From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Alexander Mikhalitsyn <alex@amutable.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Serge Hallyn <sergeh@kernel.org>, Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 00/13] Namespace for namespace roots
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 21:48:16 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <awCkANwNDox_99SR@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <awCg5VYXKJvex9vy@kernel.org>
On Fri, Nov 20, 2026 at 09:35:06PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 20, 2026 at 03:57:32PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Fri, Nov 20, 2026 at 02:24:57PM +0100, Alexander Mikhalitsyn wrote:
> > > Yeah, detached mounts API solves a security issue here, but it does not
> > > fully enable the use-case Andy describes (if I understood it
> > > correctly). My interpretation here is that to fully cover it we need
> > > some well-isolated communication channel between container and
> > > container manager (vsock for containers? :-D). And some well-defined
> > > agreement of how PID 1 inside the container can get an information
> > > about a hotplugg-ed stuff. [ But it could be that I completely
> > > misunderstood and Andy meant something much more simple here. ]
>
> The sequence for hotplug (Andy's use case) breaks down like this and is
> doable:
>
> 1. Host creates rootns(ROOTNS_SEAL_MNTNS).
> 2. Host sets uid/gid maps with NS_USERNS_SET_IDMAP.
> 3. Host populates "/" with MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS, optionally combined with
> MOVE_MOUNT_CLONE for bind mounts.
> 4. Host spawns PID 1 with clone3(CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS) (optionally passing
> an AF_UNIX socketpair fd for communication).
> 5. PID 1 watches /proc/self/ns/mnt via fanotify(FAN_REPORT_MNT |
> FAN_MARK_MNTNS, FAN_MNT_ATTACH) or polls /proc/self/mountinfo.
> 6. On hotplug, host mounts the filesystem via fsopen()/fsmount() (plus
> optional MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP).
> 7. Host creates the mountpoint with openat2(RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) + mkdirat()
> and attaches the mount with MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS.
> 8. PID 1 receives FAN_MNT_ATTACH and queries the new mount via
> statmount().
>
> ROOTNS_SEAL_MNTS, NS_USERNS_SET_IDMAP and MOVE_MOUNT_CLONE new features
> that are yet to be submitted but they were not tedious to ramp up.
>
> I'll include them to v5 of the patch set. Thanks for underlining this
> part because that led to having those.
>
> Architecture scales to this even if my choices to address these details
> would need some adjustment.
>
> The clear two-phase (build/live) progress with rootns sort of just gives
> room to address stuff like this, and I have hard time to believe that it
> would get much better than this.
A completely new feature is NS_USERNS_SET_IDMAP:
nsfs: Support NS_USERNS_SET_IDMAP ioctl
Configuring UID, GID, and project ID mappings or disabling setgroups(2)
for a user namespace currently requires writing to /proc/<pid>/uid_map,
gid_map, projid_map, and setgroups, forcing container managers to spawn a
live process before populating a filesystem owned by that user namespace.
Add the extensible NS_USERNS_SET_IDMAP ioctl on CLONE_NEWUSER nsfs file
descriptors to atomically configure setgroups policy and UID, GID, and
project ID mappings before any process enters the namespace. Enforce the
same single-write and capability invariants against both current_cred()
and filp->f_cred under userns_state_mutex.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
This can be obviously used race-free, and this is thanks to two-phase
initialization pattern I have in place.
Br, Jarkko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-20 19:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-17 23:13 [RFC PATCH v2 00/13] Namespace for namespace roots Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/13] nsproxy: Pass nsproxy to create_new_namespaces() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/13] rootns: Add core infrastructure for root namespaces Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/13] rootns: Track init lifecycle via copy_process() and pid_namespace Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/13] rootns: Add rootns_create() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/13] rootns: Add rootns_wait() " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/13] rootns: Add rootns_kill() " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/13] fork: Support CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS in clone3() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/13] fs: Support FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS in fsconfig() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/13] fs: Support installing rootns mount trees via move_mount() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/13] arch: Wire up rootns system calls Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/13] docs: Document root namespace uAPI Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/13] selftests/rootns: Add root namespace test suite Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/13] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for ROOT NAMESPACE Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 14:47 ` [RFC PATCH v2 00/13] Namespace for namespace roots Josef Bacik
2026-11-18 15:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 15:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 15:46 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 16:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-18 17:04 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 17:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 17:30 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 17:46 ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-18 18:23 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 17:30 ` Josef Bacik
2026-11-19 17:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 17:51 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 22:50 ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-19 23:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-20 12:32 ` Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2026-11-20 13:13 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-20 13:24 ` Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2026-11-20 13:57 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-20 19:35 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-20 19:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-20 19:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2026-11-20 19:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
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