From: Tycho Andersen <tycho@kernel.org>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 1/4] crypto/ccp: Do not initialize SNP for SEV ioctls
Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2026 08:07:36 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <afIPW6IYp3abgwB4@tycho.pizza> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <26259583-bf58-439b-980b-76460e8ebece@amd.com>
On Tue, Apr 28, 2026 at 04:56:36PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> On 4/27/26 11:15, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> > From: "Tycho Andersen (AMD)" <tycho@kernel.org>
> >
> > Sashiko notes:
> >
> >> if SEV initialization fails and KVM is actively running normal VMs, could a
> >> userspace process trigger this code path via /dev/sev ioctls (e.g.,
> >> SEV_PDH_GEN) and zero out MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA globally? Would the next VMRUN
> >> execution for an active VM trigger a general protection fault and crash the
> >> host?
> >
> > sev_move_to_init_state() is called for ioctls requiring only SEV firmware:
> > SEV_PEK_GEN, SEV_PDH_GEN, SEV_PEK_CSR, SEV_PEK_CERT_IMPORT, and
> > SEV_PDH_CERT_EXPORT. After the firmware command, it does SEV_SHUTDOWN on
> > the SEV firmware. Since these commands do not require SNP to be
> > initialized, skip it by calling __sev_platform_init_locked() which only
> > initializes the SEV firmware. This way SNP is not Initialized at all, and
> > HSAVE_PA is not cleared.
> >
> > The previous code saved any SEV initialization firmware error to
> > init_args.error and then threw it away and hardcoded the return value of
> > INVALID_PLATFORM_STATE regardless of the real firmware error. This patch
> > changes it to surface the underlying error, which is hopefully both more
> > useful and doesn't cause any problems.
> >
> > Note that it is still safe to call __sev_firmware_shutdown() directly: it
> > calls __sev_snp_shutdown_locked(), which skips SNP shutdown if SNP was not
> > initialized.
> >
> > Fixes: ceac7fb89e8d ("crypto: ccp - Ensure implicit SEV/SNP init and shutdown in ioctls")
> > Reported-by: Sashiko
> > Assisted-by: Gemini:gemini-3.1-pro-preview
> > Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260324161301.1353976-1-tycho%40kernel.org
> > Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) <tycho@kernel.org>
>
> I have a similar patch that I hadn't gotten out that added an argument to
> _sev_platform_init_locked() to skip/prevent SNP initialization. I wonder
> if adding something to sev_platform_init_args would be better? This could
> then be expanded to prevent SNP initialization if the KVM sev_snp module
> parameter was set to false.
Yeah, I will also need additional params to init_args here:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260427204847.112899-2-tycho@kernel.org/
so I think adding it there makes sense.
> But for a fix, this is probably simpler. It does skip some of the checks
> that _sev_platform_init_locked() has, but I think all of the checks that
> matter are performed for the paths that call sev_move_to_init_state().
>
> Should this go to stable?
Yes, they all should as you point out, I'll add that for v2.
> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Thanks,
Tycho
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-29 14:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-27 16:15 [PATCH v1 0/4] SEV re-initialization fixes Tycho Andersen
2026-04-27 16:15 ` [PATCH v1 1/4] crypto/ccp: Do not initialize SNP for SEV ioctls Tycho Andersen
2026-04-28 21:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2026-04-29 14:07 ` Tycho Andersen [this message]
2026-04-27 16:15 ` [PATCH v1 2/4] crypto/ccp: Do not initialize SNP for ioctl(SNP_COMMIT) Tycho Andersen
2026-04-28 21:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2026-04-27 16:15 ` [PATCH v1 3/4] crypto/ccp: Do not initialize SNP for ioctl(SNP_VLEK_LOAD) Tycho Andersen
2026-04-28 22:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2026-04-29 14:09 ` Tycho Andersen
2026-04-27 16:15 ` [PATCH v1 4/4] crypto/ccp: Do not initialize SNP for ioctl(SNP_CONFIG) Tycho Andersen
2026-04-28 22:07 ` Tom Lendacky
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