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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>,
	James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>,
	Pengutronix Kernel Team <kernel@pengutronix.de>,
	open list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM"
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] KEYS: trusted: Debugging as a feature
Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2026 11:24:12 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <adYQrEp84CI3Ju3o@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <0ce8d850-9ca7-4327-a6be-d1cb84925915@linux.ibm.com>

On Thu, Mar 26, 2026 at 10:34:58PM +0530, Srish Srinivasan wrote:
> 
> On 3/24/26 4:30 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > TPM_DEBUG, and other similar flags, are a non-standard way to specify a
> > feature in Linux kernel.  Introduce CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG for
> > trusted keys, and use it to replace these ad-hoc feature flags.
> > 
> > Given that trusted keys debug dumps can contain sensitive data, harden
> > the feature as follows:
> > 
> > 1. In the Kconfig description postulate that pr_debug() statements must be
> >     used.
> > 2. Use pr_debug() statements in TPM 1.x driver to print the protocol dump.
> > 
> > Traces, when actually needed, can be easily enabled by providing
> > trusted.dyndbg='+p' in the kernel command-line.
> > 
> > Cc: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
> > Reported-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
> > Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/7f8b8478-5cd8-4d97-bfd0-341fd5cf10f9@linux.ibm.com/
> > Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
> 
> 
> Tested on PKWM and emulated TPM backends.
> 
> Tested-by: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>

Thank you!

As it is uprised as a feature (like it should as ad-hoc compilation
flags are harmful), this also requires a boot flag so that "I know
what I'm doing" is addressed.

I'll send one more round with a flag 'trusted.debug=0|1'. These extra
steps protect production kernels for reasonable measure.

BR, Jarkko

  reply	other threads:[~2026-04-08  8:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-03-24 11:00 [PATCH v2] KEYS: trusted: Debugging as a feature Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-03-24 11:05 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-03-26 17:04 ` Srish Srinivasan
2026-04-08  8:24   ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2026-03-24 11:00 Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-04-07  2:42 ` Nayna Jain
2026-04-08  8:26   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-04-08  8:29     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-03-24 11:01 Jarkko Sakkinen

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