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From: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@google.com>
To: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>, Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org>,
	kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
	Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>,
	Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
	Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>,
	Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>,
	Sebastian Ene <sebastianene@google.com>,
	Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 8/8] KVM: arm64: Implement lazy vCPU state sync for non-protected guests
Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2026 14:12:55 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ajVAV5ct0xdLn1KX@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260619070719.812227-9-tabba@google.com>

On Fri, Jun 19, 2026 at 08:07:19AM +0100, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> pKVM copies a non-protected guest's register context between the host
> and the hypervisor on every world switch, even when the host never
> inspects it. Defer the copy: on entry, flush the host context into the
> hyp vCPU only when the host marked it dirty (PKVM_HOST_STATE_DIRTY); on
> exit, leave it in the hyp vCPU and copy it back only when the host needs
> it, via a __pkvm_vcpu_sync_state hypercall on trap handling or at vcpu
> put. A protected guest's context is copied as before, since lazy sync
> only helps where the host is trusted to see the guest's registers.
> 
> PC and PSTATE are the exception: they are copied back on every exit so
> the kvm_exit tracepoint reports the guest's real exit PC, and the run
> loop's vcpu_mode_is_bad_32bit() and SError-masking checks evaluate the
> guest's current PSTATE rather than the value left by the previous sync.
> 
> handle_exit_early() can also inject an SError, which writes the guest
> context (ESR_EL1) outside the trap-handling path. For a non-protected
> guest it therefore syncs the context from the hyp vCPU and marks it
> dirty, as handle_trap_exceptions() does, so the injection reaches the
> hyp vCPU on re-entry rather than being dropped.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
> ---
>  arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h   |  1 +
>  arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h  |  2 +
>  arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c               |  7 +++
>  arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c       | 30 +++++++++++
>  arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>  5 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h
> index 043495f7fc78..6e1135b3ded4 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h
> @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ enum __kvm_host_smccc_func {
>  	__KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___pkvm_finalize_teardown_vm,
>  	__KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___pkvm_vcpu_load,
>  	__KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___pkvm_vcpu_put,
> +	__KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___pkvm_vcpu_sync_state,
>  	__KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___pkvm_tlb_flush_vmid,
>  
>  	MARKER(__KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC_MAX)
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> index 2faa60df847d..caa39ee5125f 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> @@ -1068,6 +1068,8 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
>  #define INCREMENT_PC		__vcpu_single_flag(iflags, BIT(1))
>  /* Target EL/MODE (not a single flag, but let's abuse the macro) */
>  #define EXCEPT_MASK		__vcpu_single_flag(iflags, GENMASK(3, 1))
> +/* Host-set: the hyp flushes the non-protected vCPU state in on entry */
> +#define PKVM_HOST_STATE_DIRTY	__vcpu_single_flag(iflags, BIT(4))
>  
>  /* Helpers to encode exceptions with minimum fuss */
>  #define __EXCEPT_MASK_VAL	unpack_vcpu_flag(EXCEPT_MASK)
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
> index 3732ee9eb0d4..4e89558d8027 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
> @@ -733,6 +733,10 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  	if (is_protected_kvm_enabled()) {
>  		kvm_call_hyp(__vgic_v3_save_aprs, &vcpu->arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3);
>  		kvm_call_hyp_nvhe(__pkvm_vcpu_put);
> +
> +		/* __pkvm_vcpu_put implies a sync of the state */
> +		if (!kvm_vm_is_protected(vcpu->kvm))
> +			vcpu_set_flag(vcpu, PKVM_HOST_STATE_DIRTY);
>  	}
>  
>  	kvm_vcpu_put_debug(vcpu);
> @@ -964,6 +968,9 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_run_pid_change(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  		return ret;
>  
>  	if (is_protected_kvm_enabled()) {
> +		/* Start with the vcpu in a dirty state */
> +		if (!kvm_vm_is_protected(vcpu->kvm))
> +			vcpu_set_flag(vcpu, PKVM_HOST_STATE_DIRTY);
>  		ret = pkvm_create_hyp_vm(kvm);
>  		if (ret)
>  			return ret;
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c
> index 54aedf93c78b..8963621bcdd1 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c
> @@ -422,6 +422,20 @@ static int handle_trap_exceptions(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  {
>  	int handled;
>  
> +	/*
> +	 * If we run a non-protected VM when protection is enabled
> +	 * system-wide, resync the state from the hypervisor and mark
> +	 * it as dirty on the host side if it wasn't dirty already
> +	 * (which could happen if preemption has taken place).
> +	 */
> +	if (is_protected_kvm_enabled() && !kvm_vm_is_protected(vcpu->kvm)) {
> +		guard(preempt)();
> +		if (!(vcpu_get_flag(vcpu, PKVM_HOST_STATE_DIRTY))) {
> +			kvm_call_hyp_nvhe(__pkvm_vcpu_sync_state);
> +			vcpu_set_flag(vcpu, PKVM_HOST_STATE_DIRTY);
> +		}
> +	}
> +

Could we remove this update here and let handle_exit_early() do the sync
regardless of the SError injection? One of the main point of handle_exit_early()
is to do things under !prempt().


>  	/*
>  	 * See ARM ARM B1.14.1: "Hyp traps on instructions
>  	 * that fail their condition code check"
> @@ -489,6 +503,22 @@ int handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int exception_index)
>  /* For exit types that need handling before we can be preempted */
>  void handle_exit_early(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int exception_index)
>  {
> +	bool inject_serror = ARM_SERROR_PENDING(exception_index) ||
> +		ARM_EXCEPTION_CODE(exception_index) == ARM_EXCEPTION_EL1_SERROR;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * An SError injected below writes the host ctxt; for a non-protected
> +	 * guest, sync from the hyp vCPU and keep it dirty so it isn't dropped.
> +	 */
> +	if (is_protected_kvm_enabled()) {

Should we test !kvm_vm_is_protected(vcpu->kvm) here, as the
PKVM_HOST_STATE_DIRTY is only updated for p-guests everywhere else?

> +		vcpu_clear_flag(vcpu, PKVM_HOST_STATE_DIRTY);
> +
> +		if (inject_serror && !kvm_vm_is_protected(vcpu->kvm)) {
> +			kvm_call_hyp_nvhe(__pkvm_vcpu_sync_state);
> +			vcpu_set_flag(vcpu, PKVM_HOST_STATE_DIRTY);
> +		}
> +	}
> +
>  	if (ARM_SERROR_PENDING(exception_index)) {
>  		if (this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_HAS_RAS_EXTN)) {
>  			u64 disr = kvm_vcpu_get_disr(vcpu);

[...]

  reply	other threads:[~2026-06-19 13:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-06-19  7:07 [PATCH v2 0/8] KVM: arm64: Rework pKVM vCPU state synchronisation Fuad Tabba
2026-06-19  7:07 ` [PATCH v2 1/8] KVM: arm64: Extract MPIDR computation into a shared header Fuad Tabba
2026-06-19 13:24   ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-06-19  7:07 ` [PATCH v2 2/8] KVM: arm64: Make vcpu_{read,write}_sys_reg available to HYP code Fuad Tabba
2026-06-19 13:26   ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-06-19  7:07 ` [PATCH v2 3/8] KVM: arm64: Factor out reusable vCPU reset helpers Fuad Tabba
2026-06-19 13:29   ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-06-19  7:07 ` [PATCH v2 4/8] KVM: arm64: Move PSCI helper functions to a shared header Fuad Tabba
2026-06-19 13:30   ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-06-19  7:07 ` [PATCH v2 5/8] KVM: arm64: Add host and hypervisor vCPU lookup primitives Fuad Tabba
2026-06-19 13:31   ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-06-19  7:07 ` [PATCH v2 6/8] KVM: arm64: Minimise EL2's exposure of host VGIC state during world switch Fuad Tabba
2026-06-19  7:07 ` [PATCH v2 7/8] KVM: arm64: Add primitives to flush/sync the VGIC state at EL2 Fuad Tabba
2026-06-19  7:07 ` [PATCH v2 8/8] KVM: arm64: Implement lazy vCPU state sync for non-protected guests Fuad Tabba
2026-06-19 13:12   ` Vincent Donnefort [this message]
2026-06-19 16:41     ` Fuad Tabba

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