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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+git@google.com>, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mingo@kernel.org,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com>,
	Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC/RFT PATCH] x86/efistub: Don't bother enabling SEV in the EFI stub
Date: Mon, 14 Apr 2025 14:10:29 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <e48bf1ad-3d48-0867-35ce-068da901d01c@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250414130417.1486395-2-ardb+git@google.com>

On 4/14/25 08:04, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
> 
> One of the last things the EFI stub does before handing over to the core
> kernel when booting as a SEV guest is enabling SEV, even though this is
> mostly redundant: one of the first things the core kernel does is
> calling sme_enable(), after setting up the early GDT and IDT but before
> even setting up the kernel page tables.
> 
> So let's just drop this call to sev_enable(), and rely on the core
> kernel to initiaize SEV correctly.

SEV support does some things in sev_enable() that aren't done later in
the kernel proper. For example, we check certain hypervisor features and
save the CC blob into the boot parameters. And as I look closer, I see
that we don't call initialize_identity_maps() from the EFI stub so we
aren't calling snp_check_features() from the EFI stub, which we should
have been doing.

Just removing the call does cause an SNP boot to crash. My testing shows
just ensuring that the cc_blob_address in the boot_params structure is
set results in a successful boot under SNP. So some of sev_enable()
needs to remain and some things need to be moved into the kernel proper.

Thanks,
Tom

> 
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
> Cc: Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com>
> Cc: Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h              | 2 --
>  drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 6 ------
>  2 files changed, 8 deletions(-)
> 
> I'm still waiting for my SEV-capable hardware to turn up so this was
> build tested only.
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
> index 7427eb233990..1db906d6924b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
> @@ -442,7 +442,6 @@ static __always_inline void sev_es_nmi_complete(void)
>  		__sev_es_nmi_complete();
>  }
>  extern int __init sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs(pgd_t *pgd);
> -extern void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp);
>  
>  /*
>   * RMPADJUST modifies the RMP permissions of a page of a lesser-
> @@ -533,7 +532,6 @@ static inline void sev_es_ist_exit(void) { }
>  static inline int sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(struct real_mode_header *rmh) { return 0; }
>  static inline void sev_es_nmi_complete(void) { }
>  static inline int sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs(pgd_t *pgd) { return 0; }
> -static inline void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { }
>  static inline int pvalidate(unsigned long vaddr, bool rmp_psize, bool validate) { return 0; }
>  static inline int rmpadjust(unsigned long vaddr, bool rmp_psize, unsigned long attrs) { return 0; }
>  static inline void setup_ghcb(void) { }
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c
> index cafc90d4caaf..52ed13ec4fe9 100644
> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c
> @@ -925,12 +925,6 @@ void __noreturn efi_stub_entry(efi_handle_t handle,
>  		goto fail;
>  	}
>  
> -	/*
> -	 * Call the SEV init code while still running with the firmware's
> -	 * GDT/IDT, so #VC exceptions will be handled by EFI.
> -	 */
> -	sev_enable(boot_params);
> -
>  	efi_5level_switch();
>  
>  	enter_kernel(kernel_entry, boot_params);

  reply	other threads:[~2025-04-14 19:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-04-14 13:04 [RFC/RFT PATCH] x86/efistub: Don't bother enabling SEV in the EFI stub Ard Biesheuvel
2025-04-14 19:10 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2025-04-14 19:45   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-04-14 19:53     ` Tom Lendacky

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