[PATCH v2 0/3] Adhere to coding style

[PATCH v2 0/3] Adhere to coding style

[Ian To]

Edit the file to adhere to the kernel coding style. Reported by
checkpatch.

v2 changes: Fix some edits put in the wrong patch, thanks to Dan's keen
eyes.

Ian To (3):
  staging: rtl8723bs: format comments
  stagin: rtl8723bs: fix spacing
  staging: rtl8723bs: remove extra blank lines

 drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c | 279 +++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 133 insertions(+), 146 deletions(-)

-- 
2.45.3

[PATCH v2 1/3] staging: rtl8723bs: format comments

[Ian To]

Some comments were not formatted correctly. Reported by checkpatch.

Signed-off-by: Ian To <onlyian4981@gmail.com>
---
 drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c | 92 +++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c
index 1e9eff01b1aa..f4556ae54352 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c
@@ -30,10 +30,10 @@ const char *security_type_str(u8 value)
 /* WEP related ===== */
 
 /*
-	Need to consider the fragment  situation
-*/
+ *	Need to consider the fragment  situation
+ */
 void rtw_wep_encrypt(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *pxmitframe)
-{																	/*  exclude ICV */
+{
 	union {
 		__le32 f0;
 		unsigned char f1[4];
@@ -342,23 +342,23 @@ static const unsigned short Sbox1[2][256] = {      /* Sbox for hash (can be in R
 	}
 };
 
- /*
-**********************************************************************
-* Routine: Phase 1 -- generate P1K, given TA, TK, IV32
-*
-* Inputs:
-*     tk[]      = temporal key                         [128 bits]
-*     ta[]      = transmitter's MAC address            [ 48 bits]
-*     iv32      = upper 32 bits of IV                  [ 32 bits]
-* Output:
-*     p1k[]     = Phase 1 key                          [ 80 bits]
-*
-* Note:
-*     This function only needs to be called every 2**16 packets,
-*     although in theory it could be called every packet.
-*
-**********************************************************************
-*/
+/*
+ **********************************************************************
+ * Routine: Phase 1 -- generate P1K, given TA, TK, IV32
+ *
+ * Inputs:
+ *     tk[]      = temporal key                         [128 bits]
+ *     ta[]      = transmitter's MAC address            [ 48 bits]
+ *     iv32      = upper 32 bits of IV                  [ 32 bits]
+ * Output:
+ *     p1k[]     = Phase 1 key                          [ 80 bits]
+ *
+ * Note:
+ *     This function only needs to be called every 2**16 packets,
+ *     although in theory it could be called every packet.
+ *
+ **********************************************************************
+ */
 static void phase1(u16 *p1k, const u8 *tk, const u8 *ta, u32 iv32)
 {
 	signed int  i;
@@ -383,30 +383,29 @@ static void phase1(u16 *p1k, const u8 *tk, const u8 *ta, u32 iv32)
 	}
 }
 
-
 /*
-**********************************************************************
-* Routine: Phase 2 -- generate RC4KEY, given TK, P1K, IV16
-*
-* Inputs:
-*     tk[]      = Temporal key                         [128 bits]
-*     p1k[]     = Phase 1 output key                   [ 80 bits]
-*     iv16      = low 16 bits of IV counter            [ 16 bits]
-* Output:
-*     rc4key[]  = the key used to encrypt the packet   [128 bits]
-*
-* Note:
-*     The value {TA, IV32, IV16} for Phase1/Phase2 must be unique
-*     across all packets using the same key TK value. Then, for a
-*     given value of TK[], this TKIP48 construction guarantees that
-*     the final RC4KEY value is unique across all packets.
-*
-* Suggested implementation optimization: if PPK[] is "overlaid"
-*     appropriately on RC4KEY[], there is no need for the final
-*     for loop below that copies the PPK[] result into RC4KEY[].
-*
-**********************************************************************
-*/
+ **********************************************************************
+ * Routine: Phase 2 -- generate RC4KEY, given TK, P1K, IV16
+ *
+ * Inputs:
+ *     tk[]      = Temporal key                         [128 bits]
+ *     p1k[]     = Phase 1 output key                   [ 80 bits]
+ *     iv16      = low 16 bits of IV counter            [ 16 bits]
+ * Output:
+ *     rc4key[]  = the key used to encrypt the packet   [128 bits]
+ *
+ * Note:
+ *     The value {TA, IV32, IV16} for Phase1/Phase2 must be unique
+ *     across all packets using the same key TK value. Then, for a
+ *     given value of TK[], this TKIP48 construction guarantees that
+ *     the final RC4KEY value is unique across all packets.
+ *
+ * Suggested implementation optimization: if PPK[] is "overlaid"
+ *     appropriately on RC4KEY[], there is no need for the final
+ *     for loop below that copies the PPK[] result into RC4KEY[].
+ *
+ **********************************************************************
+ */
 static void phase2(u8 *rc4key, const u8 *tk, const u16 *p1k, u16 iv16)
 {
 	signed int  i;
@@ -1456,7 +1455,7 @@ static void gf_mulx(u8 *pad)
 		pad[AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1] ^= 0x87;
 }
 
-/**
+/*
  * omac1_aes_128_vector - One-Key CBC MAC (OMAC1) hash with AES-128
  * @key: 128-bit key for the hash operation
  * @num_elem: Number of elements in the data vector
@@ -1530,7 +1529,7 @@ static int omac1_aes_128_vector(u8 *key, size_t num_elem,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/**
+/*
  * omac1_aes_128 - One-Key CBC MAC (OMAC1) hash with AES-128 (aka AES-CMAC)
  * @key: 128-bit key for the hash operation
  * @data: Data buffer for which a MAC is determined
@@ -1541,7 +1540,8 @@ static int omac1_aes_128_vector(u8 *key, size_t num_elem,
  * This is a mode for using block cipher (AES in this case) for authentication.
  * OMAC1 was standardized with the name CMAC by NIST in a Special Publication
  * (SP) 800-38B.
- * modify for CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ * modify for CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ */
 int omac1_aes_128(u8 *key, u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mac)
 {
 	return omac1_aes_128_vector(key, 1, &data, &data_len, mac);
-- 
2.45.3

Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] staging: rtl8723bs: format comments

[Greg KH]

On Wed, Feb 12, 2025 at 01:22:54AM -0800, Ian To wrote:
> Some comments were not formatted correctly. Reported by checkpatch.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Ian To <onlyian4981@gmail.com>
> ---
>  drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c | 92 +++++++++----------
>  1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c
> index 1e9eff01b1aa..f4556ae54352 100644
> --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c
> +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c
> @@ -30,10 +30,10 @@ const char *security_type_str(u8 value)
>  /* WEP related ===== */
>  
>  /*
> -	Need to consider the fragment  situation
> -*/
> + *	Need to consider the fragment  situation
> + */
>  void rtw_wep_encrypt(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *pxmitframe)
> -{																	/*  exclude ICV */
> +{
>  	union {
>  		__le32 f0;
>  		unsigned char f1[4];
> @@ -342,23 +342,23 @@ static const unsigned short Sbox1[2][256] = {      /* Sbox for hash (can be in R
>  	}
>  };
>  
> - /*
> -**********************************************************************
> -* Routine: Phase 1 -- generate P1K, given TA, TK, IV32
> -*
> -* Inputs:
> -*     tk[]      = temporal key                         [128 bits]
> -*     ta[]      = transmitter's MAC address            [ 48 bits]
> -*     iv32      = upper 32 bits of IV                  [ 32 bits]
> -* Output:
> -*     p1k[]     = Phase 1 key                          [ 80 bits]
> -*
> -* Note:
> -*     This function only needs to be called every 2**16 packets,
> -*     although in theory it could be called every packet.
> -*
> -**********************************************************************
> -*/
> +/*
> + **********************************************************************

Why the long line of **** ?

That should not be needed.

> -/**
> +/*

Why are you removing kerneldoc comment style?

>   * omac1_aes_128_vector - One-Key CBC MAC (OMAC1) hash with AES-128
>   * @key: 128-bit key for the hash operation
>   * @num_elem: Number of elements in the data vector
> @@ -1530,7 +1529,7 @@ static int omac1_aes_128_vector(u8 *key, size_t num_elem,
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> -/**
> +/*

Same here?

thanks,

greg k-h

[PATCH v2 2/3] stagin: rtl8723bs: fix spacing

[Ian To]

Fixed spacing issues. Reported by checkpatch.

Signed-off-by: Ian To <onlyian4981@gmail.com>
---
 drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c | 176 +++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 87 insertions(+), 89 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c
index f4556ae54352..e8f583206f92 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c
@@ -61,14 +61,14 @@ void rtw_wep_encrypt(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *pxmitframe)
 		keylength = psecuritypriv->dot11DefKeylen[psecuritypriv->dot11PrivacyKeyIndex];
 
 		for (curfragnum = 0; curfragnum < pattrib->nr_frags; curfragnum++) {
-			iv = pframe+pattrib->hdrlen;
+			iv = pframe + pattrib->hdrlen;
 			memcpy(&wepkey[0], iv, 3);
 			memcpy(&wepkey[3], &psecuritypriv->dot11DefKey[psecuritypriv->dot11PrivacyKeyIndex].skey[0], keylength);
-			payload = pframe+pattrib->iv_len+pattrib->hdrlen;
+			payload = pframe + pattrib->iv_len + pattrib->hdrlen;
 
-			if ((curfragnum+1) == pattrib->nr_frags) {	/* the last fragment */
+			if ((curfragnum + 1) == pattrib->nr_frags) {	/* the last fragment */
 
-				length = pattrib->last_txcmdsz-pattrib->hdrlen-pattrib->iv_len-pattrib->icv_len;
+				length = pattrib->last_txcmdsz - pattrib->hdrlen - pattrib->iv_len - pattrib->icv_len;
 
 				crc.f0 = cpu_to_le32(~crc32_le(~0, payload, length));
 
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ void rtw_wep_encrypt(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *pxmitframe)
 				arc4_crypt(ctx, payload + length, crc.f1, 4);
 
 			} else {
-				length = pxmitpriv->frag_len-pattrib->hdrlen-pattrib->iv_len-pattrib->icv_len;
+				length = pxmitpriv->frag_len - pattrib->hdrlen - pattrib->iv_len - pattrib->icv_len;
 				crc.f0 = cpu_to_le32(~crc32_le(~0, payload, length));
 				arc4_setkey(ctx, wepkey, 3 + keylength);
 				arc4_crypt(ctx, payload, payload, length);
@@ -106,16 +106,16 @@ void rtw_wep_decrypt(struct adapter  *padapter, u8 *precvframe)
 
 	/* start to decrypt recvframe */
 	if ((prxattrib->encrypt == _WEP40_) || (prxattrib->encrypt == _WEP104_)) {
-		iv = pframe+prxattrib->hdrlen;
+		iv = pframe + prxattrib->hdrlen;
 		/* keyindex =(iv[3]&0x3); */
 		keyindex = prxattrib->key_index;
 		keylength = psecuritypriv->dot11DefKeylen[keyindex];
 		memcpy(&wepkey[0], iv, 3);
 		/* memcpy(&wepkey[3], &psecuritypriv->dot11DefKey[psecuritypriv->dot11PrivacyKeyIndex].skey[0], keylength); */
 		memcpy(&wepkey[3], &psecuritypriv->dot11DefKey[keyindex].skey[0], keylength);
-		length = ((union recv_frame *)precvframe)->u.hdr.len-prxattrib->hdrlen-prxattrib->iv_len;
+		length = ((union recv_frame *)precvframe)->u.hdr.len - prxattrib->hdrlen - prxattrib->iv_len;
 
-		payload = pframe+prxattrib->iv_len+prxattrib->hdrlen;
+		payload = pframe + prxattrib->iv_len + prxattrib->hdrlen;
 
 		/* decrypt payload include icv */
 		arc4_setkey(ctx, wepkey, 3 + keylength);
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ static void secmicputuint32(u8 *p, u32 val)
 	long i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
-		*p++ = (u8) (val & 0xff);
+		*p++ = (u8)(val & 0xff);
 		val >>= 8;
 	}
 }
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ void rtw_secmicsetkey(struct mic_data *pmicdata, u8 *key)
 void rtw_secmicappendbyte(struct mic_data *pmicdata, u8 b)
 {
 	/*  Append the byte to our word-sized buffer */
-	pmicdata->M |= ((unsigned long)b) << (8*pmicdata->nBytesInM);
+	pmicdata->M |= ((unsigned long)b) << (8 * pmicdata->nBytesInM);
 	pmicdata->nBytesInM++;
 	/*  Process the word if it is full. */
 	if (pmicdata->nBytesInM >= 4) {
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ void rtw_seccalctkipmic(u8 *key, u8 *header, u8 *data, u32 data_len, u8 *mic_cod
 #define  Mk16(hi, lo) ((lo) ^ (((u16)(hi)) << 8))
 
 /* select the Nth 16-bit word of the temporal key unsigned char array TK[]   */
-#define  TK16(N)     Mk16(tk[2*(N)+1], tk[2*(N)])
+#define  TK16(N)     Mk16(tk[2 * (N) + 1], tk[2 * (N)])
 
 /* S-box lookup: 16 bits --> 16 bits */
 #define _S_(v16)     (Sbox1[0][Lo8(v16)] ^ Sbox1[1][Hi8(v16)])
@@ -374,11 +374,11 @@ static void phase1(u16 *p1k, const u8 *tk, const u8 *ta, u32 iv32)
 	/* size on the 80-bit block P1K[], using the 128-bit key TK[] */
 	for (i = 0; i < PHASE1_LOOP_CNT; i++) {
 		/* Each add operation here is mod 2**16 */
-		p1k[0] += _S_(p1k[4] ^ TK16((i&1)+0));
-		p1k[1] += _S_(p1k[0] ^ TK16((i&1)+2));
-		p1k[2] += _S_(p1k[1] ^ TK16((i&1)+4));
-		p1k[3] += _S_(p1k[2] ^ TK16((i&1)+6));
-		p1k[4] += _S_(p1k[3] ^ TK16((i&1)+0));
+		p1k[0] += _S_(p1k[4] ^ TK16((i & 1) + 0));
+		p1k[1] += _S_(p1k[0] ^ TK16((i & 1) + 2));
+		p1k[2] += _S_(p1k[1] ^ TK16((i & 1) + 4));
+		p1k[3] += _S_(p1k[2] ^ TK16((i & 1) + 6));
+		p1k[4] += _S_(p1k[3] ^ TK16((i & 1) + 0));
 		p1k[4] +=  (unsigned short)i;          /* avoid "slide attacks" */
 	}
 }
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ static void phase2(u8 *rc4key, const u8 *tk, const u16 *p1k, u16 iv16)
 	for (i = 0; i < 5; i++)
 		PPK[i] = p1k[i];      /* first, copy P1K to PPK      */
 
-	PPK[5]  =  p1k[4]+iv16;             /* next,  add in IV16          */
+	PPK[5]  =  p1k[4] + iv16;             /* next,  add in IV16          */
 
 	/* Bijective non-linear mixing of the 96 bits of PPK[0..5]           */
 	PPK[0] +=    _S_(PPK[5] ^ TK16(0));   /* Mix key in each "round"     */
@@ -443,15 +443,13 @@ static void phase2(u8 *rc4key, const u8 *tk, const u16 *p1k, u16 iv16)
 	rc4key[2] = Lo8(iv16);
 	rc4key[3] = Lo8((PPK[5] ^ TK16(0)) >> 1);
 
-
 	/* Copy 96 bits of PPK[0..5] to RC4KEY[4..15]  (little-endian)       */
 	for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
-		rc4key[4+2*i] = Lo8(PPK[i]);
-		rc4key[5+2*i] = Hi8(PPK[i]);
+		rc4key[4 + 2 * i] = Lo8(PPK[i]);
+		rc4key[5 + 2 * i] = Hi8(PPK[i]);
 	}
 }
 
-
 /* The hlen isn't include the IV */
 u32 rtw_tkip_encrypt(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *pxmitframe)
 {																	/*  exclude ICV */
@@ -490,20 +488,20 @@ u32 rtw_tkip_encrypt(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *pxmitframe)
 				prwskey = pattrib->dot118021x_UncstKey.skey;
 
 			for (curfragnum = 0; curfragnum < pattrib->nr_frags; curfragnum++) {
-				iv = pframe+pattrib->hdrlen;
-				payload = pframe+pattrib->iv_len+pattrib->hdrlen;
+				iv = pframe + pattrib->hdrlen;
+				payload = pframe + pattrib->iv_len + pattrib->hdrlen;
 
 				GET_TKIP_PN(iv, dot11txpn);
 
 				pnl = (u16)(dot11txpn.val);
-				pnh = (u32)(dot11txpn.val>>16);
+				pnh = (u32)(dot11txpn.val >> 16);
 
 				phase1((u16 *)&ttkey[0], prwskey, &pattrib->ta[0], pnh);
 
 				phase2(&rc4key[0], prwskey, (u16 *)&ttkey[0], pnl);
 
-				if ((curfragnum+1) == pattrib->nr_frags) {	/* 4 the last fragment */
-					length = pattrib->last_txcmdsz-pattrib->hdrlen-pattrib->iv_len-pattrib->icv_len;
+				if ((curfragnum + 1) == pattrib->nr_frags) {	/* 4 the last fragment */
+					length = pattrib->last_txcmdsz - pattrib->hdrlen - pattrib->iv_len - pattrib->icv_len;
 					crc.f0 = cpu_to_le32(~crc32_le(~0, payload, length));
 
 					arc4_setkey(ctx, rc4key, 16);
@@ -511,7 +509,7 @@ u32 rtw_tkip_encrypt(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *pxmitframe)
 					arc4_crypt(ctx, payload + length, crc.f1, 4);
 
 				} else {
-					length = pxmitpriv->frag_len-pattrib->hdrlen-pattrib->iv_len-pattrib->icv_len;
+					length = pxmitpriv->frag_len - pattrib->hdrlen - pattrib->iv_len - pattrib->icv_len;
 					crc.f0 = cpu_to_le32(~crc32_le(~0, payload, length));
 
 					arc4_setkey(ctx, rc4key, 16);
@@ -599,14 +597,14 @@ u32 rtw_tkip_decrypt(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *precvframe)
 				prwskey = &stainfo->dot118021x_UncstKey.skey[0];
 			}
 
-			iv = pframe+prxattrib->hdrlen;
-			payload = pframe+prxattrib->iv_len+prxattrib->hdrlen;
-			length = ((union recv_frame *)precvframe)->u.hdr.len-prxattrib->hdrlen-prxattrib->iv_len;
+			iv = pframe + prxattrib->hdrlen;
+			payload = pframe + prxattrib->iv_len + prxattrib->hdrlen;
+			length = ((union recv_frame *)precvframe)->u.hdr.len - prxattrib->hdrlen - prxattrib->iv_len;
 
 			GET_TKIP_PN(iv, dot11txpn);
 
 			pnl = (u16)(dot11txpn.val);
-			pnh = (u32)(dot11txpn.val>>16);
+			pnh = (u32)(dot11txpn.val >> 16);
 
 			phase1((u16 *)&ttkey[0], prwskey, &prxattrib->ta[0], pnh);
 			phase2(&rc4key[0], prwskey, (unsigned short *)&ttkey[0], pnl);
@@ -721,8 +719,8 @@ static void construct_mic_iv(u8 *mic_iv,
 		for (i = 8; i < 14; i++)
 			mic_iv[i] = pn_vector[13 - i];          /* mic_iv[8:13] = PN[5:0] */
 		#endif
-		mic_iv[14] = (unsigned char) (payload_length / 256);
-		mic_iv[15] = (unsigned char) (payload_length % 256);
+		mic_iv[14] = (unsigned char)(payload_length / 256);
+		mic_iv[15] = (unsigned char)(payload_length % 256);
 }
 
 /************************************************/
@@ -787,7 +785,7 @@ static void construct_mic_header2(u8 *mic_header2,
 
 		if (!qc_exists && a4_exists) {
 			for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
-				mic_header2[8+i] = mpdu[24+i];   /* A4 */
+				mic_header2[8 + i] = mpdu[24 + i];   /* A4 */
 		}
 
 		if (qc_exists && !a4_exists) {
@@ -797,7 +795,7 @@ static void construct_mic_header2(u8 *mic_header2,
 
 		if (qc_exists && a4_exists) {
 			for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
-				mic_header2[8+i] = mpdu[24+i];   /* A4 */
+				mic_header2[8 + i] = mpdu[24 + i];   /* A4 */
 
 			mic_header2[14] = mpdu[30] & 0x0f;
 			mic_header2[15] = mpdu[31] & 0x00;
@@ -844,8 +842,8 @@ static void construct_ctr_preload(u8 *ctr_preload,
 	for (i = 8; i < 14; i++)
 		ctr_preload[i] =    pn_vector[13 - i];          /* ctr_preload[8:13] = PN[5:0] */
 #endif
-	ctr_preload[14] =  (unsigned char) (c / 256); /* Ctr */
-	ctr_preload[15] =  (unsigned char) (c % 256);
+	ctr_preload[14] =  (unsigned char)(c / 256); /* Ctr */
+	ctr_preload[15] =  (unsigned char)(c % 256);
 }
 
 /************************************/
@@ -861,7 +859,7 @@ static void bitwise_xor(u8 *ina, u8 *inb, u8 *out)
 }
 
 static signed int aes_cipher(u8 *key, uint	hdrlen,
-			u8 *pframe, uint plen)
+			     u8 *pframe, uint plen)
 {
 	uint	qc_exists, a4_exists, i, j, payload_remainder,
 		num_blocks, payload_index;
@@ -880,7 +878,7 @@ static signed int aes_cipher(u8 *key, uint	hdrlen,
 	uint	frtype  = GetFrameType(pframe);
 	uint	frsubtype  = GetFrameSubType(pframe);
 
-	frsubtype = frsubtype>>4;
+	frsubtype = frsubtype >> 4;
 
 	memset((void *)mic_iv, 0, 16);
 	memset((void *)mic_header1, 0, 16);
@@ -895,9 +893,9 @@ static signed int aes_cipher(u8 *key, uint	hdrlen,
 	else
 		a4_exists = 1;
 
-	if (((frtype|frsubtype) == WIFI_DATA_CFACK) ||
-	    ((frtype|frsubtype) == WIFI_DATA_CFPOLL) ||
-	    ((frtype|frsubtype) == WIFI_DATA_CFACKPOLL)) {
+	if (((frtype | frsubtype) == WIFI_DATA_CFACK) ||
+	    ((frtype | frsubtype) == WIFI_DATA_CFPOLL) ||
+	    ((frtype | frsubtype) == WIFI_DATA_CFACKPOLL)) {
 		qc_exists = 1;
 		if (hdrlen !=  WLAN_HDR_A3_QOS_LEN)
 			hdrlen += 2;
@@ -916,11 +914,11 @@ static signed int aes_cipher(u8 *key, uint	hdrlen,
 	}
 
 	pn_vector[0] = pframe[hdrlen];
-	pn_vector[1] = pframe[hdrlen+1];
-	pn_vector[2] = pframe[hdrlen+4];
-	pn_vector[3] = pframe[hdrlen+5];
-	pn_vector[4] = pframe[hdrlen+6];
-	pn_vector[5] = pframe[hdrlen+7];
+	pn_vector[1] = pframe[hdrlen + 1];
+	pn_vector[2] = pframe[hdrlen + 4];
+	pn_vector[3] = pframe[hdrlen + 5];
+	pn_vector[4] = pframe[hdrlen + 6];
+	pn_vector[5] = pframe[hdrlen + 7];
 
 	construct_mic_iv(mic_iv,
 			 qc_exists,
@@ -976,12 +974,12 @@ static signed int aes_cipher(u8 *key, uint	hdrlen,
 
 	/* Insert MIC into payload */
 	for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
-		pframe[payload_index+j] = mic[j];
+		pframe[payload_index + j] = mic[j];
 
 	payload_index = hdrlen + 8;
 	for (i = 0; i < num_blocks; i++) {
 		construct_ctr_preload(ctr_preload, a4_exists, qc_exists, pframe, /* message, */
-				      pn_vector, i+1, frtype);
+				      pn_vector, i + 1, frtype);
 		/*  add for CONFIG_IEEE80211W, none 11w also can use */
 		aes128k128d(key, ctr_preload, aes_out);
 		bitwise_xor(aes_out, &pframe[payload_index], chain_buffer);
@@ -993,13 +991,13 @@ static signed int aes_cipher(u8 *key, uint	hdrlen,
 		/* If there is a short final block, then pad it,*/
 		/* encrypt it and copy the unpadded part back   */
 		construct_ctr_preload(ctr_preload, a4_exists, qc_exists, pframe, /* message, */
-				      pn_vector, num_blocks+1, frtype);
+				      pn_vector, num_blocks + 1, frtype);
 		/*  add for CONFIG_IEEE80211W, none 11w also can use */
 
 		for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
 			padded_buffer[j] = 0x00;
 		for (j = 0; j < payload_remainder; j++)
-			padded_buffer[j] = pframe[payload_index+j];
+			padded_buffer[j] = pframe[payload_index + j];
 
 		aes128k128d(key, ctr_preload, aes_out);
 		bitwise_xor(aes_out, padded_buffer, chain_buffer);
@@ -1015,7 +1013,7 @@ static signed int aes_cipher(u8 *key, uint	hdrlen,
 	for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
 		padded_buffer[j] = 0x00;
 	for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
-		padded_buffer[j] = pframe[j+hdrlen+8+plen];
+		padded_buffer[j] = pframe[j + hdrlen + 8 + plen];
 
 	aes128k128d(key, ctr_preload, aes_out);
 	bitwise_xor(aes_out, padded_buffer, chain_buffer);
@@ -1055,12 +1053,12 @@ u32 rtw_aes_encrypt(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *pxmitframe)
 			prwskey = pattrib->dot118021x_UncstKey.skey;
 
 		for (curfragnum = 0; curfragnum < pattrib->nr_frags; curfragnum++) {
-			if ((curfragnum+1) == pattrib->nr_frags) {	/* 4 the last fragment */
-				length = pattrib->last_txcmdsz-pattrib->hdrlen-pattrib->iv_len-pattrib->icv_len;
+			if ((curfragnum + 1) == pattrib->nr_frags) {	/* 4 the last fragment */
+				length = pattrib->last_txcmdsz - pattrib->hdrlen - pattrib->iv_len - pattrib->icv_len;
 
 				aes_cipher(prwskey, pattrib->hdrlen, pframe, length);
 			} else {
-				length = pxmitpriv->frag_len-pattrib->hdrlen-pattrib->iv_len-pattrib->icv_len;
+				length = pxmitpriv->frag_len - pattrib->hdrlen - pattrib->iv_len - pattrib->icv_len;
 
 				aes_cipher(prwskey, pattrib->hdrlen, pframe, length);
 				pframe += pxmitpriv->frag_len;
@@ -1072,7 +1070,7 @@ u32 rtw_aes_encrypt(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *pxmitframe)
 }
 
 static signed int aes_decipher(u8 *key, uint	hdrlen,
-			 u8 *pframe, uint plen)
+			       u8 *pframe, uint plen)
 {
 	static u8 message[MAX_MSG_SIZE];
 	uint qc_exists, a4_exists, i, j, payload_remainder,
@@ -1093,7 +1091,7 @@ static signed int aes_decipher(u8 *key, uint	hdrlen,
 	uint frtype  = GetFrameType(pframe);
 	uint frsubtype  = GetFrameSubType(pframe);
 
-	frsubtype = frsubtype>>4;
+	frsubtype = frsubtype >> 4;
 
 	memset((void *)mic_iv, 0, 16);
 	memset((void *)mic_header1, 0, 16);
@@ -1105,9 +1103,9 @@ static signed int aes_decipher(u8 *key, uint	hdrlen,
 
 	/* start to decrypt the payload */
 
-	num_blocks = (plen-8) / 16; /* plen including LLC, payload_length and mic) */
+	num_blocks = (plen - 8) / 16; /* plen including LLC, payload_length and mic) */
 
-	payload_remainder = (plen-8) % 16;
+	payload_remainder = (plen - 8) % 16;
 
 	pn_vector[0]  = pframe[hdrlen];
 	pn_vector[1]  = pframe[hdrlen + 1];
@@ -1121,9 +1119,9 @@ static signed int aes_decipher(u8 *key, uint	hdrlen,
 	else
 		a4_exists = 1;
 
-	if (((frtype|frsubtype) == WIFI_DATA_CFACK) ||
-	    ((frtype|frsubtype) == WIFI_DATA_CFPOLL) ||
-	    ((frtype|frsubtype) == WIFI_DATA_CFACKPOLL)) {
+	if (((frtype | frsubtype) == WIFI_DATA_CFACK) ||
+	    ((frtype | frsubtype) == WIFI_DATA_CFPOLL) ||
+	    ((frtype | frsubtype) == WIFI_DATA_CFACKPOLL)) {
 		qc_exists = 1;
 		if (hdrlen !=  WLAN_HDR_A3_QOS_LEN)
 			hdrlen += 2;
@@ -1162,13 +1160,13 @@ static signed int aes_decipher(u8 *key, uint	hdrlen,
 		/* If there is a short final block, then pad it,*/
 		/* encrypt it and copy the unpadded part back   */
 		construct_ctr_preload(ctr_preload, a4_exists, qc_exists, pframe, pn_vector,
-				      num_blocks+1, frtype);
+				      num_blocks + 1, frtype);
 		/*  add for CONFIG_IEEE80211W, none 11w also can use */
 
 		for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
 			padded_buffer[j] = 0x00;
 		for (j = 0; j < payload_remainder; j++)
-			padded_buffer[j] = pframe[payload_index+j];
+			padded_buffer[j] = pframe[payload_index + j];
 
 		aes128k128d(key, ctr_preload, aes_out);
 		bitwise_xor(aes_out, padded_buffer, chain_buffer);
@@ -1177,25 +1175,25 @@ static signed int aes_decipher(u8 *key, uint	hdrlen,
 	}
 
 	/* start to calculate the mic */
-	if ((hdrlen + plen+8) <= MAX_MSG_SIZE)
-		memcpy((void *)message, pframe, (hdrlen + plen+8)); /* 8 is for ext iv len */
+	if ((hdrlen + plen + 8) <= MAX_MSG_SIZE)
+		memcpy((void *)message, pframe, (hdrlen + plen + 8)); /* 8 is for ext iv len */
 
 	pn_vector[0] = pframe[hdrlen];
-	pn_vector[1] = pframe[hdrlen+1];
-	pn_vector[2] = pframe[hdrlen+4];
-	pn_vector[3] = pframe[hdrlen+5];
-	pn_vector[4] = pframe[hdrlen+6];
-	pn_vector[5] = pframe[hdrlen+7];
+	pn_vector[1] = pframe[hdrlen + 1];
+	pn_vector[2] = pframe[hdrlen + 4];
+	pn_vector[3] = pframe[hdrlen + 5];
+	pn_vector[4] = pframe[hdrlen + 6];
+	pn_vector[5] = pframe[hdrlen + 7];
 
-	construct_mic_iv(mic_iv, qc_exists, a4_exists, message, plen-8, pn_vector, frtype);
+	construct_mic_iv(mic_iv, qc_exists, a4_exists, message, plen - 8, pn_vector, frtype);
 	/*  add for CONFIG_IEEE80211W, none 11w also can use */
 
 	construct_mic_header1(mic_header1, hdrlen, message, frtype);
 	/*  add for CONFIG_IEEE80211W, none 11w also can use */
 	construct_mic_header2(mic_header2, message, a4_exists, qc_exists);
 
-	payload_remainder = (plen-8) % 16;
-	num_blocks = (plen-8) / 16;
+	payload_remainder = (plen - 8) % 16;
+	num_blocks = (plen - 8) / 16;
 
 	/* Find start of payload */
 	payload_index = (hdrlen + 8);
@@ -1230,11 +1228,11 @@ static signed int aes_decipher(u8 *key, uint	hdrlen,
 
 	/* Insert MIC into payload */
 	for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
-		message[payload_index+j] = mic[j];
+		message[payload_index + j] = mic[j];
 
 	payload_index = hdrlen + 8;
 	for (i = 0; i < num_blocks; i++) {
-		construct_ctr_preload(ctr_preload, a4_exists, qc_exists, message, pn_vector, i+1,
+		construct_ctr_preload(ctr_preload, a4_exists, qc_exists, message, pn_vector, i + 1,
 				      frtype);
 		/*  add for CONFIG_IEEE80211W, none 11w also can use */
 		aes128k128d(key, ctr_preload, aes_out);
@@ -1247,13 +1245,13 @@ static signed int aes_decipher(u8 *key, uint	hdrlen,
 		/* If there is a short final block, then pad it,*/
 		/* encrypt it and copy the unpadded part back   */
 		construct_ctr_preload(ctr_preload, a4_exists, qc_exists, message, pn_vector,
-				      num_blocks+1, frtype);
+				      num_blocks + 1, frtype);
 		/*  add for CONFIG_IEEE80211W, none 11w also can use */
 
 		for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
 			padded_buffer[j] = 0x00;
 		for (j = 0; j < payload_remainder; j++)
-			padded_buffer[j] = message[payload_index+j];
+			padded_buffer[j] = message[payload_index + j];
 
 		aes128k128d(key, ctr_preload, aes_out);
 		bitwise_xor(aes_out, padded_buffer, chain_buffer);
@@ -1268,7 +1266,7 @@ static signed int aes_decipher(u8 *key, uint	hdrlen,
 	for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
 		padded_buffer[j] = 0x00;
 	for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
-		padded_buffer[j] = message[j+hdrlen+8+plen-8];
+		padded_buffer[j] = message[j + hdrlen + 8 + plen - 8];
 
 	aes128k128d(key, ctr_preload, aes_out);
 	bitwise_xor(aes_out, padded_buffer, chain_buffer);
@@ -1355,7 +1353,7 @@ u32 rtw_aes_decrypt(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *precvframe)
 				prwskey = &stainfo->dot118021x_UncstKey.skey[0];
 			}
 
-			length = ((union recv_frame *)precvframe)->u.hdr.len-prxattrib->hdrlen-prxattrib->iv_len;
+			length = ((union recv_frame *)precvframe)->u.hdr.len - prxattrib->hdrlen - prxattrib->iv_len;
 
 			res = aes_decipher(prwskey, prxattrib->hdrlen, pframe, length);
 
@@ -1380,7 +1378,7 @@ u32 rtw_BIP_verify(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *precvframe)
 	__le16 le_tmp;
 	__le64 le_tmp64;
 
-	ori_len = pattrib->pkt_len-WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN+BIP_AAD_SIZE;
+	ori_len = pattrib->pkt_len - WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN + BIP_AAD_SIZE;
 	BIP_AAD = rtw_zmalloc(ori_len);
 
 	if (!BIP_AAD)
@@ -1391,28 +1389,28 @@ u32 rtw_BIP_verify(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *precvframe)
 	/* mapping to wlan header */
 	pwlanhdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)pframe;
 	/* save the frame body + MME */
-	memcpy(BIP_AAD+BIP_AAD_SIZE, pframe+WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN, pattrib->pkt_len-WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN);
+	memcpy(BIP_AAD + BIP_AAD_SIZE, pframe + WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN, pattrib->pkt_len - WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN);
 	/* find MME IE pointer */
-	p = rtw_get_ie(BIP_AAD+BIP_AAD_SIZE, WLAN_EID_MMIE, &len, pattrib->pkt_len-WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN);
+	p = rtw_get_ie(BIP_AAD + BIP_AAD_SIZE, WLAN_EID_MMIE, &len, pattrib->pkt_len - WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN);
 	/* Baron */
 	if (p) {
 		u16 keyid = 0;
 		u64 temp_ipn = 0;
 		/* save packet number */
-		memcpy(&le_tmp64, p+4, 6);
+		memcpy(&le_tmp64, p + 4, 6);
 		temp_ipn = le64_to_cpu(le_tmp64);
 		/* BIP packet number should bigger than previous BIP packet */
 		if (temp_ipn <= pmlmeext->mgnt_80211w_IPN_rx)
 			goto BIP_exit;
 
 		/* copy key index */
-		memcpy(&le_tmp, p+2, 2);
+		memcpy(&le_tmp, p + 2, 2);
 		keyid = le16_to_cpu(le_tmp);
 		if (keyid != padapter->securitypriv.dot11wBIPKeyid)
 			goto BIP_exit;
 
 		/* clear the MIC field of MME to zero */
-		memset(p+2+len-8, 0, 8);
+		memset(p + 2 + len - 8, 0, 8);
 
 		/* conscruct AAD, copy frame control field */
 		memcpy(BIP_AAD, &pwlanhdr->frame_control, 2);
@@ -1420,14 +1418,14 @@ u32 rtw_BIP_verify(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *precvframe)
 		ClearPwrMgt(BIP_AAD);
 		ClearMData(BIP_AAD);
 		/* conscruct AAD, copy address 1 to address 3 */
-		memcpy(BIP_AAD+2, pwlanhdr->addr1, 18);
+		memcpy(BIP_AAD + 2, pwlanhdr->addr1, 18);
 
 		if (omac1_aes_128(padapter->securitypriv.dot11wBIPKey[padapter->securitypriv.dot11wBIPKeyid].skey
 			, BIP_AAD, ori_len, mic))
 			goto BIP_exit;
 
 		/* MIC field should be last 8 bytes of packet (packet without FCS) */
-		if (!memcmp(mic, pframe+pattrib->pkt_len-8, 8)) {
+		if (!memcmp(mic, pframe + pattrib->pkt_len - 8, 8)) {
 			pmlmeext->mgnt_80211w_IPN_rx = temp_ipn;
 			res = _SUCCESS;
 		} else {
@@ -1573,7 +1571,7 @@ u8 rtw_handle_tkip_countermeasure(struct adapter *adapter, const char *caller)
 	if (securitypriv->btkip_countermeasure) {
 		unsigned long passing_ms = jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies - securitypriv->btkip_countermeasure_time);
 
-		if (passing_ms > 60*1000) {
+		if (passing_ms > 60 * 1000) {
 			netdev_dbg(adapter->pnetdev,
 				   "%s(%s) countermeasure time:%lus > 60s\n",
 				   caller, ADPT_ARG(adapter),
-- 
2.45.3

Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] stagin: rtl8723bs: fix spacing

[Greg KH]

On Wed, Feb 12, 2025 at 01:22:55AM -0800, Ian To wrote:
> Fixed spacing issues. Reported by checkpatch.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Ian To <onlyian4981@gmail.com>
> ---
>  drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c | 176 +++++++++---------
>  1 file changed, 87 insertions(+), 89 deletions(-)

Subject line needs a spelling check :(

thanks,

greg k-h

[PATCH v2 3/3] staging: rtl8723bs: remove extra blank lines

[Ian To]

Repeated blank lines were present and removed. Reported by checkpatch.

Signed-off-by: Ian To <onlyian4981@gmail.com>
---
 drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c | 11 -----------
 1 file changed, 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c
index e8f583206f92..18f640d48701 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c
@@ -123,7 +123,6 @@ void rtw_wep_decrypt(struct adapter  *padapter, u8 *precvframe)
 
 		/* calculate icv and compare the icv */
 		*((u32 *)crc) = ~crc32_le(~0, payload, length - 4);
-
 	}
 }
 
@@ -219,10 +218,8 @@ void rtw_secgetmic(struct mic_data *pmicdata, u8 *dst)
 	secmicclear(pmicdata);
 }
 
-
 void rtw_seccalctkipmic(u8 *key, u8 *header, u8 *data, u32 data_len, u8 *mic_code, u8 pri)
 {
-
 	struct mic_data	micdata;
 	u8 priority[4] = {0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0};
 
@@ -245,7 +242,6 @@ void rtw_seccalctkipmic(u8 *key, u8 *header, u8 *data, u32 data_len, u8 *mic_cod
 	}
 	rtw_secmicappend(&micdata, &priority[0], 4);
 
-
 	rtw_secmicappend(&micdata, data, data_len);
 
 	rtw_secgetmic(&micdata, mic_code);
@@ -305,7 +301,6 @@ static const unsigned short Sbox1[2][256] = {      /* Sbox for hash (can be in R
 	 0x82C3, 0x29B0, 0x5A77, 0x1E11, 0x7BCB, 0xA8FC, 0x6DD6, 0x2C3A,
 	},
 
-
 	{  /* second half of table is unsigned char-reversed version of first! */
 	 0xA5C6, 0x84F8, 0x99EE, 0x8DF6, 0x0DFF, 0xBDD6, 0xB1DE, 0x5491,
 	 0x5060, 0x0302, 0xA9CE, 0x7D56, 0x19E7, 0x62B5, 0xE64D, 0x9AEC,
@@ -480,7 +475,6 @@ u32 rtw_tkip_encrypt(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *pxmitframe)
 
 	/* 4 start to encrypt each fragment */
 	if (pattrib->encrypt == _TKIP_) {
-
 		{
 			if (is_multicast_ether_addr(pattrib->ra))
 				prwskey = psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKeyid].skey;
@@ -525,7 +519,6 @@ u32 rtw_tkip_encrypt(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *pxmitframe)
 	return res;
 }
 
-
 /* The hlen isn't include the IV */
 u32 rtw_tkip_decrypt(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *precvframe)
 {																	/*  exclude ICV */
@@ -627,11 +620,8 @@ u32 rtw_tkip_decrypt(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *precvframe)
 	return res;
 }
 
-
 /* 3			=====AES related ===== */
 
-
-
 #define MAX_MSG_SIZE	2048
 
 /*****************************/
@@ -664,7 +654,6 @@ static void construct_ctr_preload(u8 *ctr_preload,
 
 static void aes128k128d(u8 *key, u8 *data, u8 *ciphertext);
 
-
 /****************************************/
 /* aes128k128d()                        */
 /* Performs a 128 bit AES encrypt with  */
-- 
2.45.3

Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] staging: rtl8723bs: remove extra blank lines

[Greg KH]

On Wed, Feb 12, 2025 at 01:22:56AM -0800, Ian To wrote:
> Repeated blank lines were present and removed. Reported by checkpatch.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Ian To <onlyian4981@gmail.com>
> ---
>  drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c | 11 -----------
>  1 file changed, 11 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c
> index e8f583206f92..18f640d48701 100644
> --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c
> +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c
> @@ -123,7 +123,6 @@ void rtw_wep_decrypt(struct adapter  *padapter, u8 *precvframe)
>  
>  		/* calculate icv and compare the icv */
>  		*((u32 *)crc) = ~crc32_le(~0, payload, length - 4);
> -
>  	}

This was not a "repeated blank line".

>  }
>  
> @@ -219,10 +218,8 @@ void rtw_secgetmic(struct mic_data *pmicdata, u8 *dst)
>  	secmicclear(pmicdata);
>  }
>  
> -
>  void rtw_seccalctkipmic(u8 *key, u8 *header, u8 *data, u32 data_len, u8 *mic_code, u8 pri)
>  {
> -
>  	struct mic_data	micdata;
>  	u8 priority[4] = {0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0};
>  

Neither was that :(

I've stopped reviewing here.

thanks,

greg k-h