From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Evgeniy Baskov <baskov@ispras.ru>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Alexey Khoroshilov <khoroshilov@ispras.ru>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/8] x86_64: Harden compressed kernel, part 1
Date: Mon, 1 Aug 2022 09:48:58 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <e6e7fef1-0dff-ef72-8a17-8ecec89994ca@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1659369873.git.baskov@ispras.ru>
On 8/1/22 09:38, Evgeniy Baskov wrote:
> This is the first half of changes aimed to increase security of early
> boot code of compressed kernel for x86_64 by enforcing memory protection
> on page table level.
Could you share a little more background here? Hardening is good, but
you _can_ have too much of a good thing.
Is this part of the boot cycle becoming a target for attackers in
trusted boot environments? Do emerging confidential computing
technologies like SEV and TDX cause increased reliance on compressed
kernel security?
In other words, why is *THIS* important versus all the other patches
floating around out there?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-08-01 16:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-08-01 16:38 [RFC PATCH 0/8] x86_64: Harden compressed kernel, part 1 Evgeniy Baskov
2022-08-01 16:38 ` [PATCH 1/8] x86/boot: Align vmlinuz sections on page size Evgeniy Baskov
2022-08-01 16:38 ` [PATCH 2/8] x86/build: Remove RWX sections and align on 4KB Evgeniy Baskov
2022-08-01 16:39 ` [PATCH 3/8] x86/boot: Set cr0 to known state in trampoline Evgeniy Baskov
2022-08-01 16:39 ` [PATCH 4/8] x86/boot: Increase boot page table size Evgeniy Baskov
2022-08-01 16:39 ` [PATCH 5/8] x86/boot: Support 4KB pages for identity mapping Evgeniy Baskov
2022-08-01 16:39 ` [PATCH 6/8] x86/boot: Setup memory protection for bzImage code Evgeniy Baskov
2022-08-01 16:39 ` [PATCH 7/8] x86/boot: Map memory explicitly Evgeniy Baskov
2022-08-01 16:39 ` [PATCH 8/8] x86/boot: Remove mapping from page fault handler Evgeniy Baskov
2022-08-01 16:48 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2022-08-02 0:25 ` [RFC PATCH 0/8] x86_64: Harden compressed kernel, part 1 Evgeniy Baskov
2022-08-02 2:41 ` Dave Hansen
2022-08-02 23:45 ` Evgeniy Baskov
2022-08-03 14:05 ` Dave Hansen
2022-08-04 10:41 ` Evgeniy Baskov
2022-08-04 11:22 ` Greg KH
2022-08-04 14:26 ` Evgeniy Baskov
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