From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 0/7] x86: uaccess hardening, easy part
Date: Tue, 24 May 2016 15:48:37 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <cover.1464129798.git.luto@kernel.org> (raw)
This series hardens x86's uaccess code a bit. It adds warnings for
some screwups, adds an OOPS for a major exploitable screwup, and it
improves debuggability a bit by indicating non-default fs in oopses.
It shouldn't cause any new OOPSes except in the particularly
dangerous case where the kernel faults on a kernel address under
USER_DS, which indicates that an access_ok is missing and is likely
to be easily exploitable -- OOPSing will make it harder to exploit.
I have some draft patches to force OOPSes on user address accesses
under KERNEL_DS (which is a big no-no), but I'd rather make those
warn instead of OOPSing, and I don't have a good implementation of
that yet. Those patches aren't part of this series.
Andy Lutomirski (7):
x86/xen: Simplify set_aliased_prot
x86/extable: Pass error_code and an extra unsigned long to exhandlers
x86/uaccess: Give uaccess faults their own handler
x86/dumpstack: If addr_limit is non-default, display it
x86/uaccess: Warn on uaccess faults other than #PF
x86/uaccess: Don't fix up USER_DS uaccess faults to kernel addresses
x86/uaccess: OOPS or warn on a fault with KERNEL_DS and
!pagefault_disabled()
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 19 ++++---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_32.c | 4 ++
arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c | 5 ++
arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c | 6 +-
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 6 +-
arch/x86/lib/getuser.S | 12 ++--
arch/x86/lib/putuser.S | 10 ++--
arch/x86/mm/extable.c | 120 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c | 4 +-
11 files changed, 145 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
--
2.5.5
next reply other threads:[~2016-05-24 22:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-05-24 22:48 Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2016-05-24 22:48 ` [PATCH 1/7] x86/xen: Simplify set_aliased_prot Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-25 9:38 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-05-25 9:50 ` [Xen-devel] " David Vrabel
2016-06-10 22:12 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-11 9:29 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-06-11 9:34 ` [tip:x86/asm] x86/xen: Simplify set_aliased_prot() tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-24 22:48 ` [PATCH 2/7] x86/extable: Pass error_code and an extra unsigned long to exhandlers Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-24 22:48 ` [PATCH 3/7] x86/uaccess: Give uaccess faults their own handler Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-24 22:48 ` [PATCH 4/7] x86/dumpstack: If addr_limit is non-default, display it Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-25 11:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-05-29 16:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-25 11:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-05-29 16:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-29 18:42 ` Boris Petkov
2016-05-29 19:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-30 7:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-05-24 22:48 ` [PATCH 5/7] x86/uaccess: Warn on uaccess faults other than #PF Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-25 9:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-05-29 16:42 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-24 22:48 ` [PATCH 6/7] x86/uaccess: Don't fix up USER_DS uaccess faults to kernel addresses Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-24 22:48 ` [PATCH 7/7] x86/uaccess: OOPS or warn on a fault with KERNEL_DS and !pagefault_disabled() Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-25 15:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-05-29 16:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-25 3:55 ` [PATCH 0/7] x86: uaccess hardening, easy part Brian Gerst
2016-05-25 17:19 ` Kees Cook
2016-05-25 17:31 ` Kees Cook
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