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From: "Maxime Bélair" <maxime.belair@canonical.com>
To: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	john.johansen@canonical.com, paul@paul-moore.com,
	jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, mic@digikod.net,
	kees@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com,
	casey@schaufler-ca.com, takedakn@nttdata.co.jp,
	penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] lsm: introduce security_lsm_manage_policy hook
Date: Wed, 7 May 2025 17:37:25 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <bc252425-2703-48c4-a1fa-9268124c2386@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAPhsuW7q1hvOG7-uG2C8d_wWnOhEmvTmwnBcXZYVX-oJ8=5FJQ@mail.gmail.com>



On 5/7/25 08:19, Song Liu wrote:
> On Tue, May 6, 2025 at 7:40 AM Maxime Bélair
> <maxime.belair@canonical.com> wrote:
>>
>> Define a new LSM hook security_lsm_manage_policy and wire it into the
>> lsm_manage_policy() syscall so that LSMs can register a unified interface
>> for policy management. This initial, minimal implementation only supports
>> the LSM_POLICY_LOAD operation to limit changes.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Maxime Bélair <maxime.belair@canonical.com>
> [...]
>> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
>> index fb57e8fddd91..256104e338b1 100644
>> --- a/security/security.c
>> +++ b/security/security.c
>> @@ -5883,6 +5883,27 @@ int security_bdev_setintegrity(struct block_device *bdev,
>>  }
>>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_bdev_setintegrity);
>>
>> +/**
>> + * security_lsm_manage_policy() - Manage the policies of LSMs
>> + * @lsm_id: id of the lsm to target
>> + * @op: Operation to perform (one of the LSM_POLICY_XXX values)
>> + * @buf:  userspace pointer to policy data
>> + * @size: size of @buf
>> + * @flags: lsm policy management flags
>> + *
>> + * Manage the policies of a LSM. This notably allows to update them even when
>> + * the lsmfs is unavailable is restricted. Currently, only LSM_POLICY_LOAD is
>> + * supported.
>> + *
>> + * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
>> + */
>> +int security_lsm_manage_policy(u32 lsm_id, u32 op, void __user *buf,
>> +                              size_t size, u32 flags)
>> +{
>> +       return call_int_hook(lsm_manage_policy, lsm_id, op, buf, size, flags);
> 
> If the LSM doesn't implement this hook, sys_lsm_manage_policy will return 0
> for any inputs, right? This is gonna be so confusing for users.

Indeed, that was an oversight. It will return -EOPNOTSUPP in the next patch revision.

> 
> Thanks,
> Song

Thanks,

Maxime


  reply	other threads:[~2025-05-07 15:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-05-06 14:32 [PATCH 0/3] lsm: introduce lsm_manage_policy() syscall Maxime Bélair
2025-05-06 14:32 ` [PATCH 1/3] Wire up the lsm_manage_policy syscall Maxime Bélair
2025-05-07  6:26   ` Song Liu
2025-05-07 15:37     ` Maxime Bélair
2025-05-07 22:04       ` Tetsuo Handa
2025-05-08  7:52         ` John Johansen
2025-05-09 10:25           ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-05-11 11:09             ` John Johansen
2025-05-08  6:06       ` Song Liu
2025-05-08  8:18         ` John Johansen
2025-05-09 10:26           ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-05-11 10:47             ` John Johansen
2025-05-12 10:20               ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-05-17  7:59                 ` John Johansen
2025-05-08  7:12     ` John Johansen
2025-05-07 13:58   ` kernel test robot
2025-05-06 14:32 ` [PATCH 2/3] lsm: introduce security_lsm_manage_policy hook Maxime Bélair
2025-05-07  6:19   ` Song Liu
2025-05-07 15:37     ` Maxime Bélair [this message]
2025-05-08  8:20       ` John Johansen
2025-05-07 10:40   ` Tetsuo Handa
2025-05-07 15:37     ` Maxime Bélair
2025-05-07 20:25     ` Paul Moore
2025-05-08  8:29       ` John Johansen
2025-05-08 16:54         ` Casey Schaufler
2025-05-09 10:26           ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-05-09 14:21             ` Casey Schaufler
2025-05-11 11:26               ` John Johansen
2025-05-11 11:20             ` John Johansen
2025-05-08  8:25     ` John Johansen
2025-05-08 12:55       ` Tetsuo Handa
2025-05-08 14:44         ` John Johansen
2025-05-08 15:07           ` Tetsuo Handa
2025-05-09  3:25             ` John Johansen
2025-05-07 12:04   ` kernel test robot
2025-05-06 14:32 ` [PATCH 3/3] AppArmor: add support for lsm_manage_policy Maxime Bélair

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