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From: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, andrii@kernel.org,
	 kpsingh@kernel.org, mic@digikod.net, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
	brauner@kernel.org,  kees@kernel.org, gnoack@google.com,
	jack@suse.cz, song@kernel.org,  yonghong.song@linux.dev,
	martin.lau@linux.dev, m@maowtm.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next 00/13] BPF interface for applying Landlock rulesets
Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 17:37:07 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <anOnaGmBTlBW9xwj@zenbox> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhSSzNBCSvy4cQHh6OOM4-EvHF+bmrB9=V1y=Lj53RvxQQ@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Jul 31, 2026 at 04:30:39PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 30, 2026 at 10:21 PM Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com> wrote:
> [...]
> As you may, or may not have seen, there is currently an ongoing debate
> regarding the location of LSM kfuncs that will impact this patchset.
> Sadly, we don't appear to be approaching an agreement on this issue
> which introduces some additional risk to this patchset.  We'll have to
> see how that ends up, but I just wanted you to be aware of the
> situation.

Quick aside question: Would security/bpf/ be a better place for these
type of kfuncs?

security/bpf/bpf_lsm_kfuncs.c could be for LSM framework kfuncs,
and each LSM could maintain their own security/bpf/<lsm>_kfuncs.c
for kfuncs dealing with lsm-specific types.

One issue with just security/ is it's not CONFIG_SECURITY_BPF. But
security/bpf is. Right now security/bpf only has hooks.c so it's free
real estate.

That way things are more greppable... (important!) and we can have
proper MAINTAINERS entries per file so emails get routed properly.

(linux-security-module, bpf, and whatever lsm list)

Justin

  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-08-05 21:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-07-31  2:20 [PATCH bpf-next 00/13] BPF interface for applying Landlock rulesets Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 01/13] lsm: Add LSM hook security_policy_kptr_from_fd Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 02/13] lsm: Add LSM hook security_policy_kptr_put Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 03/13] lsm: Add LSM hook security_bprm_enforce_policy_kptr Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 04/13] landlock: Expose the ruleset fd lookup to the rest of Landlock Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 05/13] landlock: Factor the credential restriction out of landlock_restrict_self() Justin Suess
2026-07-31 22:24   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 06/13] landlock: Implement the LSM policy kptr hooks Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 07/13] bpf: Add the LSM policy kfunc infrastructure Justin Suess
2026-07-31 22:24   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 08/13] bpf: Add the bpf_landlock_put_ruleset kfunc and ruleset destructor Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 09/13] bpf: Add the bpf_landlock_get_ruleset_from_fd kfunc Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 10/13] bpf: Add the bpf_landlock_restrict_binprm kfunc Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 11/13] selftests/bpf: Add tests for the Landlock policy kfuncs Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 12/13] landlock: Document the BPF kfunc interface Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 13/13] lsm: Document the LSM policy kptr hooks Justin Suess
2026-07-31 20:30 ` [PATCH bpf-next 00/13] BPF interface for applying Landlock rulesets Paul Moore
2026-07-31 21:15   ` Justin Suess
2026-07-31 21:28     ` Paul Moore
2026-08-05 21:37   ` Justin Suess [this message]
2026-08-05 21:49     ` Justin Suess
2026-08-05 22:51     ` Paul Moore
2026-08-06  0:32       ` Justin Suess

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