From: "Yang, Weijiang" <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: <pbonzini@redhat.com>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <peterz@infradead.org>,
<rppt@kernel.org>, <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>,
<rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>, <john.allen@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 16/21] KVM:x86: Save/Restore GUEST_SSP to/from SMM state save area
Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2023 11:50:51 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ca4e620b-6d3e-ef30-8d02-c436640bf0ce@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ZJoBFegpUDwCTVLS@google.com>
On 6/27/2023 5:20 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 26, 2023, Weijiang Yang wrote:
>> On 6/24/2023 6:30 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>>> On Thu, May 11, 2023, Yang Weijiang wrote:
>>>> Save GUEST_SSP to SMM state save area when guest exits to SMM
>>>> due to SMI and restore it VMCS field when guest exits SMM.
>>> This fails to answer "Why does KVM need to do this?"
>> How about this:
>>
>> Guest SMM mode execution is out of guest kernel, to avoid GUEST_SSP
>> corruption,
>>
>> KVM needs to save current normal mode GUEST_SSP to SMRAM area so that it can
>> restore original GUEST_SSP at the end of SMM.
> The key point I am looking for is a call out that KVM is emulating architectural
> behavior, i.e. that smram->ssp is defined in the SDM and that the documented
> behavior of Intel CPUs is that the CPU's current SSP is saved on SMI and loaded
> on RSM. And I specifically say "loaded" and not "restored", because the field
> is writable.
OK, will enclose these ideas.
>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
>>>> ---
>>>> arch/x86/kvm/smm.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
>>>> 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/smm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/smm.c
>>>> index b42111a24cc2..c54d3eb2b7e4 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/smm.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/smm.c
>>>> @@ -275,6 +275,16 @@ static void enter_smm_save_state_64(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>>>> enter_smm_save_seg_64(vcpu, &smram->gs, VCPU_SREG_GS);
>>>> smram->int_shadow = static_call(kvm_x86_get_interrupt_shadow)(vcpu);
>>>> +
>>>> + if (kvm_cet_user_supported()) {
>>> This is wrong, KVM should not save/restore state that doesn't exist from the guest's
>>> perspective, i.e. this needs to check guest_cpuid_has().
>> Yes, the check missed the case that user space disables SHSTK. Will change
>> it, thanks!
>>
>>> On a related topic, I would love feedback on my series that adds a framework for
>>> features like this, where KVM needs to check guest CPUID as well as host support.
>>>
>>> https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230217231022.816138-1-seanjc@google.com
>> The framework looks good, will it be merged in kvm_x86?
> Yes, I would like to merge it at some point.
>
>>>> @@ -565,6 +575,16 @@ static int rsm_load_state_64(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
>>>> static_call(kvm_x86_set_interrupt_shadow)(vcpu, 0);
>>>> ctxt->interruptibility = (u8)smstate->int_shadow;
>>>> + if (kvm_cet_user_supported()) {
>>>> + struct msr_data msr;
>>>> +
>>>> + msr.index = MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP;
>>>> + msr.host_initiated = true;
>>>> + msr.data = smstate->ssp;
>>>> + /* Mimic host_initiated access to bypass ssp access check. */
>>> No, masquerading as a host access is all kinds of wrong. I have no idea what
>>> check you're trying to bypass, but whatever it is, it's wrong. Per the SDM, the
>>> SSP field in SMRAM is writable, which means that KVM needs to correctly handle
>>> the scenario where SSP holds garbage, e.g. a non-canonical address.
>> MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP is only accessible to user space, e.g., during LM, it's not
>> accessible to VM itself. So in kvm_cet_is_msr_accessible(), I added a check to
>> tell whether the access is initiated from user space or not, I tried to bypass
>> that check. Yes, I will add necessary checks here.
>>
>>> Why can't this use kvm_get_msr() and kvm_set_msr()?
>> If my above assumption is correct, these helpers are passed by
>> host_initiated=false and cannot meet the requirments.
> Sorry, I don't follow. These writes are NOT initiated from the host, i.e.
> kvm_get_msr() and kvm_set_msr() do the right thing, unless I'm missing something.
In this series, in patch 14, I added below check:
+/* The synthetic MSR is for userspace access only. */
+if (msr->index == MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP)
+return false;
If kvm_get_msr() or kvm_set_msr() is used(host_initiated=false),
it'll hit this check and fail to write the MSR.
But there's anther check at the beginning of kvm_cet_is_msr_accessible():
+if (msr->host_initiated)
+return true;
I thought to use the host_initiated = true to bypass the former check.
Now the helper is going to be overhauled then this is not an issue.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-06-27 3:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 99+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-05-11 4:08 [PATCH v3 00/21] Enable CET Virtualization Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 01/21] x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for shadow stack Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 02/21] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 03/21] x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 04/21] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 05/21] x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 06/21] KVM:x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Yang Weijiang
2023-05-24 7:06 ` Chao Gao
2023-05-24 8:19 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 07/21] KVM:x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Yang Weijiang
2023-05-25 6:10 ` Chao Gao
2023-05-30 3:51 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-30 12:08 ` Chao Gao
2023-05-31 1:11 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-15 23:45 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-16 1:58 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-23 23:21 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-26 9:24 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 08/21] KVM:x86: Init kvm_caps.supported_xss with supported feature bits Yang Weijiang
2023-06-06 8:38 ` Chao Gao
2023-06-08 5:42 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 09/21] KVM:x86: Load guest FPU state when accessing xsaves-managed MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-06-15 23:50 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-16 2:02 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 10/21] KVM:x86: Add #CP support in guest exception classification Yang Weijiang
2023-06-06 9:08 ` Chao Gao
2023-06-08 6:01 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-15 23:58 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-16 6:56 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-16 18:57 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-19 9:28 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-30 9:34 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-30 10:27 ` Chao Gao
2023-06-30 12:05 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-30 15:05 ` Neiger, Gil
2023-06-30 15:15 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-01 1:58 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-01 1:54 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-30 15:07 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-30 15:21 ` Neiger, Gil
2023-07-01 1:57 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 11/21] KVM:VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 12/21] KVM:x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Yang Weijiang
2023-06-06 11:03 ` Chao Gao
2023-06-08 6:06 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 13/21] KVM:VMX: Emulate reads and writes to CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-05-23 8:21 ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-24 2:49 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-23 23:53 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-26 14:05 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-26 21:15 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-27 3:32 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-27 14:55 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-28 1:42 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-07 9:10 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-07 15:28 ` Neiger, Gil
2023-07-12 16:42 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 14/21] KVM:VMX: Add a synthetic MSR to allow userspace to access GUEST_SSP Yang Weijiang
2023-05-23 8:57 ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-24 2:55 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 15/21] KVM:x86: Report CET MSRs as to-be-saved if CET is supported Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 16/21] KVM:x86: Save/Restore GUEST_SSP to/from SMM state save area Yang Weijiang
2023-06-23 22:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-26 8:59 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-26 21:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-27 3:50 ` Yang, Weijiang [this message]
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 17/21] KVM:VMX: Pass through user CET MSRs to the guest Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 18/21] KVM:x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Yang Weijiang
2023-05-24 6:35 ` Chenyi Qiang
2023-05-24 8:07 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 19/21] KVM:nVMX: Enable user CET support for nested VMX Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 20/21] KVM:x86: Enable kernel IBT support for guest Yang Weijiang
2023-06-24 0:03 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-26 12:10 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-26 20:50 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-27 1:53 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 21/21] KVM:x86: Support CET supervisor shadow stack MSR access Yang Weijiang
2023-06-15 23:30 ` [PATCH v3 00/21] Enable CET Virtualization Sean Christopherson
2023-06-16 0:00 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-16 1:00 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-16 8:25 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-16 17:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-19 6:41 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-23 20:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-26 6:46 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-17 7:44 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-19 19:41 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-19 20:26 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-20 1:58 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-19 20:36 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-07-20 5:26 ` Pankaj Gupta
2023-07-20 8:03 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-07-20 8:09 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-07-20 9:14 ` Pankaj Gupta
2023-07-20 10:46 ` Andrew Cooper
2023-07-20 1:55 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-10 0:28 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-10 22:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-11 1:24 ` Yang, Weijiang
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