From: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
To: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, dave.hansen@intel.com,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org, chao.gao@intel.com,
rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, john.allen@amd.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 24/26] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace
Date: Thu, 30 Nov 2023 19:46:21 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ad3156de93a31449e1e88c52169a08cd6fc7edb1.camel@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231124055330.138870-25-weijiang.yang@intel.com>
On Fri, 2023-11-24 at 00:53 -0500, Yang Weijiang wrote:
> Expose CET features to guest if KVM/host can support them, clear CPUID
> feature bits if KVM/host cannot support.
>
> Set CPUID feature bits so that CET features are available in guest CPUID.
> Add CR4.CET bit support in order to allow guest set CET master control
> bit.
>
> Disable KVM CET feature if unrestricted_guest is unsupported/disabled as
> KVM does not support emulating CET.
> Don't expose CET feature if either of {U,S}_CET xstate bits is cleared
> in host XSS or if XSAVES isn't supported.
>
> The CET load-bits in VM_ENTRY/VM_EXIT control fields should be set to make
> guest CET xstates isolated from host's. And all platforms that support CET
> enumerate VMX_BASIC[bit56] as 1, clear CET feature bits if the bit doesn't
> read 1.
>
> Per Arch confirmation, CET MSR contents after reset, power-up and INIT are
> set to 0s, clears relevant guest fpstate areas so that the guest MSRs are
> reset to 0s after these events.
>
> Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 3 ++-
> arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h | 6 ++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 6 ++++--
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 3 +++
> 8 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> index f536102f1eca..fd110a0b712f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> @@ -133,7 +133,8 @@
> | X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PCE | X86_CR4_OSFXSR | X86_CR4_PCIDE \
> | X86_CR4_OSXSAVE | X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_FSGSBASE \
> | X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT | X86_CR4_LA57 | X86_CR4_VMXE \
> - | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_PKE | X86_CR4_UMIP))
> + | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_PKE | X86_CR4_UMIP \
> + | X86_CR4_CET))
>
> #define CR8_RESERVED_BITS (~(unsigned long)X86_CR8_TPR)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> index 389f9594746e..25ae7ceb5b39 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> @@ -1097,6 +1097,7 @@
> #define VMX_BASIC_MEM_TYPE_MASK 0x003c000000000000LLU
> #define VMX_BASIC_MEM_TYPE_WB 6LLU
> #define VMX_BASIC_INOUT 0x0040000000000000LLU
> +#define VMX_BASIC_NO_HW_ERROR_CODE_CC 0x0100000000000000LLU
>
> /* Resctrl MSRs: */
> /* - Intel: */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> index 1d9843b34196..6d758054f994 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> @@ -648,7 +648,7 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
> F(AVX512_VPOPCNTDQ) | F(UMIP) | F(AVX512_VBMI2) | F(GFNI) |
> F(VAES) | F(VPCLMULQDQ) | F(AVX512_VNNI) | F(AVX512_BITALG) |
> F(CLDEMOTE) | F(MOVDIRI) | F(MOVDIR64B) | 0 /*WAITPKG*/ |
> - F(SGX_LC) | F(BUS_LOCK_DETECT)
> + F(SGX_LC) | F(BUS_LOCK_DETECT) | F(SHSTK)
> );
> /* Set LA57 based on hardware capability. */
> if (cpuid_ecx(7) & F(LA57))
> @@ -666,7 +666,8 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
> F(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) | F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES) | F(INTEL_STIBP) |
> F(MD_CLEAR) | F(AVX512_VP2INTERSECT) | F(FSRM) |
> F(SERIALIZE) | F(TSXLDTRK) | F(AVX512_FP16) |
> - F(AMX_TILE) | F(AMX_INT8) | F(AMX_BF16) | F(FLUSH_L1D)
> + F(AMX_TILE) | F(AMX_INT8) | F(AMX_BF16) | F(FLUSH_L1D) |
> + F(IBT)
> );
>
> /* TSC_ADJUST and ARCH_CAPABILITIES are emulated in software. */
> @@ -679,6 +680,20 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
> kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP);
> if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
> kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD);
> + /*
> + * Don't use boot_cpu_has() to check availability of IBT because the
> + * feature bit is cleared in boot_cpu_data when ibt=off is applied
> + * in host cmdline.
> + *
> + * As currently there's no HW bug which requires disabling IBT feature
> + * while CPU can enumerate it, host cmdline option ibt=off is most
> + * likely due to administrative reason on host side, so KVM refers to
> + * CPU CPUID enumeration to enable the feature. In future if there's
> + * actually some bug clobbered ibt=off option, then enforce additional
> + * check here to disable the support in KVM.
> + */
This is a reasonable explanation.
> + if (cpuid_edx(7) & F(IBT))
> + kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_IBT);
>
> kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_7_1_EAX,
> F(AVX_VNNI) | F(AVX512_BF16) | F(CMPCCXADD) |
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
> index ee8938818c8a..e12bc233d88b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
> @@ -79,6 +79,12 @@ static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_basic_inout(void)
> return (((u64)vmcs_config.basic_cap << 32) & VMX_BASIC_INOUT);
> }
>
> +static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_basic_no_hw_errcode(void)
> +{
> + return ((u64)vmcs_config.basic_cap << 32) &
> + VMX_BASIC_NO_HW_ERROR_CODE_CC;
> +}
I still think that we should add a comment explaining why this check is needed,
as I said in the previous review.
> +
> static inline bool cpu_has_virtual_nmis(void)
> {
> return vmcs_config.pin_based_exec_ctrl & PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS &&
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index c658f2f230df..a1aae8709939 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -2614,6 +2614,7 @@ static int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,
> { VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER, VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER },
> { VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS, VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS },
> { VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_RTIT_CTL, VM_EXIT_CLEAR_IA32_RTIT_CTL },
> + { VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE, VM_EXIT_LOAD_CET_STATE },
> };
>
> memset(vmcs_conf, 0, sizeof(*vmcs_conf));
> @@ -4935,6 +4936,15 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
>
> vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, 0); /* 22.2.1 */
>
> + if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> + vmcs_writel(GUEST_SSP, 0);
> + if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
> + kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
> + vmcs_writel(GUEST_S_CET, 0);
> + if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) &&
> + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))
> + vmcs_writel(GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE, 0);
Looks reasonable now.
> +
> kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD, vcpu);
>
> vpid_sync_context(vmx->vpid);
> @@ -6354,6 +6364,12 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> if (vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_MSR_STORE_COUNT) > 0)
> vmx_dump_msrs("guest autostore", &vmx->msr_autostore.guest);
>
> + if (vmentry_ctl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE) {
> + pr_err("S_CET = 0x%016lx\n", vmcs_readl(GUEST_S_CET));
> + pr_err("SSP = 0x%016lx\n", vmcs_readl(GUEST_SSP));
> + pr_err("INTR SSP TABLE = 0x%016lx\n",
> + vmcs_readl(GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE));
> + }
> pr_err("*** Host State ***\n");
> pr_err("RIP = 0x%016lx RSP = 0x%016lx\n",
> vmcs_readl(HOST_RIP), vmcs_readl(HOST_RSP));
> @@ -6431,6 +6447,12 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID)
> pr_err("Virtual processor ID = 0x%04x\n",
> vmcs_read16(VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID));
> + if (vmexit_ctl & VM_EXIT_LOAD_CET_STATE) {
> + pr_err("S_CET = 0x%016lx\n", vmcs_readl(HOST_S_CET));
> + pr_err("SSP = 0x%016lx\n", vmcs_readl(HOST_SSP));
> + pr_err("INTR SSP TABLE = 0x%016lx\n",
> + vmcs_readl(HOST_INTR_SSP_TABLE));
> + }
> }
>
> /*
> @@ -7964,7 +7986,6 @@ static __init void vmx_set_cpu_caps(void)
> kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_UMIP);
>
> /* CPUID 0xD.1 */
> - kvm_caps.supported_xss = 0;
> if (!cpu_has_vmx_xsaves())
> kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
>
> @@ -7976,6 +7997,12 @@ static __init void vmx_set_cpu_caps(void)
>
> if (cpu_has_vmx_waitpkg())
> kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_WAITPKG);
> +
> + if (!cpu_has_load_cet_ctrl() || !enable_unrestricted_guest ||
> + !cpu_has_vmx_basic_no_hw_errcode()) {
> + kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
> + kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_IBT);
> + }
My review feedback from previous version still applies here, I don't have an
idea why this was not addressed....
"I think that here we also need to clear kvm_caps.supported_xss,
or even better, lets set the CET bits in kvm_caps.supported_xss only
once CET is fully enabled (both this check and check in __kvm_x86_vendor_init pass).
"
In addition to that I just checked and unless I am mistaken:
vmx_set_cpu_caps() is called from vmx's hardware_setup(), which is called
from __kvm_x86_vendor_init.
After this call, __kvm_x86_vendor_init does clear kvm_caps.supported_xss,
but doesn't do this if the above code cleared X86_FEATURE_SHSTK/X86_FEATURE_IBT.
> }
>
> static void vmx_request_immediate_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
> index c2130d2c8e24..fb72819fbb41 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
> @@ -480,7 +480,8 @@ static inline u8 vmx_get_rvi(void)
> VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER | \
> VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS | \
> VM_ENTRY_PT_CONCEAL_PIP | \
> - VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_RTIT_CTL)
> + VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_RTIT_CTL | \
> + VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE)
>
> #define __KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS \
> (VM_EXIT_SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS | \
> @@ -502,7 +503,8 @@ static inline u8 vmx_get_rvi(void)
> VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER | \
> VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS | \
> VM_EXIT_PT_CONCEAL_PIP | \
> - VM_EXIT_CLEAR_IA32_RTIT_CTL)
> + VM_EXIT_CLEAR_IA32_RTIT_CTL | \
> + VM_EXIT_LOAD_CET_STATE)
>
> #define KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL \
> (PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK | \
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index c6b57ede0f57..2bcf3c7923bf 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -231,7 +231,8 @@ static struct kvm_user_return_msrs __percpu *user_return_msrs;
> | XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR | XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512 \
> | XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU | XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE)
>
> -#define KVM_SUPPORTED_XSS 0
> +#define KVM_SUPPORTED_XSS (XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER | \
> + XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL)
>
> u64 __read_mostly host_efer;
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(host_efer);
> @@ -9854,6 +9855,15 @@ static int __kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
> if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
> kvm_caps.supported_xss = 0;
>
> + if ((kvm_caps.supported_xss & (XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER |
> + XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL)) !=
> + (XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER | XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL)) {
> + kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
> + kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_IBT);
> + kvm_caps.supported_xss &= ~XFEATURE_CET_USER;
> + kvm_caps.supported_xss &= ~XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL;
> + }
> +
> #define __kvm_cpu_cap_has(UNUSED_, f) kvm_cpu_cap_has(f)
> cr4_reserved_bits = __cr4_reserved_bits(__kvm_cpu_cap_has, UNUSED_);
> #undef __kvm_cpu_cap_has
> @@ -12319,7 +12329,9 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>
> static inline bool is_xstate_reset_needed(void)
> {
> - return kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_MPX);
> + return kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_MPX) ||
> + kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
> + kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT);
> }
>
> void kvm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
> @@ -12396,6 +12408,16 @@ void kvm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
> XFEATURE_BNDCSR);
> }
>
> + if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
> + fpstate_clear_xstate_component(fpstate,
> + XFEATURE_CET_USER);
> + fpstate_clear_xstate_component(fpstate,
> + XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL);
> + } else if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) {
> + fpstate_clear_xstate_component(fpstate,
> + XFEATURE_CET_USER);
> + }
> +
> if (init_event)
> kvm_load_guest_fpu(vcpu);
> }
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> index d9cc352cf421..dc79dcd733ac 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> @@ -531,6 +531,9 @@ bool kvm_msr_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u32 type);
> __reserved_bits |= X86_CR4_VMXE; \
> if (!__cpu_has(__c, X86_FEATURE_PCID)) \
> __reserved_bits |= X86_CR4_PCIDE; \
> + if (!__cpu_has(__c, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && \
> + !__cpu_has(__c, X86_FEATURE_IBT)) \
> + __reserved_bits |= X86_CR4_CET; \
> __reserved_bits; \
> })
>
Best regards,
Maxim Levitsky
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-11-30 17:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 104+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-11-24 5:53 [PATCH v7 00/26] Enable CET Virtualization Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 01/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Always preserve non-user xfeatures/flags in __state_perm Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:24 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 02/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Refine CET user xstate bit enabling Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 9:40 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-11-27 2:55 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-28 1:31 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-28 8:50 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-11-28 1:31 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-28 7:52 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:26 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 6:51 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 9:53 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-06 1:03 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-06 15:57 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-08 14:57 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-08 15:15 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-13 9:30 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-13 13:31 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-13 17:01 ` Chang S. Bae
2023-12-14 3:12 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Add CET supervisor mode state support Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 9:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-11-27 4:06 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-28 1:34 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-30 17:27 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 7:01 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 9:53 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 04/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XFEATURE_MASK_KERNEL_DYNAMIC xfeature set Yang Weijiang
2023-11-28 1:46 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-28 8:00 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:33 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 7:49 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 9:55 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-06 3:00 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-06 16:11 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-08 15:57 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 05/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce fpu_guest_cfg for guest FPU configuration Yang Weijiang
2023-11-28 14:58 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-29 14:12 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-29 17:08 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-30 13:28 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:29 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-30 18:02 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-30 17:29 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 06/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Create guest fpstate with guest specific config Yang Weijiang
2023-11-28 15:19 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-29 14:16 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:36 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 8:36 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 9:57 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 07/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Warn if kernel dynamic xfeatures detected in normal fpstate Yang Weijiang
2023-11-28 15:25 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-29 14:18 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 08/26] KVM: x86: Rework cpuid_get_supported_xcr0() to operate on vCPU data Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 09/26] KVM: x86: Rename kvm_{g,s}et_msr() to menifest emulation operations Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:36 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 10/26] KVM: x86: Refine xsave-managed guest register/MSR reset handling Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:36 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 11/26] KVM: x86: Add kvm_msr_{read,write}() helpers Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:37 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 12/26] KVM: x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 13/26] KVM: x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:37 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 14/26] KVM: x86: Initialize kvm_caps.supported_xss Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 15/26] KVM: x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:38 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 16/26] KVM: x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 17/26] KVM: x86: Report KVM supported CET MSRs as to-be-saved Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:40 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 18/26] KVM: VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 19/26] KVM: x86: Use KVM-governed feature framework to track "SHSTK/IBT enabled" Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:40 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 20/26] KVM: VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:41 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 21/26] KVM: x86: Save and reload SSP to/from SMRAM Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:42 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 2:23 ` Chao Gao
2023-12-04 0:45 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 10:02 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 8:55 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 22/26] KVM: VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:44 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 6:33 ` Chao Gao
2023-12-05 10:04 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 9:45 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 10:07 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 23/26] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 24/26] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:46 ` Maxim Levitsky [this message]
2023-12-01 16:15 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 10:07 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 25/26] KVM: nVMX: Introduce new VMX_BASIC bit for event error_code delivery to L1 Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 26/26] KVM: nVMX: Enable CET support for nested guest Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:53 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-04 8:50 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 10:12 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-06 9:22 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-06 17:24 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-08 15:15 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-08 15:22 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-12 8:56 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-12 11:09 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-15 2:29 ` [PATCH v7 00/26] Enable CET Virtualization Yang, Weijiang
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