From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755811AbdKJC5E (ORCPT ); Thu, 9 Nov 2017 21:57:04 -0500 Received: from userp1040.oracle.com ([156.151.31.81]:31750 "EHLO userp1040.oracle.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1755728AbdKJC5C (ORCPT ); Thu, 9 Nov 2017 21:57:02 -0500 Date: Fri, 10 Nov 2017 13:56:18 +1100 (AEDT) From: James Morris X-X-Sender: james.l.morris@localhost To: Djalal Harouni cc: Kees Cook , Alexey Gladkov , Andy Lutomirski , Andrew Morton , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Greg Kroah-Hartman , Alexander Viro , Akinobu Mita , me@tobin.cc, Oleg Nesterov , Jeff Layton , Ingo Molnar , Alexey Dobriyan , ebiederm@xmission.com, Linus Torvalds , Daniel Micay , Jonathan Corbet , bfields@fieldses.org, Stephen Rothwell , solar@openwall.com Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v3 6/7] proc: support new 'pids=all|ptraceable' mount option In-Reply-To: <1510244046-3256-7-git-send-email-tixxdz@gmail.com> Message-ID: References: <1510244046-3256-1-git-send-email-tixxdz@gmail.com> <1510244046-3256-7-git-send-email-tixxdz@gmail.com> User-Agent: Alpine 2.20 (LFD 67 2015-01-07) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII X-Source-IP: userv0021.oracle.com [156.151.31.71] Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Thu, 9 Nov 2017, Djalal Harouni wrote: > This patch introduces the new 'pids' mount option, as it was discussed > and suggested by Andy Lutomirski [1]. > > * If 'pids=' is passed without 'newinstance' then it has no effect. > > * If 'newinstance,pids=all' then all processes will be shown in proc. > > * If 'newinstance,pids=ptraceable' then only ptraceable processes will be > shown. > > * 'pids=' takes precendence over 'hidepid=' since 'hidepid=' can be > ignored if "gid=" was set and caller has the "gid=" set in its groups. > We want to guarantee that LSM have a security path there that can not > be disabled with "gid=". > > This allows to support lightweight sandboxes in Embedded Linux. > > Later Yama LSM can be updated to check that processes are able only > able to see their children inside /proc/, allowing to support more tight > cases. > > [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/4/26/646 > > Cc: Kees Cook > Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman > Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski > Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov > Signed-off-by: Djalal Harouni Reviewed-by: James Morris -- James Morris