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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
	"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/3] lib/crypto: Provide a function for zeroizing hmac_sha1_ctx
Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2026 03:03:27 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aoeVz8FsDOEP32M2@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260812163336.3103835-1-thuth@redhat.com>

On Wed, Aug 12, 2026 at 06:33:33PM +0200, Thomas Huth wrote:
> It's maybe not worth the effort for hmac_sha1_ctx right now (since there
> is only one spot that forgot to zeroize the structure in case of errors),
> but offering a function for zeroizing the data via __cleanup might help to
> get future code into the proper shape right from the start. Thus let's
> introduce a hmac_sha1_zeroize_ctx() function now and use it in the
> appropriate spots.
> 
> Thomas Huth (3):
>   crypto: Provide a wrapper for zeroizing hmac_sha1_ctx
>   security: keys: trusted: always clear the hmac_sha1_ctx before
>     returning
>   lib/crypto: sha1: Use hmac_sha1_zeroize_ctx() instead of
>     memzero_explicit()
> 
>  include/crypto/sha1.h                     | 17 +++++++++++++++++
>  lib/crypto/sha1.c                         |  2 +-
>  security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c |  2 +-
>  3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> -- 
> 2.55.0
> 

Looks right to me:


For 1-3:

Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>

BR, Jarkko

      parent reply	other threads:[~2026-08-21  0:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-12 16:33 [PATCH 0/3] lib/crypto: Provide a function for zeroizing hmac_sha1_ctx Thomas Huth
2026-08-12 16:33 ` [PATCH 1/3] crypto: Provide a wrapper " Thomas Huth
2026-08-12 16:33 ` [PATCH 2/3] security: keys: trusted: always clear the hmac_sha1_ctx before returning Thomas Huth
2026-08-12 16:33 ` [PATCH 3/3] lib/crypto: sha1: Use hmac_sha1_zeroize_ctx() instead of memzero_explicit() Thomas Huth
2026-08-13  2:27 ` [PATCH 0/3] lib/crypto: Provide a function for zeroizing hmac_sha1_ctx Eric Biggers
2026-08-13  6:10   ` Thomas Huth
2026-08-21  0:03 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]

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