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From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, zohar@linux.ibm.com,
	christian.brauner@ubuntu.com, containers@lists.linux.dev,
	dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com, roberto.sassu@huawei.com,
	mpeters@redhat.com, lhinds@redhat.com, lsturman@redhat.com,
	puiterwi@redhat.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, jamjoom@us.ibm.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com,
	rgb@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	jmorris@namei.org, jpenumak@redhat.com,
	Denis Semakin <denis.semakin@huawei.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 11/26] ima: Define mac_admin_ns_capable() as a wrapper for ns_capable()
Date: Tue, 24 May 2022 10:17:27 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ba9027b7-40dc-c958-e140-2eaa102e2c30@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220522173100.GB24041@mail.hallyn.com>



On 5/22/22 13:31, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 20, 2022 at 10:06:18AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
>> Define mac_admin_ns_capable() as a wrapper for the combined ns_capable()
>> checks on CAP_MAC_ADMIN and CAP_SYS_ADMIN in a user namespace. Return
>> true on the check if either capability or both are available.
>>
>> Use mac_admin_ns_capable() in place of capable(SYS_ADMIN). This will allow
>> an IMA namespace to read the policy with only CAP_MAC_ADMIN, which has
>> less privileges than CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
>>
>> Since CAP_MAC_ADMIN is an additional capability added to an existing gate
>> avoid auditing in case it is not set.
> 
> It would probably be best to become a user of
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220217145003.78982-2-cgzones@googlemail.com/
> 
> when that lands.

Hm,I'll try to monitor to see when this gets merged. Though the function 
proposed there uses a hard-coded init_user_ns, which may not work for 
everyone.

> 
>> Signed-off-by: Denis Semakin <denis.semakin@huawei.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
>>
>> ---
>> v11:
>>    - use ns_capable_noaudit for CAP_MAC_ADMIN to avoid auditing in this case
>> ---
>>   include/linux/capability.h      | 6 ++++++
>>   security/integrity/ima/ima.h    | 6 ++++++
>>   security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 5 ++++-
>>   3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
>> index 65efb74c3585..dc3e1230b365 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/capability.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/capability.h
>> @@ -270,6 +270,12 @@ static inline bool checkpoint_restore_ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns)
>>   		ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
>>   }
>>   
>> +static inline bool mac_admin_ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns)
>> +{
>> +	return ns_capable_noaudit(ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN) ||
>> +		ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
>> +}
>> +
>>   /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
>>   int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
>>   			   const struct dentry *dentry,
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
>> index 5bf7f080c2be..626a6ce2453c 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
>> @@ -491,4 +491,10 @@ static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
>>   #define	POLICY_FILE_FLAGS	S_IWUSR
>>   #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY */
>>   
>> +static inline
>> +struct user_namespace *ima_user_ns_from_file(const struct file *filp)
>> +{
>> +	return file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_user_ns;
>> +}
> 
> include/linux/fs.h has file_mnt_user_ns().  Maybe you should add a
> file_sb_user_ns() next to that?

I did that now:


+static inline
+struct user_namespace *ima_user_ns_from_file(struct file *filp)
+{
+       return file_sb_user_ns(filp);
+}
+


+static inline struct user_namespace *file_sb_user_ns(struct file *file)
+{
+       return i_user_ns(file_inode(file));
+}
+



> 
>> +
>>   #endif /* __LINUX_IMA_H */
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
>> index 89d3113ceda1..c41aa61b7393 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
>> @@ -377,6 +377,9 @@ static const struct seq_operations ima_policy_seqops = {
>>    */
>>   static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
>>   {
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
>> +	struct user_namespace *user_ns = ima_user_ns_from_file(filp);
>> +#endif
>>   	struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns;
>>   
>>   	if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY)) {
>> @@ -385,7 +388,7 @@ static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
>>   #else
>>   		if ((filp->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY)
>>   			return -EACCES;
>> -		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
>> +		if (!mac_admin_ns_capable(user_ns))
>>   			return -EPERM;
>>   		return seq_open(filp, &ima_policy_seqops);
>>   #endif
>> -- 
>> 2.34.1

  reply	other threads:[~2022-05-24 14:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-04-20 14:06 [PATCH v12 00/26] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns Stefan Berger
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 01/26] securityfs: rework dentry creation Stefan Berger
2022-05-09 19:54   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-05-09 20:36     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-05-10  8:43       ` Amir Goldstein
2022-05-10 10:38         ` Christian Brauner
2022-05-10 14:51           ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-05-10 14:53         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-05-10 10:26       ` Christian Brauner
2022-05-10 10:25     ` Christian Brauner
2022-05-10 14:10       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-05-10 15:51         ` Christian Brauner
2022-05-10 18:51           ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-05-10 20:41           ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-06-09 14:27             ` Mimi Zohar
2022-05-10 16:50       ` Stefan Berger
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 02/26] securityfs: Extend securityfs with namespacing support Stefan Berger
2022-05-21  2:23   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-05-21  9:38     ` Christian Brauner
2022-05-21 15:09       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-07-07 14:34     ` Stefan Berger
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 03/26] ima: Define ima_namespace struct and start moving variables into it Stefan Berger
2022-05-21  2:33   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-05-24 14:57     ` Stefan Berger
2022-05-24 15:05       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-05-24 16:18     ` Stefan Berger
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 04/26] ima: Move arch_policy_entry into ima_namespace Stefan Berger
2022-05-21  2:46   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-05-21  3:07     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-07-07 14:12     ` Stefan Berger
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 05/26] ima: Move ima_htable " Stefan Berger
2022-05-21  2:50   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 06/26] ima: Move measurement list related variables " Stefan Berger
2022-05-21  2:55   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 07/26] ima: Move some IMA policy and filesystem " Stefan Berger
2022-05-21  3:03   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 08/26] ima: Move IMA securityfs files into ima_namespace or onto stack Stefan Berger
2022-05-21  3:24   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 09/26] ima: Move ima_lsm_policy_notifier into ima_namespace Stefan Berger
2022-05-22  2:35   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 10/26] ima: Switch to lazy lsm policy updates for better performance Stefan Berger
2022-05-22 17:06   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 11/26] ima: Define mac_admin_ns_capable() as a wrapper for ns_capable() Stefan Berger
2022-05-22 17:31   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-05-24 14:17     ` Stefan Berger [this message]
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 12/26] ima: Only accept AUDIT rules for non-init_ima_ns namespaces for now Stefan Berger
2022-05-22 17:38   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-05-24 13:25     ` Stefan Berger
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 13/26] userns: Add pointer to ima_namespace to user_namespace Stefan Berger
2022-05-22 18:24   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-05-23  9:59     ` Christian Brauner
2022-05-23 11:31       ` Stefan Berger
2022-05-23 12:41         ` Christian Brauner
2022-05-23 12:58           ` Stefan Berger
2022-05-23 14:25           ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-07-07 14:14             ` Stefan Berger
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 14/26] ima: Implement hierarchical processing of file accesses Stefan Berger
2022-05-23  0:42   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 15/26] ima: Implement ima_free_policy_rules() for freeing of an ima_namespace Stefan Berger
2022-05-23  0:43   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 16/26] ima: Add functions for creating and " Stefan Berger
2022-05-30  1:07   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 17/26] integrity/ima: Define ns_status for storing namespaced iint data Stefan Berger
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 18/26] integrity: Add optional callback function to integrity_inode_free() Stefan Berger
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 19/26] ima: Namespace audit status flags Stefan Berger
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 20/26] ima: Remove unused iints from the integrity_iint_cache Stefan Berger
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 21/26] ima: Setup securityfs for IMA namespace Stefan Berger
2022-05-30  1:16   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-05-31 19:26     ` Stefan Berger
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 22/26] ima: Introduce securityfs file to activate an " Stefan Berger
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 23/26] ima: Show owning user namespace's uid and gid when displaying policy Stefan Berger
2022-05-22 17:54   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-05-24 13:19     ` Stefan Berger
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 24/26] ima: Limit number of policy rules in non-init_ima_ns Stefan Berger
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 25/26] ima: Restrict informational audit messages to init_ima_ns Stefan Berger
2022-04-20 14:06 ` [PATCH v12 26/26] ima: Enable IMA namespaces Stefan Berger

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