From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net,
tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org,
peterz@infradead.org, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com,
hch@infradead.org, sohil.mehta@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 12/22] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data
Date: Wed, 4 Mar 2026 08:42:36 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aahg_PgO5mwjArZ6@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <A7B34157-A5CA-430C-A459-E8E142951ECB@zytor.com>
On Thu, Jan 29, 2026, Xin Li wrote:
> > On Jan 29, 2026, at 9:21 AM, H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> wrote:
> >
> >> Just to confirm, you are referring to requeueing an original event
> >> via vmx_complete_interrupts(), right?
> >>
> >> Regardless of whether FRED or IDT is in use, the event payload is delivered
> >> into the appropriate guest state and then invalidated in
> >> kvm_deliver_exception_payload():
> >>
> >> 1) CR2 for #PF
> >>
> >> 2) DR6 for #DB
> >>
> >> 3) guest_fpu.xfd_err for #NM (in handle_nm_fault_irqoff())
> >>
> >> We should be able to recover the FRED event data from there.
> >>
> >> Alternatively, we could drop the original event and allow the hardware to
> >> regenerate it upon resuming the guest. However, this breaks #DB delivery,
> >> as debug exceptions sometimes are triggered post-instruction.
> >>
> >> Sean, does it make sense to recover the FRED event data from guest CPU state?
No? As Peter points out, the payload is tied to the exception and shouldn't
change.
> > I think some bits in DR6 are "sticky", and so unless the guest has
> > explicitly cleared DR6 the event data isn't necessarily derivable from DR6.
> > However, the FRED event data for #DB is directly based on the data already
> > reported by VTx (for exactly the same reason – knowing what the *currently
> > taken* trap represents.)
>
> Yeah, it's important to keep in mind that DR6 bits are 'sticky'.
>
> Regarding vmx_complete_interrupts(), when a VM migration occurs immediately
> following a VM exit with a valid original event saved in the VMCS, we can
> safely assume the guest DR6 state remains consistent with the original event
> data because there is no chance for guest OS to modify DR6.
There's a different problem though. If there's a re-injected exception at the
time of save/restore, the destination vCPU won't see a valid payload and thus
won't set the appropriate FRED VMCS fields.
We _could_ extend KVM's uAPI to save/restore event_data, but ugh. Rather than
add event_data, what if we reuse payload, and then simply skip updating register
state on re-injection? E.g.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 967b58a8ab9d..b79d545d69c7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -1941,6 +1941,9 @@ void vmx_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
u32 intr_info = ex->vector | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK;
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+ if (ex->has_payload)
+ <do fred>;
+
kvm_deliver_exception_payload(vcpu, ex);
if (ex->has_error_code) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index db3f393192d9..485eec337203 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -773,6 +773,9 @@ void kvm_deliver_exception_payload(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
if (!ex->has_payload)
return;
+ if (ex->injected)
+ goto clear_payload;
+
switch (ex->vector) {
case DB_VECTOR:
/*
@@ -814,6 +817,7 @@ void kvm_deliver_exception_payload(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
break;
}
+clear_payload:
ex->has_payload = false;
ex->payload = 0;
}
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-03-04 16:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 106+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-10-26 20:18 [PATCH v9 00/22] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 01/22] KVM: VMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 02/22] KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config Xin Li (Intel)
2026-01-20 9:24 ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-22 17:57 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 03/22] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Xin Li (Intel)
2026-03-05 0:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 04/22] x86/cea: Prefix event stack names with ESTACK_ Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 05/22] x86/cea: Use array indexing to simplify exception stack access Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-27 15:49 ` Dave Hansen
2025-10-28 2:31 ` Xin Li
2026-01-30 13:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 06/22] x86/cea: Export __this_cpu_ist_top_va() to KVM Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-27 15:50 ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-30 13:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-01-30 16:35 ` Xin Li
2026-01-30 17:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-03-07 7:38 ` Xin Li
2026-03-09 15:24 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-09 22:57 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 07/22] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 2:44 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-21 6:44 ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-21 18:14 ` Xin Li
2026-01-22 0:45 ` Xin Li
2026-01-22 1:56 ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-22 17:22 ` Xin Li
2026-03-04 16:23 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 5:27 ` Xin Li
2026-03-05 15:21 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 17:25 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 08/22] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR intercepts Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 5:49 ` Chao Gao
2026-03-05 0:48 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 5:56 ` Xin Li
2026-03-06 2:30 ` Chao Gao
2026-03-06 15:54 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-16 19:49 ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-17 0:43 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 09/22] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 5:59 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-21 7:23 ` Binbin Wu
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 10/22] KVM: VMX: Add support for saving and restoring FRED MSRs Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 6:16 ` Chao Gao
2025-12-01 6:20 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 11/22] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 6:19 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-21 8:05 ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-21 16:46 ` Xin Li
2026-01-21 20:24 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-21 22:38 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 12/22] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 3:24 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-29 17:12 ` Xin Li
2026-01-29 17:21 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-01-29 22:50 ` Xin Li
2026-03-04 16:42 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 13/22] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 6:54 ` Chao Gao
2026-03-07 2:07 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-07 3:05 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 14/22] KVM: x86: Save/restore the nested flag of an exception Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 6:13 ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 15/22] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 7:26 ` Chao Gao
2026-03-05 0:58 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 7:20 ` Xin Li
2026-03-05 15:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 17:09 ` Xin Li
2026-03-05 17:46 ` Xin Li
2026-03-06 5:33 ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 16/22] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 7:40 ` Chao Gao
2025-11-30 18:42 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 17/22] KVM: x86: Advertise support for FRED Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 7:30 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20 6:56 ` Xin Li
2026-01-20 8:07 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20 9:09 ` Xin Li
2026-01-20 9:46 ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-20 15:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-20 18:04 ` Xin Li
2026-01-20 17:58 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 18/22] KVM: nVMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 13:42 ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 19/22] KVM: nVMX: Handle FRED VMCS fields in nested VMX context Xin Li (Intel)
2025-12-02 6:32 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20 6:30 ` Xin Li
2026-01-20 16:07 ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-20 18:10 ` Xin Li
2026-01-21 0:44 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-22 16:52 ` Xin Li
2025-12-08 22:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 20/22] KVM: nVMX: Validate FRED-related VMCS fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-13 3:00 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20 9:19 ` Xin Li
2026-01-21 2:33 ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 21/22] KVM: nVMX: Guard SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros with VMX feature checks Xin Li (Intel)
2025-12-02 6:35 ` Chao Gao
2025-12-08 22:49 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 22/22] KVM: nVMX: Enable VMX FRED controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-13 3:20 ` Chao Gao
2025-11-06 17:35 ` [PATCH v9 00/22] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li
2025-11-13 22:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-08 22:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-09 17:08 ` Xin Li
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