From: "Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: Ada Smith <adasmithgt@gmail.com>,
Hungyu Lin <dennylin0707@gmail.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
Serge Hallyn <sergeh@kernel.org>,
kernel-team@cloudflare.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/6] landlock: Mediate CAP_SYS_RAWIO for mappings below mmap_min_addr
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 15:23:56 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <avxjfHybQBcATFKV@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261117101157.2520463-3-mic@digikod.net>
On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 11:11:52AM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> Until now, a process in a domain that denies CAP_SYS_RAWIO could still
> map memory below the vm.mmap_min_addr limit if it held this capability.
> cap_mmap_addr() is commoncap's mmap_addr hook, and it checks
> CAP_SYS_RAWIO with cap_capable(), not security_capable(), so the check
> never reaches hook_capable(). Mapping the lowest pages is what this
> limit protects against, because it helps to exploit kernel NULL pointer
> dereferences.
>
> Add a Landlock mmap_addr hook that checks CAP_SYS_RAWIO against the
> domain under the same condition as cap_mmap_addr(). With the same
> vm.mmap_min_addr value, the hook only denies mappings for which
> commoncap required the capability. security_mmap_addr() stops at
> commoncap's error, so processes without the capability get the same
> result as before. This also covers the x86 vm86(2) and vm86old(2)
> system calls, which use the same check for address 0.
>
> Making cap_mmap_addr() call capable() would also fix this, but it would
> send every low mapping through the capable hook of all LSMs (SELinux,
> AppArmor, SafeSetID, BPF LSM programs), adding capability checks that
> their policies never had to handle. For instance, SELinux checks
> mmap_zero in its own mmap_addr hook and keeps it separate from the
> capability on purpose. LSMs with their own policy for low mappings
> implement it in this hook, so Landlock does the same.
>
> Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn (AMD) <sergeh@kernel.org>
> Fixes: 97c8386f1d74 ("landlock: Enforce capability restrictions")
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
> ---
>
> Changes since v1:
> https://patch.msgid.link/20261110202436.2408244-3-mic@digikod.net
> - Add Serge Hallyn's Acked-by.
> ---
> security/landlock/cap.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/security/landlock/cap.c b/security/landlock/cap.c
> index fa59118e3486..10e1ca772b9c 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/cap.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/cap.c
> @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
> #include <linux/cred.h>
> #include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
> #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
> #include <uapi/linux/landlock.h>
>
> #include "cap.h"
> @@ -90,8 +91,29 @@ static int hook_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> return check_cap(cred, cap, opts);
> }
>
> +/**
> + * hook_mmap_addr - Restrict mappings below dac_mmap_min_addr
> + *
> + * @addr: Address of the new mapping.
> + *
> + * cap_mmap_addr() requires CAP_SYS_RAWIO to map below dac_mmap_min_addr, but
> + * calls cap_capable() directly, which skips hook_capable(). Check the same
> + * condition against the domain. commoncap runs first, so this only sees
> + * mappings that commoncap allowed.
> + *
> + * Return: 0 if allowed, -EPERM if CAP_SYS_RAWIO use is denied.
> + */
> +static int hook_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
> +{
> + if (addr >= dac_mmap_min_addr)
> + return 0;
> +
> + return check_cap(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_RAWIO, CAP_OPT_NONE);
> +}
> +
> static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, hook_capable),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, hook_mmap_addr),
> };
>
> __init void landlock_add_cap_hooks(void)
> --
> 2.56.0
>
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Looks good; I compared this against the commoncap implementation of
the same hook, and the logic checks out.
Minor nit, in case you end up sending a V3; I found the commit message
a bit wordy.
It makes intuitively sense that the commoncap LSM does not want to
invoke functions which themselves call into LSM hooks, even if it's
just a safeguard to prevent accidental recursion or deep call stacks.
So for the few cases where commoncap checks capabilities directly, we
need to do the equivalent checks in the same LSM hooks in Landlock.
That means, we replicate the logic from the commoncap hook if
necessary and treat it like a capability use that came in through the
normal hook. This is similar to what SELinux already does as well.
What I would have found useful to discuss in this commit message would
have been the story of PF_SUPERPRIV:
commoncap sets PF_SUPERPRIV when granting the capability use, and
Landlock does not undo that when it rejects the capability use. In my
understanding this is OK because the flag only gets used in "legacy
accounting" use cases and the consequences are benign. The
interaction with SELinux is already the same as well - it does not
unset that flag.
—Günther
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-17 14:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-17 10:11 [PATCH v2 0/6] Fix Landlock mediation of commoncap's capability checks Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:11 ` [PATCH v2 1/6] landlock: Factor out capability denial checks Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 13:56 ` Günther Noack
2026-11-17 10:11 ` [PATCH v2 2/6] landlock: Mediate CAP_SYS_RAWIO for mappings below mmap_min_addr Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 14:23 ` Günther Noack [this message]
2026-11-17 10:11 ` [PATCH v2 3/6] landlock: Mediate CAP_SETPCAP for inheritable capabilities Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:11 ` [PATCH v2 4/6] landlock: Mediate CAP_SYS_ADMIN for the admin memory reserve Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:11 ` [PATCH v2 5/6] selftests/landlock: Test capability checks outside the capable hook Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:11 ` [PATCH v2 6/6] landlock: Fix capability restriction documentation Mickaël Salaün
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