From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795036976; b=oGBveMXfn70MndCAI/lHJuZCKHt1ZmUAXf9nlcWWjPnG7F/wNdK0a4w38icKZ40tGN4H jIAWSUeTFKfCH53x9pfSCUthaFrAytY3MGmNTkrdJeOHwX7QmCCAqMEB79fmooZDOGy+s bmZZzxeTEy8/uR1C9xbylhig5gDGvDroLjImackE36Twd/uaKxUxY5uoZvvrBeWStyzYh Vr28NghNyDo72EV8tVOHGoV8MTrUlGDm/eYBhqOtlGPoRLdSUNEJvPlMbl8qVaJ/Ywcqa eyFG2aeHVnwGFh6Lgi+wfYmCJvz8cUmFMy78yh54fP0Yid+OJfryjIpX0g6E9XDLKcw== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795036976; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID: References:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; bh=vqtZas3t5wXmBF7qeLP24ETZ+NnHhg0AAw7WUrgO5/M=; b=leWOvHPL7P3/S0xaO7i4oBhePMp6+uRPAKM47EHD1CeAyIMyfvqJ5UKBdNCg6j8Uh1wg KVHH2+UjoQoXKMsVkrXPmzrd1EqktsCNU/6aE6ep24xb+E4LRvG8y/lq4edxsVyBh9M3u z+iowanOGQKq7I+hGQ6m/skkV8XICqhq5H8lq9TfJWhW/ck4NmD14kwefGIjxm+gsiKek jjFY7j1RpgQJcTONEodFb4kR+PhbV0FNJt4SfmAgj6w+IPI5dr2kSlHJ5p+827mlsN6vH NEP8MSTGQ5OIBljS15i/+UD83Ow4dHwEbPZGG3CxHCUErAH4x6KX78ZOCU5F+aA1/Xw== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=Ml+aVGKv; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with UTF8SMTPS id 5DE5B606A31C; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 21:22:56 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=Ml+aVGKv Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with UTF8SMTPSA id 733A41F000C4; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 21:22:55 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1795036976; bh=vqtZas3t5wXmBF7qeLP24ETZ+NnHhg0AAw7WUrgO5/M=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To; b=Ml+aVGKvvIC5pcrzx9ZzwGHLtrNZnut1ESXjSEU2HVNx6KxFl13Zr+qffUFbbPCwW V83mH7Py3EnQBPKdeQ6gpt7TyHQQlg5bEPLKqrq2wu1xjOrLWufishv37LqIoW8BFs YQp1QvRsDrJQWGENlrzay8K370ntnq0LSRLNiftl+fd7XrzLs8QDVSKZwPJ3ElX+vi OjP/miHHrlWI0I0NTP6aPNfvZ2Uz7sgVwWjL+HOqy7hVzjmWfdLN31G6Jok2wePmbd RziLHmPCbpggAo4Y/HUC9dK4Gjc1b5IRHx6l3+MHzVFmMxy1ndqJ3CxDspiyEHOVVd 1GWZ+a/AyLQMA== Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 23:22:52 +0200 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: David Howells Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Alexander Viro , Andrew Morton , Andy Lutomirski , Anna-Maria Behnsen , Ben Segall , Christian Brauner , David Hildenbrand , Davidlohr Bueso , Dietmar Eggemann , Frederic Weisbecker , Ingo Molnar , Jan Kara , John Johansen , Jonathan Corbet , Juri Lelli , Kees Cook , K Prateek Nayak , "Liam R. Howlett" , Lorenzo Stoakes , Manfred Spraul , Mel Gorman , Michal Hocko , Mike Rapoport , Neal Gompa , Paul Moore , Pavel Tikhomirov , Peter Zijlstra , Randy Dunlap , Serge Hallyn , Shuah Khan , Steven Rostedt , Suren Baghdasaryan , Thomas Gleixner , Valentin Schneider , Vincent Guittot , Vincenzo Frascino , Vlastimil Babka , Zygmunt Krynicki Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 00/13] Namespace for namespace roots Message-ID: References: <20261118193539.240065-1-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 10:42:15PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 09:54:32PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 09:35:26PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > OVERVIEW > > > ======== > > > > > > A root namespace (rootns) is a kernel object backed by a file descriptor > > > that binds together: > > > > > > 1. A full set of detached namespaces owned by a fresh user namespace. > > > 2. A dedicated PID namespace for spawning processes into, signaling > > > members, and polling or waiting on PID 1 exit. > > > 3. An initially empty mount namespace (CLONE_EMPTY_MNTNS) populated > > > directly in its target user namespace before going live, without > > > inheriting host mounts or cloning staged trees, while still allowing > > > new mounts to be attached at runtime. > > > > > > Work on this feature started in 2025 from David Howells' container object > > > patch set [1], which I turned into a namespace for namespace roots and > > > rebuilt around that premise. > > > > > > While the patch set is manually written, the original motivation came > > > from isolating LLM agents. Running untrusted agent workloads made it > > > clear that OCI runtimes need to minimize their live configuration > > > surface. > > > > > > Assembling mounts, credentials, and namespaces inside helper processes > > > with a half-configured container is what I see as the main challenge, > > > and the existential debate around namespaces and container objects is an > > > unfocused discussion topic. > > > > > > [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/155059610368.17079.2220554006494174417.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ > > > > > > IMPLEMENTATION > > > ============== > > > > > > rootns_create() allocates a rootns instance backed by a pollable > > > anonymous inode fd, creating a fresh owning user namespace and a full set > > > of detached namespaces: empty mount (CLONE_EMPTY_MNTNS), PID, UTS, IPC, > > > network, cgroup, and time. ioctl(rootnsfd, ROOTNS_GET_NSFD, nstype) > > > returns nsfs file descriptors for individual member namespaces when > > > standalone namespace operations are needed. > > > > > > Superblocks are configured directly in the target user namespace via > > > fsopen(), FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS, and fsmount(), allowing unprivileged > > > callers to assemble FS_USERNS_MOUNT filesystems without holding > > > CAP_SYS_ADMIN in their own user namespace or entering the target user > > > namespace first. move_mount(..., MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS) operates on any > > > non-anonymous mount namespace fd: on an empty mount namespace it installs > > > "/" onto the nullfs root once, and it attaches relative submounts both > > > before entry and into live mount namespaces. > > > > > > Once "/" is installed, processes are spawned into the rootns via clone3() > > > with CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS and struct clone_args.rootns, without mutating the > > > caller in place. Pairing CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS with CLONE_VM | CLONE_VFORK > > > and opening the target binary via openat2(..., RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) on the > > > retained "/" mount fd allows spawning with execveat() without copying > > > page tables. > > > > > > The first entrant becomes PID 1; once it exits and > > > zap_pid_ns_processes() reaps all members, poll() reports EPOLLHUP and > > > rootns_wait() returns init's exit status and rusage. rootns_kill() walks > > > pid_ns->idr under tasklist_lock to signal member thread groups. > > > > > > CHANGES > > > ======= > > > > > > v3: > > > - The patch set size increased predominantly because the coverage of > > > kselftest had to widened to cover the introduced changes. > > > - Replace MOVE_MOUNT_T_ROOTNS_ROOT with MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS targeting > > > mnt_ns nsfs fds, and add ioctl(ROOTNS_GET_NSFD) to open member > > > namespace fds (Andy Lutomirski). > > > - Allow unprivileged fsopen(), FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS, and fsmount() to > > > configure and mount FS_USERNS_MOUNT filesystems directly in the target > > > user namespace without entering it first (Andy Lutomirski). > > > - Fix locking, refcounting, credential/dumpability/timens setup, > > > pivot_root() lookup, and cross-userns mount checks across copy_rootns(), > > > CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS, rootns_kill(), FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS, and move_mount() > > > (Sashiko). > > > - Mark PowerPC rootns syscalls nospu (Sashiko). > > > - Update documentation and kselftests. > > > > I.e. before PID 1 and /proc//ns/* existss, nsfd for namespace other > > than root nsfd can be acquired as follows: > > > > int mnts_fd = ioctl(root_fd, ROOTNS_GET_NSFD, CLONE_NEWNS); > > > Unprivileged caller becomes the owner of rootns->user_ns. Each mount > syscall then just checks CAP_SYS_ADMIN against rootns->user_ns. > > The user space wiring goes along the lines of: > > int root_fd = rootns_create(ROOTNS_KILL_ON_CLOSE | ROOTNS_CLOSE_ON_EXEC); > int mntns_fd = ioctl(root_fd, ROOTNS_GET_NSFD, CLONE_NEWNS); > > int tmpfs_fd = fsopen("tmpfs", 0); > fsconfig(tmpfs_fd, FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS, NULL, NULL, root_fd); > fsconfig(tmpfs_fd, FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE, NULL, NULL, 0); > int rootfs_fd = fsmount(tmpfs_fd, 0, 0); > > move_mount(rootfs_fd, "", mntns_fd, "/", MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH | MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS); > > struct clone_args args = { > .flags = CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS, > .rootns = root_fd, > }; > pid_t pid = clone3(&args, sizeof(args)); > > Note that example is uncompiled :-) > > This example makes me feel that perhaps RootNS is not the best possible > name for this but this rather should be e.g., NullNS? Before judging this, keep in mind that I've not just suddenly invented this. I first encountered the topic when David posted his patches, and felt that they were a bit unfairly judged. Somewhere at 2025 David rebased his branch when I asked, and slow-cooked the result that we're seeing during a period of 1.5 years. It has not been a priority topic at work so this has been more like a spare time sudoku. So if you count the David's original patch set version, this has history spanning since 2017. Br, Jarkko