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Hallyn" , iommu@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] lockdown: Prevent booting with lockdown enabled but IOMMU disabled Message-ID: References: <20261102-lockdown-iommu-v1-0-00f3c2be4c9f@kernel.org> <44ac3423-0a51-4562-816a-fea881511afa@huawei.com> X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: X-AntiAbuse: This header was added to track abuse, please include it with any abuse report X-AntiAbuse: Primary Hostname - pf-012.whm.fr-par.scw.cloud X-AntiAbuse: Original Domain - vger.kernel.org X-AntiAbuse: Originator/Caller UID/GID - [47 12] / [47 12] X-AntiAbuse: Sender Address Domain - oss.cyber.gouv.fr X-Get-Message-Sender-Via: pf-012.whm.fr-par.scw.cloud: authenticated_id: nicolas.bouchinet@oss.cyber.gouv.fr X-Authenticated-Sender: pf-012.whm.fr-par.scw.cloud: nicolas.bouchinet@oss.cyber.gouv.fr X-Source: X-Source-Args: X-Source-Dir: On Mon, Nov 16, 2026 at 02:29:01PM +0100, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote: > > > > How would you feel about at least blocking the user from turning off IOMMU > > (if it's present on the system) via the kernel command line while lockdown > > was enabled? > > > > Thinking about the case where most distros enable lockdown by default, this > > will strenghten it's use without much downside that I can see. > > > > At least on a properly configured system that contains an IOMMU it would > > prevent a user from subverting lockdown with a malicious device during the > > boot sequence. > > I do agree with you, it could be a great addition. With Lockdown enabled > as an early LSM (CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM_EARLY), this might be > feasible before boot parameter parsing. Lockdown already locks unsafe > module parameters. > > If I remember correctly on distro's that have a Lockdown patch that > enables it if secure boot is enabled, it should also be called before > early param parsing. > > But taking this threat into account also brings other questions. > i.e, a physical attacker with root access on a system where Lockdown is > enabled and with a bootchain configured with shim+MOK is able to change > kernel cmdline, generate a MOK and sign a compromised kernel > binary. Thus defeating lockdown purpose. > > In order to take the physical attacker into account, a securely > configured bootchain where the kernel image can't be tampered with and > where an attacker is not able to inject it owns certificates/hash in > db/MOK is mandatory so that Lockdown makes sense. To be perfectly clear, my intention was not to suggest including a physical attacker in the Lockdown threat model, but rather to provide examples of how such an attacker could bypass Lockdown through other exploitation paths.