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From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
	Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
	Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
	Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>, Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Patch v4 03/18] x86/speculation: Reorganize cpu_show_common()
Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2018 11:12:15 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ada2e62c-24bd-4293-17d2-d3e5b9ab6442@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.DEB.2.21.1811031851010.3160@nanos.tec.linutronix.de>

On 11/03/2018 11:07 AM, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> Tim,
> 
> On Tue, 30 Oct 2018, Tim Chen wrote:
>> Extract the logic to show IBPB, STIBP usages in cpu_show_common()
>> into helper functions.
>>
>> Later patches will add other userspace Spectre v2 mitigation modes.
>> This patch makes it easy to show IBPB and STIBP
>> usage scenario according to the mitigation mode.
> 
> First of all, I asked you before to do:
> 
> # git grep 'This patch' Documentation/process
> 
> This leads you to:
> 
>  "Describe your changes in imperative mood, e.g. "make xyzzy do frotz"
>   instead of "[This patch] makes xyzzy do frotz" or "[I] changed xyzzy
>   to do frotz", as if you are giving orders to the codebase to change
>   its behaviour."
> 
> Documentation is there for a reason.
> 
> Aside of that, I'd really have a hard time to figure out what you are
> trying to say, if I didn't have the context already. Change logs need to
> make sense on their own. So something like this:
> 
>   The Spectre V2 printout in cpu_show_common() handles conditionals for the
>   various mitigation methods directly in the sprintf() argument list. That's
>   hard to read and will become unreadable if more complex decisions need to
>   be made for a particular method.
> 
>   Move the conditionals for STIBP and IBPB string selection into helper
>   functions, so they can be extended later on.
> 
> follows the obvious ordering for change logs:
> 
>   1) Describe context and problem
>   
>   2) Describe the solution
> 
> and is understandable without needing to know about the context in which
> this change was developed.
> 
> Hmm? This is a suggestion, feel free to rewrite it in you own words. The
> same applies to other change logs as well. I won't comment on those.

Thanks for the suggestion.  Will update.

>  
>>  static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
>>  			       char *buf, unsigned int bug)
>>  {
>> @@ -872,9 +888,8 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
>>  
>>  	case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2:
>>  		return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
>> -			       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "",
>>  			       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
>> -			       (x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP) ? ", STIBP" : "",
>> +			       ibpb_state(), stibp_state(),
>>  			       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "",
>>  			       spectre_v2_module_string());
> 
> Any particular reason for changing the output ordering here? If yes, then
> the changelog should mention it. If no, why?
> 

I was putting the features related to user application protection together. It
was not necessary and I can leave it at the same place.

Tim

  reply	other threads:[~2018-11-05 19:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-10-30 18:49 [Patch v4 00/18] Provide process property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection* Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 01/18] x86/speculation: Clean up spectre_v2_parse_cmdline() Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 02/18] x86/speculation: Remove unnecessary ret variable in cpu_show_common() Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 03/18] x86/speculation: Reorganize cpu_show_common() Tim Chen
2018-11-03 18:07   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-05 19:12     ` Tim Chen [this message]
2018-11-05 19:17       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 04/18] x86/speculation: Add X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_ENHANCED Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 05/18] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 06/18] smt: Create cpu_smt_enabled static key for SMT specific code Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 07/18] x86/smt: Convert cpu_smt_control check to cpu_smt_enabled static key Tim Chen
2018-11-03 18:29   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-08  1:43     ` Tim Chen
2018-11-08 11:18       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 08/18] sched: Deprecate sched_smt_present and use " Tim Chen
2018-11-03 18:20   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-09 22:08     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 09/18] x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 10/18] x86/speculation: Reorganize speculation control MSRs update Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 11/18] x86/speculation: Update comment on TIF_SSBD Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 12/18] x86: Group thread info flags by functionality Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 13/18] security: Update security level of a process when modifying its dumpability Tim Chen
2018-10-30 20:57   ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-10-30 21:30     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-30 21:53       ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 14/18] x86/speculation: Turn on or off STIBP according to a task's TIF_STIBP Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 15/18] x86/speculation: Add Spectre v2 app to app protection modes Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 16/18] x86/speculation: Enable STIBP to protect security sensitive tasks Tim Chen
2018-10-30 21:07   ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-10-30 21:34     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-30 22:02       ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 17/18] x86/speculation: Update SPEC_CTRL MSRs of remote CPUs Tim Chen
2018-11-04 19:49   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-05 22:02     ` Tim Chen
2018-11-05 23:04       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-05 23:59         ` Tim Chen
2018-11-06  7:46           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-07  0:18             ` Tim Chen
2018-11-07 18:33               ` Waiman Long
2018-11-07 23:15                 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-07 23:03               ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-08  0:22                 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 18/18] x86/speculation: Create PRCTL interface to restrict indirect branch speculation Tim Chen

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