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From: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
To: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: overlayfs: caller_credentials option bypass creator_cred
Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2018 14:59:50 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aecdeaca-74cf-54b1-3ea9-4751972074f5@android.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180618194345.GA15973@redhat.com>

On 06/18/2018 12:43 PM, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> Will it be acceptable to write security policies in such a way so that
> mounter has access as well.
Unfortunately No. Policy of minimizing attack surface for a contained 
root service (init in this case). Just because it can mount, does not 
mean it can modify critical content; an attacker could use this to open 
a hole.

> Current model does assume that mounter has privileges on underlying files.

Only ones it appears to need is the workdir AFAIK, had to add ability to 
create in the <wordir> xattr in order to enable r/w mounts later. 
Although not all corners were tested, I did not see any copy_up issues 
b/c the caller had the privs in the Android security model when mounted 
with this new flag.

-- Mark

  reply	other threads:[~2018-06-18 21:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-06-18 15:42 overlayfs: caller_credentials option bypass creator_cred Mark Salyzyn
2018-06-18 18:54 ` Vivek Goyal
2018-06-18 19:18   ` Mark Salyzyn
2018-06-18 19:43     ` Vivek Goyal
2018-06-18 21:59       ` Mark Salyzyn [this message]
2018-06-19 14:36         ` Vivek Goyal
2018-06-20 15:28           ` Mark Salyzyn
2018-06-18 18:57 ` kbuild test robot

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