public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: davidsen@tmr.com (bill davidsen)
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: hard links create local DoS vulnerability and security problems
Date: 24 Nov 2003 23:50:12 GMT	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <bpu5fk$vsn$1@gatekeeper.tmr.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 200311241736.23824.jlell@JakobLell.de

In article <200311241736.23824.jlell@JakobLell.de>,
Jakob Lell  <jlell@JakobLell.de> wrote:

| on Linux it is possible for any user to create a hard link to a file belonging 
| to another user. This hard link continues to exist even if the original file 
| is removed by the owner. However, as the link still belongs to the original 
| owner, it is still counted to his quota. If a malicious user creates hard 
| links for every temp file created by another user, this can make the victim 
| run out of quota (or even fill up the hard disk). This makes a local DoS 
| attack possible.

Of course they must be created in a directory when the evil user has
write, from a directory where the evil user has... have to check if
that's read or just evecute.
| 
| Furthermore, users can even create links to a setuid binary. If there is a 
| security whole like a buffer overflow in any setuid binary, a cracker can 
| create a hard link to this file in his home directory.

Not unless the admin is a total bozo... remember hard links must be in
the same filesystem, and I wouldn't expect untrusted users to have write
in /usr, /var, /lib or /opt, which is where the problem might likely to
exist.

|                                                        This link still exists 
| when the administrator has fixed the security whole by removing or replacing 
| the insecure program. This makes it possible for a cracker to keep a security 
| whole open until an exploit is available. It is even possible to create links 
| to every setuid program on the system. This doesn't create new security 
| wholes but makes it more likely that they are exploited.

See above, this is less likely that you make it sound.
| 
| To solve the problem, the kernel shouldn't allow users to create hard links to 
| files belonging to someone else.

While I think you're overblowing the problem, it is an issue which might
be addressed in SE Linux or somewhere. I have an idea on that, but I
want to look before I suggest anything.
| 
| I could reproduce the problem on linux 2.2.19 and 2.4.21 (and found nothing 
| about it in the changelogs to 2.4.23-rc3).

Bear in mind it isn't a "problem" it's 'expected behaviour" for the o/s,
and might even be mentioned in SuS somehow. Interesting topic, but not a
bug, since the behaviour is as intended.
-- 
bill davidsen <davidsen@tmr.com>
  CTO, TMR Associates, Inc
Doing interesting things with little computers since 1979.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2003-11-25  0:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2003-11-24 16:36 hard links create local DoS vulnerability and security problems Jakob Lell
2003-11-24 17:05 ` Måns Rullgård
2003-11-24 20:42   ` Mike Fedyk
2003-11-24 17:14 ` Richard B. Johnson
2003-11-24 17:35   ` Jamie Lokier
2003-11-24 18:57     ` aic7xxx loading oops in 2.6.0-test10 Alexander Nyberg
2003-11-24 20:03       ` Ken Witherow
     [not found]         ` <Pine.LNX.4.58.0311241524310.1245@morpheus>
2003-11-24 20:49           ` Ken Witherow
2003-11-24 23:42             ` Dick Streefland
2003-11-25  3:16     ` hard links create local DoS vulnerability and security problems Matthias Andree
2003-11-25 14:48     ` Jan Kara
2003-11-25 15:27       ` Jakob Lell
2003-11-24 17:37   ` Rudo Thomas
2003-11-24 18:10     ` Richard B. Johnson
2003-11-24 18:22       ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2003-11-24 22:17       ` [OT] " Rudo Thomas
2003-11-24 17:57   ` Jakob Lell
2003-11-24 18:08     ` splite
2003-11-24 18:13       ` Richard B. Johnson
2003-11-24 18:24         ` Jakob Lell
2003-11-24 23:57         ` bill davidsen
2003-11-24 18:18       ` Jakob Lell
2003-11-24 18:29         ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2003-11-24 19:25           ` hard links create local DoS vulnerability and security proble Mathieu Chouquet-Stringer
2003-11-24 20:00             ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2003-11-24 20:02               ` Mathieu Chouquet-Stringer
2003-11-24 20:22             ` H. Peter Anvin
2003-11-24 18:21     ` hard links create local DoS vulnerability and security problems Michael Buesch
2003-11-24 18:35       ` Jakob Lell
2003-11-24 18:53       ` Chris Wright
2003-11-25  0:04         ` bill davidsen
2003-11-25 13:54     ` Jesse Pollard
2003-11-24 23:50 ` bill davidsen [this message]
2003-11-25  0:22   ` Mike Fedyk
2003-11-25  0:35   ` Chris Wright
2003-11-25  8:15     ` Amon Ott
2003-11-25 16:11     ` Bill Davidsen
2003-11-25 11:26 ` Gianni Tedesco
     [not found] <fa.hevpbbs.u5q2r6@ifi.uio.no>
     [not found] ` <fa.l1quqni.v405hu@ifi.uio.no>
2003-11-24 20:54   ` Andy Lutomirski
2003-11-24 21:16     ` Linus Torvalds
2003-11-24 23:28       ` Ricky Beam
2003-11-24 22:04     ` John Bradford
2003-11-24 22:12       ` Måns Rullgård
2003-11-25 12:10         ` John Bradford
2003-11-25 12:18           ` Måns Rullgård
2003-11-25 13:12             ` John Bradford

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to='bpu5fk$vsn$1@gatekeeper.tmr.com' \
    --to=davidsen@tmr.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox