From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>, Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 10/10] x86/retpoline: Exclude objtool with retpoline
Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 11:25:04 +0100 (CET) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.20.1801081124070.1735@nanos> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1515363085-4219-11-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
On Sun, 7 Jan 2018, David Woodhouse wrote:
Cc+ Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Sigh....
> From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
>
> objtool's assembler nanny currently cannot deal with the code generated
> by the retpoline compiler and throws hundreds of warnings, mostly
> because it sees calls that don't have a symbolic target.
>
> Exclude all the options that rely on objtool when RETPOLINE is active.
>
> This mainly means that we use the frame pointer unwinder and livepatch
> is not supported.
>
> Eventually objtool can be fixed to handle this.
>
> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
> Acked-By: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/Kconfig | 4 ++--
> arch/x86/Kconfig.debug | 6 +++---
> 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> index 77c58ae..651d25f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -171,8 +171,8 @@ config X86
> select HAVE_PERF_USER_STACK_DUMP
> select HAVE_RCU_TABLE_FREE
> select HAVE_REGS_AND_STACK_ACCESS_API
> - select HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE if X86_64 && UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER && STACK_VALIDATION
> - select HAVE_STACK_VALIDATION if X86_64
> + select HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE if X86_64 && UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER && STACK_VALIDATION && !RETPOLINE
> + select HAVE_STACK_VALIDATION if X86_64 && !RETPOLINE
> select HAVE_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINTS
> select HAVE_UNSTABLE_SCHED_CLOCK
> select HAVE_USER_RETURN_NOTIFIER
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
> index 6293a87..9f3928d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
> @@ -359,8 +359,8 @@ config PUNIT_ATOM_DEBUG
>
> choice
> prompt "Choose kernel unwinder"
> - default UNWINDER_ORC if X86_64
> - default UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER if X86_32
> + default UNWINDER_ORC if X86_64 && !RETPOLINE
> + default UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER if X86_32 || RETPOLINE
> ---help---
> This determines which method will be used for unwinding kernel stack
> traces for panics, oopses, bugs, warnings, perf, /proc/<pid>/stack,
> @@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ choice
>
> config UNWINDER_ORC
> bool "ORC unwinder"
> - depends on X86_64
> + depends on X86_64 && !RETPOLINE
> select STACK_VALIDATION
> ---help---
> This option enables the ORC (Oops Rewind Capability) unwinder for
> --
> 2.7.4
>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-08 10:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 66+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-07 22:11 [PATCH v6 00/10] Retpoline: Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel David Woodhouse
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 01/10] x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 10:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-08 10:53 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 11:03 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-08 12:45 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 13:42 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-08 13:46 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 13:53 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-08 14:26 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 21:20 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-09 12:36 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-09 13:35 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-09 13:40 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 02/10] x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 13:49 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 03/10] x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry " David Woodhouse
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 04/10] x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace " David Woodhouse
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 05/10] x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert " David Woodhouse
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 06/10] x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall " David Woodhouse
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 07/10] x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler " David Woodhouse
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 08/10] x86/retpoline/irq32: " David Woodhouse
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 09/10] x86/retpoline: Add boot time option to disable retpoline David Woodhouse
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 10/10] x86/retpoline: Exclude objtool with retpoline David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 10:25 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2018-01-08 10:34 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-08 13:20 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-07 22:22 ` [PATCH v6 00/10] Retpoline: Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel Linus Torvalds
2018-01-08 10:01 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 17:54 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-08 21:10 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 10:34 ` Paul Turner
2018-01-08 10:38 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-08 10:45 ` Paul Turner
2018-01-08 10:42 ` Paul Turner
2018-01-08 11:16 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-08 11:25 ` Paul Turner
2018-01-08 16:13 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-10 15:20 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-10 15:31 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2018-01-08 10:45 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 10:53 ` Paul Turner
2018-01-08 12:49 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 23:44 ` [PATCH v6 11/10] x86/retpoline: Avoid return buffer underflows on context switch David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 23:56 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-08 23:58 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-09 0:35 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-09 0:42 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-09 0:48 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-09 0:55 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-09 0:44 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-09 0:58 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-09 1:15 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 3:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-09 13:04 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-09 13:10 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-09 17:53 ` Kees Cook
2018-01-09 18:09 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-16 8:58 ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-09 1:16 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-09 1:21 ` [PATCH v6 11/10] x86/retpoline: Avoid return buffer underflows on context switch II Andi Kleen
2018-01-09 1:23 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-09 1:49 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-09 1:53 ` Paul Turner
2018-01-09 1:18 ` [PATCH v6 11/10] x86/retpoline: Avoid return buffer underflows on context switch Woodhouse, David
2018-01-09 0:06 ` Andi Kleen
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