From: Brian Norris <briannorris@chromium.org>
To: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
Cc: francesco@dolcini.it, kees@kernel.org,
linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] wifi: mwifiex: validate HT/VHT capability and operation IE lengths
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2026 14:46:06 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <anuYHjoUCW5rSVyt@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260802124426.87779-1-doruk@0sec.ai>
Hi Doruk,
On Sun, Aug 02, 2026 at 02:44:26PM +0200, Doruk Tan Ozturk wrote:
> mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie() records raw pointers to the HT
> Capabilities, HT Operation, VHT Capabilities, VHT Operation, 20/40 BSS
> Coexistence and Operating Mode Notification elements taken straight out
> of a beacon/probe-response buffer, without checking that each element is
> long enough for the fixed-size structure that later consumers read. The
> buffer is a tight kmemdup() of the on-air IEs (beacon_buf_size ==
> ies->len), so a truncated element placed last leaves the stored pointer
> one past the end of the allocation.
>
> At association time these pointers are dereferenced at fixed offsets
> regardless of the on-air length: mwifiex_cmd_append_11n_tlv() memcpy()s
> sizeof(struct ieee80211_ht_cap) (26 bytes) from bcn_ht_cap and reads
> bcn_ht_oper->ht_param, and mwifiex_cmd_append_11ac_tlv() memcpy()s
> sizeof(struct ieee80211_vht_cap) (12 bytes) from bcn_vht_cap and reads
> bcn_vht_oper->chan_width. A nearby AP (rogue / evil-twin; an open SSID
> needs no credentials) advertising a BSS with a truncated HT/VHT cap
> element therefore triggers a slab out-of-bounds read on the victim's
> association attempt. This out-of-bounds read is the primary issue.
>
> For the HT-Cap copy the over-read bytes are additionally placed into the
> outgoing association request, so a limited amount of adjacent heap memory
> can leak over the air. In station mode this is small (single-digit
> bytes), because mwifiex_fill_cap_info() rewrites most of the copied
> HT-Cap before transmission; the leak is a secondary effect.
>
> mwifiex_set_sta_ht_cap() has the same missing-length pattern: in uAP mode
> it reads two bytes of ieee80211_ht_cap.cap_info from a
> cfg80211_find_ie(WLAN_EID_HT_CAPABILITY) result in a client association
> request without checking the element length, a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds
> read (used only to select an A-MSDU size, not leaked).
>
> Reject the frame with -EINVAL when any of these elements is shorter than
> the structure the driver later reads, matching the length validation the
> FH/DS/CF/IBSS parameter-set cases in the same beacon parser already
> perform. mwifiex_set_sta_ht_cap() returns void, so there the too-short
> element is skipped instead.
>
> The length tested in mwifiex_set_sta_ht_cap() is ht_cap_ie->len, which
> is attacker-controlled on-air data, so it is only used as a bound.
> cfg80211_find_ie() walks the IE stream and returns NULL for an element
> that claims to be longer than the data it was given, so any element it
> does return has len bytes of payload inside ies_len. The new test is
> therefore a minimum-size check before the fixed-size cap_info read, not
> an assumption that len is trustworthy beyond the bounds cfg80211 has
> already enforced.
>
> No dynamic reproducer: mwifiex is a fullmac driver for Marvell hardware
> with no mac80211_hwsim equivalent, so this was confirmed by source and
> structure-offset analysis, and compile-tested only.
>
> Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).
>
> Fixes: 5e6e3a92b9a4 ("wireless: mwifiex: initial commit for Marvell mwifiex driver")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Assisted-by: 0sec:multi-model
> Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
> ---
>
> Changes in v3 (per Francesco Dolcini's review of v2):
> - Commit message only; the diff is unchanged from v2.
> - Spell out why ht_cap_ie->len is safe to test against in
> mwifiex_set_sta_ht_cap(): cfg80211_find_ie() already rejects an
> element that claims to be longer than the data it was given, so len
> is used purely as a minimum-size bound, not as a trusted value.
> - Restore the note (dropped in v2) that there is no dynamic
> reproducer and that this is source-analysis plus compile-tested
> only, answering the "did you test this" question on v1.
>
> Changes in v2 (per Francesco Dolcini's review of v1):
> - Return -EINVAL on a too-short element instead of break, matching the
> FH/DS/CF/IBSS and VENDOR_SPECIFIC cases in the same function.
> mwifiex_set_sta_ht_cap() returns void, so there it stays a skip.
> - Switch the Assisted-by trailer to 0sec:multi-model.
>
> v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260709100800.7026-1-doruk@0sec.ai/
> v2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260715185543.14478-1-doruk@0sec.ai/
>
> drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c | 12 ++++++++++++
> drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/util.c | 2 +-
> 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c
> index 97c0ec3b822e7..22031faba057f 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c
> @@ -1384,6 +1384,8 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter,
> bss_entry->beacon_buf);
> break;
> case WLAN_EID_HT_CAPABILITY:
> + if (element_len < sizeof(struct ieee80211_ht_cap))
I think this is more clearly-correct when you use this form:
if (element_len < sizeof(*bss_entry->bcn_ht_cap))
Same for most/all of these. See especially the note for
WLAN_EID_OPMODE_NOTIF below.
> + return -EINVAL;
> bss_entry->bcn_ht_cap = (struct ieee80211_ht_cap *)
> (current_ptr +
> sizeof(struct ieee_types_header));
> @@ -1392,6 +1394,8 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter,
> bss_entry->beacon_buf);
> break;
> case WLAN_EID_HT_OPERATION:
> + if (element_len < sizeof(struct ieee80211_ht_operation))
> + return -EINVAL;
> bss_entry->bcn_ht_oper =
> (struct ieee80211_ht_operation *)(current_ptr +
> sizeof(struct ieee_types_header));
> @@ -1400,6 +1404,8 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter,
> bss_entry->beacon_buf);
> break;
> case WLAN_EID_VHT_CAPABILITY:
> + if (element_len < sizeof(struct ieee80211_vht_cap))
> + return -EINVAL;
> bss_entry->disable_11ac = false;
> bss_entry->bcn_vht_cap =
> (void *)(current_ptr +
> @@ -1409,6 +1415,8 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter,
> bss_entry->beacon_buf);
> break;
> case WLAN_EID_VHT_OPERATION:
> + if (element_len < sizeof(struct ieee80211_vht_operation))
> + return -EINVAL;
> bss_entry->bcn_vht_oper =
> (void *)(current_ptr +
> sizeof(struct ieee_types_header));
> @@ -1417,6 +1425,8 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter,
> bss_entry->beacon_buf);
> break;
> case WLAN_EID_BSS_COEX_2040:
> + if (!element_len)
> + return -EINVAL;
> bss_entry->bcn_bss_co_2040 = current_ptr;
> bss_entry->bss_co_2040_offset =
> (u16) (current_ptr - bss_entry->beacon_buf);
> @@ -1427,6 +1437,8 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter,
> (u16) (current_ptr - bss_entry->beacon_buf);
> break;
> case WLAN_EID_OPMODE_NOTIF:
> + if (!element_len)
Are you sure "non-zero" is the right check here? This field is used as
'struct ieee_types_oper_mode_ntf'. If you used the sizeof(*...)
suggestion above, I don't think we'd fall into that type mismatch trap.
Brian
> + return -EINVAL;
> bss_entry->oper_mode = (void *)current_ptr;
> bss_entry->oper_mode_offset =
> (u16)((u8 *)bss_entry->oper_mode -
> diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/util.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/util.c
> index 7d3631d212236..844223c04e2ef 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/util.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/util.c
> @@ -721,7 +721,7 @@ mwifiex_set_sta_ht_cap(struct mwifiex_private *priv, const u8 *ies,
>
> ht_cap_ie = (void *)cfg80211_find_ie(WLAN_EID_HT_CAPABILITY, ies,
> ies_len);
> - if (ht_cap_ie) {
> + if (ht_cap_ie && ht_cap_ie->len >= sizeof(struct ieee80211_ht_cap)) {
> ht_cap = (void *)(ht_cap_ie + 1);
> node->is_11n_enabled = 1;
> node->max_amsdu = le16_to_cpu(ht_cap->cap_info) &
> --
> 2.43.0
>
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-11 21:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-02 12:44 [PATCH v3] wifi: mwifiex: validate HT/VHT capability and operation IE lengths Doruk Tan Ozturk
2026-08-11 21:46 ` Brian Norris [this message]
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