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Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2026 16:07:26 -0600
From: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
To: Daniel Wagner <wagi@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>, Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>,
	Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>, linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] nvme: expose TLS mode
Message-ID: <aeFdnk4Qd4Tj1q1S@kbusch-mbp>
References: <20260408-expose-tls-mode-v3-1-b869da028eff@kernel.org>
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In-Reply-To: <20260408-expose-tls-mode-v3-1-b869da028eff@kernel.org>

On Wed, Apr 08, 2026 at 06:19:56PM +0200, Daniel Wagner wrote:
> It is not possible to determine the active TLS mode from the
> presence or absence of sysfs attributes like tls_key,
> tls_configured_key, or dhchap_secret.
> 
> With the introduction of the concat mode and optional DH-CHAP
> authentication, different configurations can result in identical
> sysfs state. This makes user space detection unreliable.
> 
> Expose the TLS mode explicitly to allow user space to
> unambiguously identify the active configuration and avoid
> fragile heuristics in nvme-cli.

I'd applied v2 earlier, but I'll force push this one instead since we
haven't done a pull request since then.