From: sergeh@kernel.org
To: cem@kernel.org
Cc: jack@suse.cz, djwong@kernel.org, hch@lst.de, serge@hallyn.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org,
stable@vger.kernel.org,
"Dr. Thomas Orgis" <thomas.orgis@uni-hamburg.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 1/5] xfs: fix capability check in xfs
Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2026 12:22:29 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <anTC1e_zAhKedcpH@AUS2MQ6190Y76.amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260804094602.84766-2-cem@kernel.org>
On Tue, Aug 04, 2026 at 11:45:51AM +0200, cem@kernel.org wrote:
> From: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
>
> An user reported a bug where he managed to evade group's quota
> by changing a file's gid to a different group id the same user
> belonged to, even though quotas were enforced on both gids and the
> file's size was big enough to exceed the quota's hardlimit.
>
> Commit eba0549bc7d1 replaced a capable() call by a
> has_capability_noaudit() to prevent unnecessary selinux audit messages.
> Turns out that both calls have slightly different semantics even though
> their documentation seems similar. Where in a nutshell:
>
> capable() - Tests the task's effective credentials
> has_ns_capability_noaudit() - Tests the task's real credentials
>
> This most of the time has no practical difference but in some cases like
> changing attrs (specifically group id in this case) through a NFS client
> this will allow the quota code to use XFS_QMOPT_FORCE_RES, effectively
> bypassing quota accounting checks.
>
> Using instead ns_capable_noaudit() should fix this issue and prevent
> selinux audit messages.
Hi,
this makes perfect sense, but since you say "should fix this issue",
did you have a chance to set up a reproducer, and verify?
> This also fix the remaining calls to has_capability_noaudit()
>
> Fixes: eba0549bc7d1 ("xfs: don't generate selinux audit messages for capability testing")
> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.18
> Reported-by: Dr. Thomas Orgis <thomas.orgis@uni-hamburg.de>
> Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
> Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <sergeh@kernel.org>
thanks,
-serge
> ---
> fs/xfs/xfs_fsmap.c | 2 +-
> fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c | 2 +-
> fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c | 2 +-
> 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_fsmap.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_fsmap.c
> index b6a3bc9f143c..7c79fbe0a74c 100644
> --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_fsmap.c
> +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_fsmap.c
> @@ -1175,7 +1175,7 @@ xfs_getfsmap(
> return -EINVAL;
>
> use_rmap = xfs_has_rmapbt(mp) &&
> - has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
> + ns_capable_noaudit(&init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
> head->fmh_entries = 0;
>
> /* Set up our device handlers. */
> diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
> index 1b53701bebea..1a8af827dde1 100644
> --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
> +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
> @@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ xfs_ioctl_setattr_get_trans(
> goto out_error;
>
> error = xfs_trans_alloc_ichange(ip, NULL, NULL, pdqp,
> - has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_FOWNER), &tp);
> + ns_capable_noaudit(&init_user_ns, CAP_FOWNER), &tp);
> if (error)
> goto out_error;
>
> diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c
> index 6339f4956ecb..7a8c77fdcf68 100644
> --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c
> +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c
> @@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ xfs_setattr_nonsize(
> }
>
> error = xfs_trans_alloc_ichange(ip, udqp, gdqp, NULL,
> - has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_FOWNER), &tp);
> + ns_capable_noaudit(&init_user_ns, CAP_FOWNER), &tp);
> if (error)
> goto out_dqrele;
>
> --
> 2.55.0
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-06 17:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-04 9:45 [PATCH v4 0/5] Fix quota evasion on xfs and add capable_noaudit cem
2026-08-04 9:45 ` [PATCH v4 1/5] xfs: fix capability check in xfs cem
2026-08-04 14:08 ` Christoph Hellwig
2026-08-06 17:22 ` sergeh [this message]
2026-08-04 9:45 ` [PATCH v4 2/5] capability: Add new capable_noaudit cem
2026-08-06 18:49 ` sergeh
2026-08-04 9:45 ` [PATCH v4 3/5] quota: Don't issue audit messages on quota enforcing cem
2026-08-04 9:45 ` [PATCH v4 4/5] xfs: replace ns_capable_noaudit cem
2026-08-04 14:09 ` Christoph Hellwig
2026-08-06 21:11 ` sergeh
2026-08-04 9:45 ` [PATCH v4 5/5] capability: unexport has_capability_noaudit cem
2026-08-06 18:54 ` sergeh
2026-08-06 21:09 ` [PATCH v4 0/5] Fix quota evasion on xfs and add capable_noaudit sergeh
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