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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Shivansh Dhiman <shivansh.dhiman@amd.com>
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org,  tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,
	bp@alien8.de,  dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org,
	hpa@zytor.com, xin@zytor.com,  nikunj.dadhania@amd.com,
	santosh.shukla@amd.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 7/7] KVM: SVM: Enable save/restore of FRED MSRs
Date: Fri, 6 Mar 2026 18:14:11 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aauJ80pZrw_SfF31@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260129063653.3553076-8-shivansh.dhiman@amd.com>

On Thu, Jan 29, 2026, Shivansh Dhiman wrote:
> Set the FRED_VIRT_ENABLE bit (bit 4) in the VIRT_EXT field of VMCB to enable
> FRED Virtualization for the guest. This enables automatic save/restore of
> FRED MSRs. Also toggle this bit when setting CPUIDs, to support booting of
> secure guests.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Shivansh Dhiman <shivansh.dhiman@amd.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 6 ++++++
>  1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index 954df4eae90e..24579c149937 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -1144,6 +1144,9 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
>  	save->fred_ssp3 = 0;
>  	save->fred_config = 0;
>  
> +	if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FRED))
> +		svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext |= FRED_VIRT_ENABLE_MASK;

This is completely unnecessary, no?  CPUID is empty at vCPU creation and so FRED
_can't_ be enabled before going through svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid().

>  	init_sys_seg(&save->ldtr, SEG_TYPE_LDT);
>  	init_sys_seg(&save->tr, SEG_TYPE_BUSY_TSS16);
>  
> @@ -4529,6 +4532,9 @@ static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  	if (guest_cpuid_is_intel_compatible(vcpu))
>  		guest_cpu_cap_clear(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD);
>  
> +	if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FRED))
> +		svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext |= FRED_VIRT_ENABLE_MASK;

The flag needs to be cleared if FRED isn't supported, because KVM's wonderful
ABI allows userspace to modify CPUID however many times it wants before running
the vCPU.

> +
>  	if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
>  		sev_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(svm);
>  }
> -- 
> 2.43.0
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2026-03-07  2:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-01-29  6:36 [PATCH 0/7] KVM: SVM: Enable FRED support Shivansh Dhiman
2026-01-29  6:36 ` [PATCH 1/7] KVM: SVM: Initialize FRED VMCB fields Shivansh Dhiman
2026-03-07  1:58   ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-09 17:46     ` Shivansh Dhiman
2026-03-09 18:57       ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-11  4:18         ` Shivansh Dhiman
2026-03-27  6:41       ` Shivansh Dhiman
2026-01-29  6:36 ` [PATCH 2/7] KVM: SVM: Disable interception of FRED MSRs for FRED supported guests Shivansh Dhiman
2026-03-07  2:10   ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-09 17:47     ` Shivansh Dhiman
2026-01-29  6:36 ` [PATCH 3/7] KVM: SVM: Save restore FRED_RSP0 " Shivansh Dhiman
2026-03-05 20:37   ` Shivansh Dhiman
2026-01-29  6:36 ` [PATCH 4/7] KVM: SVM: Populate FRED event data on event injection Shivansh Dhiman
2026-03-06 11:31   ` Paolo Bonzini
2026-03-09 19:47     ` Shivansh Dhiman
2026-01-29  6:36 ` [PATCH 5/7] KVM: SVM: Support FRED nested exception injection Shivansh Dhiman
2026-03-07  2:07   ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 15:56     ` Shivansh Dhiman
2026-03-10 16:20       ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-11  4:12         ` Shivansh Dhiman
2026-01-29  6:36 ` [PATCH 6/7] KVM: SVM: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcb() Shivansh Dhiman
2026-03-07  2:03   ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-09 19:57     ` Shivansh Dhiman
2026-01-29  6:36 ` [PATCH 7/7] KVM: SVM: Enable save/restore of FRED MSRs Shivansh Dhiman
2026-03-07  2:14   ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2026-03-09 18:20     ` Shivansh Dhiman
2026-02-06  9:22 ` [PATCH 0/7] KVM: SVM: Enable FRED support Shivansh Dhiman
2026-02-11  0:53   ` Andrew Cooper
2026-03-06  9:33     ` Shivansh Dhiman
2026-03-03 17:58 ` Shivansh Dhiman

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