From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: nikunj@amd.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de, mingo@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, dionnaglaze@google.com,
pgonda@google.com, seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 07/14] x86/sev: Move and reorganize sev guest request api
Date: Thu, 2 Nov 2023 09:17:14 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <d38bf900-98b0-479f-bcd5-7366f339938b@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <d1bb638b-cb7e-44d7-bd70-e1282c993ca4@amd.com>
On 11/1/23 23:28, Nikunj A. Dadhania wrote:
> On 10/31/2023 12:46 AM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> On 10/30/23 01:36, Nikunj A Dadhania wrote:
>>> For enabling Secure TSC, SEV-SNP guests need to communicate with the
>>> AMD Security Processor early during boot. Many of the required
>>> functions are implemented in the sev-guest driver and therefore not
>>> available at early boot. Move the required functions and provide an
>>> API to the driver to assign key and send guest request.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
>>> ---
>>> +static void snp_inc_msg_seqno(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
>>> +{
>>> + u32 *os_area_msg_seqno = snp_get_os_area_msg_seqno(snp_dev->vmpck_id);
>>> +
>>> + if (!os_area_msg_seqno) {
>>> + pr_err("SNP unable to get message sequence counter\n");
>>> + return;
>>> + }
>>
>> I probably missed this in the other patch or even when the driver was first created, but shouldn't we have a lockdep_assert_held() here, too, before updating the count?
>
> As per the current code flow, snp_get_msg_seqno() is always called before snp_inc_msg_seqno(), maybe because of that the check wasnt there. It still makes sense to have a lockdep_assert_held() in snp_inc_msg_seqno().
>
> Should I add this change as a separate fix ?
It can be sent as a separate patch (I don't think it is a fix) either
before or after this series.
Thanks,
Tom
>
>>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-11-02 14:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-10-30 6:36 [PATCH v5 00/14] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-10-30 6:36 ` [PATCH v5 01/14] virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-10-30 17:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-11-02 3:33 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-10-30 6:36 ` [PATCH v5 02/14] virt: sev-guest: Move mutex to SNP guest device structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-10-30 6:36 ` [PATCH v5 03/14] virt: sev-guest: Replace dev_dbg with pr_debug Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-10-30 6:36 ` [PATCH v5 04/14] virt: sev-guest: Add SNP guest request structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-10-30 18:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-11-02 4:01 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-10-30 6:36 ` [PATCH v5 05/14] virt: sev-guest: Add vmpck_id to snp_guest_dev struct Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-10-30 16:16 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-10-30 17:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-11-02 4:03 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-10-30 18:26 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-10-30 6:36 ` [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-10-30 6:36 ` [PATCH v5 07/14] x86/sev: Move and reorganize sev guest request api Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-10-30 19:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-11-02 4:28 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-11-02 14:17 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2023-10-30 6:36 ` [PATCH v5 08/14] x86/mm: Add generic guest initialization hook Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-10-30 17:23 ` Dave Hansen
2023-11-02 4:30 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-10-30 19:19 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-11-02 5:08 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-10-30 6:36 ` [PATCH v5 09/14] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-10-30 16:46 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-11-02 5:13 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-10-30 20:26 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-11-02 5:36 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-11-02 14:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-11-02 5:41 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-11-02 10:36 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-11-06 10:45 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-11-06 13:00 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-30 6:36 ` [PATCH v5 10/14] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-10-30 6:36 ` [PATCH v5 11/14] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-10-30 20:32 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-11-02 5:47 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-10-30 6:36 ` [PATCH v5 12/14] x86/kvmclock: Skip kvmclock when Secure TSC is available Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-10-30 21:00 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-11-02 5:39 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-10-30 6:36 ` [PATCH v5 13/14] x86/tsc: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-10-30 17:18 ` Dave Hansen
2023-11-02 5:53 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-11-02 10:33 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-11-02 12:07 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-11-02 12:16 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-11-02 12:38 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-11-06 11:53 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-11-06 13:03 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-30 6:36 ` [PATCH v5 14/14] x86/sev: Enable Secure TSC for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
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