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From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
To: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
	Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
	Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
	Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>, Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: [Patch v4 13/18] security: Update security level of a process when modifying its dumpability
Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2018 11:49:20 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <e8b6b10e15653b3b2c5727e935f75142e441f834.1540923609.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1540923609.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1540923609.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>

When a process is made non-dumpable, the action implies a higher level
of security implicitly as its memory is imposed with access restriction.

A call to update_process_security() is added to update security defenses
according to a process's dumpability and its implied security level.

Architecture specific defenses is erected for threads in the process
by calling arch_set_security(task, SECURITY_LEVEL_HIGH) or the defenses
relaxed via arch_set_security(task, SECURITY_LEVEL_NORMAL).  Such defenses
may incur extra overhead and is reserved for tasks needing high security.

Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
---
 fs/exec.c                |  2 ++
 include/linux/security.h |  6 ++++++
 kernel/cred.c            |  5 ++++-
 kernel/sys.c             |  1 +
 security/security.c      | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 1ebf6e5..e70c8a7 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1366,6 +1366,8 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
 	else
 		set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER);
 
+	update_process_security(current);
+
 	arch_setup_new_exec();
 	perf_event_exec();
 	__set_task_comm(current, kbasename(bprm->filename), true);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 75f4156..469d05f 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -61,6 +61,12 @@ struct mm_struct;
 /* LSM Agnostic defines for sb_set_mnt_opts */
 #define SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS	1
 
+/* Security level */
+#define SECURITY_NORMAL	0
+#define SECURITY_HIGH	1
+
+extern int update_process_security(struct task_struct *task);
+
 struct ctl_table;
 struct audit_krule;
 struct user_namespace;
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index ecf0365..0806a74 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
 #include <linux/cn_proc.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #if 0
 #define kdebug(FMT, ...)						\
@@ -445,8 +446,10 @@ int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
 	    !uid_eq(old->fsuid, new->fsuid) ||
 	    !gid_eq(old->fsgid, new->fsgid) ||
 	    !cred_cap_issubset(old, new)) {
-		if (task->mm)
+		if (task->mm) {
 			set_dumpable(task->mm, suid_dumpable);
+			update_process_security(task);
+		}
 		task->pdeath_signal = 0;
 		smp_wmb();
 	}
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index cf5c675..c6f179a 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -2293,6 +2293,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
 			break;
 		}
 		set_dumpable(me->mm, arg2);
+		update_process_security(me);
 		break;
 
 	case PR_SET_UNALIGN:
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 736e78d..12460f2 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
 #include <linux/personality.h>
 #include <linux/backing-dev.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/coredump.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
 #include <net/flow.h>
 
 #include <trace/events/initcall.h>
@@ -1353,6 +1355,35 @@ int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
 
+void __weak arch_set_security(struct task_struct *task,
+			      unsigned int security_level)
+{
+}
+
+int update_process_security(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+	struct task_struct *t;
+	int security_level;
+
+	if (!task->mm)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!lock_task_sighand(task, &flags))
+		return -ESRCH;
+
+	if (get_dumpable(task->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER)
+		security_level = SECURITY_HIGH;
+	else
+		security_level = SECURITY_NORMAL;
+
+	for_each_thread(task, t)
+		arch_set_security(task, security_level);
+
+	unlock_task_sighand(task, &flags);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 
 int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
-- 
2.9.4


  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-10-30 19:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-10-30 18:49 [Patch v4 00/18] Provide process property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection* Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 01/18] x86/speculation: Clean up spectre_v2_parse_cmdline() Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 02/18] x86/speculation: Remove unnecessary ret variable in cpu_show_common() Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 03/18] x86/speculation: Reorganize cpu_show_common() Tim Chen
2018-11-03 18:07   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-05 19:12     ` Tim Chen
2018-11-05 19:17       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 04/18] x86/speculation: Add X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_ENHANCED Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 05/18] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 06/18] smt: Create cpu_smt_enabled static key for SMT specific code Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 07/18] x86/smt: Convert cpu_smt_control check to cpu_smt_enabled static key Tim Chen
2018-11-03 18:29   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-08  1:43     ` Tim Chen
2018-11-08 11:18       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 08/18] sched: Deprecate sched_smt_present and use " Tim Chen
2018-11-03 18:20   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-09 22:08     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 09/18] x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 10/18] x86/speculation: Reorganize speculation control MSRs update Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 11/18] x86/speculation: Update comment on TIF_SSBD Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 12/18] x86: Group thread info flags by functionality Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` Tim Chen [this message]
2018-10-30 20:57   ` [Patch v4 13/18] security: Update security level of a process when modifying its dumpability Schaufler, Casey
2018-10-30 21:30     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-30 21:53       ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 14/18] x86/speculation: Turn on or off STIBP according to a task's TIF_STIBP Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 15/18] x86/speculation: Add Spectre v2 app to app protection modes Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 16/18] x86/speculation: Enable STIBP to protect security sensitive tasks Tim Chen
2018-10-30 21:07   ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-10-30 21:34     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-30 22:02       ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 17/18] x86/speculation: Update SPEC_CTRL MSRs of remote CPUs Tim Chen
2018-11-04 19:49   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-05 22:02     ` Tim Chen
2018-11-05 23:04       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-05 23:59         ` Tim Chen
2018-11-06  7:46           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-07  0:18             ` Tim Chen
2018-11-07 18:33               ` Waiman Long
2018-11-07 23:15                 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-07 23:03               ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-08  0:22                 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 18/18] x86/speculation: Create PRCTL interface to restrict indirect branch speculation Tim Chen

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