From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/fpu: Disable shstk if no CET_USER state
Date: Fri, 3 Apr 2026 12:36:18 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <adAWsl016zKoyBgY@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260403154915.2285621-1-david.kaplan@amd.com>
On Fri, Apr 03, 2026, David Kaplan wrote:
> Some hypervisors (including QEMU 10.1.5) may report CET_SS support in
> CPUID Fn7 but fail to report that CET_USER state is supported in
> supervisor xstate. Linux relies on XSAVES/XRSTORS to swap CET state
> during context switch and assumes it is supported when CET_SS is
> present.
>
> As a result, if a user process is run with shadow stacks enabled and
> then is switched away from, the system may crash because the new process
> may be incorrectly run with shadow stacks enabled.
>
> Detect this broken configuration and disable user shadow stacks unless
> CET_USER is supported in xstate.
It's not actually broken though, is it? Just "odd". AFAICT, neither the SDM
nor the APM _requires_ CET_{U,S} to be supported in XSS if shadow stacks are
suppported.
> Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 11 +++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
> index 76153dfb58c9..188323442b4d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
> @@ -855,6 +855,17 @@ void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(unsigned int legacy_size)
> goto out_disable;
> }
>
> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK) &&
> + !(fpu_kernel_cfg.max_features & XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER)) {
> + /*
> + * The kernel relies on XSAVES/XRSTORS to context switch shadow
> + * stack state. If this isn't present, disable user shadow
> + * stacks.
> + */
> + pr_err("x86/fpu: CET_USER not supported in xstate when CET is supported. Disabling shadow stacks.\n");
> + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK);
Doesn't this apply to IBT as well? This code is also misplaced, as it needs to
live after at least this code:
if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
fpu_kernel_cfg.max_features &= XFEATURE_MASK_USER_SUPPORTED;
else
fpu_kernel_cfg.max_features &= XFEATURE_MASK_USER_SUPPORTED |
XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_SUPPORTED;
and should probably play nice with the "out_disable" path too.
All in all, setup_cet() seems like a much better fit, but unfortunately that
runs before fpu__init_system() :-(
> + }
> +
> fpu_kernel_cfg.independent_features = fpu_kernel_cfg.max_features &
> XFEATURE_MASK_INDEPENDENT;
>
>
> base-commit: d998c62f267213aeb815cf654908608eb7c00db2
> --
> 2.53.0
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-03 19:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-03 15:49 [PATCH] x86/fpu: Disable shstk if no CET_USER state David Kaplan
2026-04-03 19:36 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2026-04-03 19:52 ` Kaplan, David
2026-04-03 20:10 ` Kaplan, David
2026-04-06 14:26 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-04-06 15:04 ` Kaplan, David
2026-04-06 15:32 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-04-07 21:30 ` Kaplan, David
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