no chance for guest OS to modify DR6.

There's a different problem though.  If there's a re-injected exception at the
time of save/restore, the destination vCPU won't see a valid payload and thus
won't set the appropriate FRED VMCS fields.

We _could_ extend KVM's uAPI to save/restore event_data, but ugh.  Rather than
add event_data, what if we reuse payload, and then simply skip updating register
state on re-injection?  E.g.

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 967b58a8ab9d..b79d545d69c7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -1941,6 +1941,9 @@ void vmx_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
        u32 intr_info = ex->vector | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK;
        struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 
+       if (ex->has_payload)
+               <do fred>;
+
        kvm_deliver_exception_payload(vcpu, ex);
 
        if (ex->has_error_code) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index db3f393192d9..485eec337203 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -773,6 +773,9 @@ void kvm_deliver_exception_payload(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
        if (!ex->has_payload)
                return;
 
+       if (ex->injected)
+               goto clear_payload;
+
        switch (ex->vector) {
        case DB_VECTOR:
                /*
@@ -814,6 +817,7 @@ void kvm_deliver_exception_payload(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
                break;
        }
 
+clear_payload:
        ex->has_payload = false;
        ex->payload = 0;
 }

  reply	other threads:[~2026-03-04 16:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 106+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-10-26 20:18 [PATCH v9 00/22] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 01/22] KVM: VMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 02/22] KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config Xin Li (Intel)
2026-01-20  9:24   ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-22 17:57     ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 03/22] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Xin Li (Intel)
2026-03-05  0:25   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 04/22] x86/cea: Prefix event stack names with ESTACK_ Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 05/22] x86/cea: Use array indexing to simplify exception stack access Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-27 15:49   ` Dave Hansen
2025-10-28  2:31     ` Xin Li
2026-01-30 13:42   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 06/22] x86/cea: Export __this_cpu_ist_top_va() to KVM Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-27 15:50   ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-30 13:46   ` Borislav Petkov
2026-01-30 16:35     ` Xin Li
2026-01-30 17:56       ` Borislav Petkov
2026-03-07  7:38     ` Xin Li
2026-03-09 15:24       ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-09 22:57         ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 07/22] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19  2:44   ` Chao Gao
2026-01-21  6:44   ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-21 18:14     ` Xin Li
2026-01-22  0:45       ` Xin Li
2026-01-22  1:56         ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-22 17:22           ` Xin Li
2026-03-04 16:23     ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05  5:27       ` Xin Li
2026-03-05 15:21         ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 17:25           ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 08/22] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR intercepts Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12  5:49   ` Chao Gao
2026-03-05  0:48     ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05  5:56       ` Xin Li
2026-03-06  2:30       ` Chao Gao
2026-03-06 15:54         ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-16 19:49   ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-17  0:43     ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 09/22] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12  5:59   ` Chao Gao
2026-01-21  7:23   ` Binbin Wu
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 10/22] KVM: VMX: Add support for saving and restoring FRED MSRs Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12  6:16   ` Chao Gao
2025-12-01  6:20     ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 11/22] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12  6:19   ` Chao Gao
2026-01-21  8:05   ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-21 16:46     ` Xin Li
2026-01-21 20:24       ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-21 22:38         ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 12/22] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19  3:24   ` Chao Gao
2026-01-29 17:12     ` Xin Li
2026-01-29 17:21       ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-01-29 22:50         ` Xin Li
2026-03-04 16:42           ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 13/22] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19  6:54   ` Chao Gao
2026-03-07  2:07   ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-07  3:05     ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 14/22] KVM: x86: Save/restore the nested flag of an exception Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19  6:13   ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 15/22] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19  7:26   ` Chao Gao
2026-03-05  0:58     ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05  7:20       ` Xin Li
2026-03-05 15:35         ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 17:09           ` Xin Li
2026-03-05 17:46             ` Xin Li
2026-03-06  5:33       ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 16/22] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19  7:40   ` Chao Gao
2025-11-30 18:42     ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 17/22] KVM: x86: Advertise support for FRED Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12  7:30   ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20  6:56     ` Xin Li
2026-01-20  8:07       ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20  9:09         ` Xin Li
2026-01-20  9:46           ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-20 15:25             ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-20 18:04               ` Xin Li
2026-01-20 17:58             ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 18/22] KVM: nVMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 13:42   ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 19/22] KVM: nVMX: Handle FRED VMCS fields in nested VMX context Xin Li (Intel)
2025-12-02  6:32   ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20  6:30     ` Xin Li
2026-01-20 16:07       ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-20 18:10         ` Xin Li
2026-01-21  0:44       ` Chao Gao
2026-01-22 16:52         ` Xin Li
2025-12-08 22:37   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 20/22] KVM: nVMX: Validate FRED-related VMCS fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-13  3:00   ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20  9:19     ` Xin Li
2026-01-21  2:33       ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 21/22] KVM: nVMX: Guard SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros with VMX feature checks Xin Li (Intel)
2025-12-02  6:35   ` Chao Gao
2025-12-08 22:49   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 22/22] KVM: nVMX: Enable VMX FRED controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-13  3:20   ` Chao Gao
2025-11-06 17:35 ` [PATCH v9 00/22] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li
2025-11-13 22:20   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-08 22:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-09 17:08   ` Xin Li

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