From: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
"Chen, Yian" <yian.chen@intel.com>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <x86@kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>, Paul Lai <paul.c.lai@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/7] x86/cpu: Disable kernel LASS when patching kernel alternatives
Date: Tue, 31 Jan 2023 18:25:04 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ed41ccf1-8f2d-6d4a-7692-7a3465aca73a@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f8352c29-6b9f-2711-ddf4-223a6806f42f@intel.com>
On 1/12/2023 10:48 AM, Dave Hansen wrote:
> Also, Andy Cooper made a very good point: when the kernel enables
> paging, it's running with a low address so that the instruction pointer
> stays valid as paging becomes enabled.
>
> But, if LASS were enabled and enforced at that point, you'd get a LASS
> fault and go kablooey. Can you see what simics does in that case, and
> also make sure we're clearing CR4.LASS when enabling paging? That would
> obviate the need to do it later in C code too.
CR4 and CR0 are always restored to a known state during kexec. So,
running with LASS enabled should not happen during early boot.
machine_kexec()
-> relocate_kernel()
-> identity_mapped()
> /*
> * Set cr0 to a known state:
> * - Paging enabled
> * - Alignment check disabled
> * - Write protect disabled
> * - No task switch
> * - Don't do FP software emulation.
> * - Protected mode enabled
> */
> movq %cr0, %rax
> andq $~(X86_CR0_AM | X86_CR0_WP | X86_CR0_TS | X86_CR0_EM), %rax
> orl $(X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_PE), %eax
> movq %rax, %cr0
>
> /*
> * Set cr4 to a known state:
> * - physical address extension enabled
> * - 5-level paging, if it was enabled before
> */
> movl $X86_CR4_PAE, %eax
> testq $X86_CR4_LA57, %r13
> jz 1f
> orl $X86_CR4_LA57, %eax
> 1:
> movq %rax, %cr4
>
> jmp 1f
> 1:
Dave, does this address your concern or were you looking for something
else? Is there some path other than kexec that should also be audited
for this scenario?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-02-01 2:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-01-10 5:51 [PATCH 0/7] Enable LASS (Linear Address space Separation) Yian Chen
2023-01-10 5:51 ` [PATCH 1/7] x86/cpu: Enumerate LASS CPUID and CR4 bits Yian Chen
2023-01-10 20:14 ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-11 0:13 ` Dave Hansen
2023-01-11 23:23 ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-12 0:06 ` Luck, Tony
2023-01-12 0:15 ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-11 19:21 ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-10 5:51 ` [PATCH 2/7] x86: Add CONFIG option X86_LASS Yian Chen
2023-01-10 21:05 ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-12 0:13 ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-10 5:52 ` [PATCH 3/7] x86/cpu: Disable kernel LASS when patching kernel alternatives Yian Chen
2023-01-10 21:04 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-01-11 1:01 ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-11 9:10 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-01-10 22:41 ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-12 0:27 ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-12 0:37 ` Dave Hansen
2023-01-12 18:36 ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-12 18:48 ` Dave Hansen
2023-02-01 2:25 ` Sohil Mehta [this message]
2023-02-01 18:20 ` Dave Hansen
2023-02-01 2:10 ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-10 5:52 ` [PATCH 4/7] x86/vsyscall: Setup vsyscall to compromise LASS protection Yian Chen
2023-01-11 0:34 ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-12 1:43 ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-12 2:49 ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-21 4:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-01-10 5:52 ` [PATCH 5/7] x86/cpu: Enable LASS (Linear Address Space Separation) Yian Chen
2023-01-11 22:22 ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-12 17:56 ` Chen, Yian
2023-01-12 18:17 ` Dave Hansen
2023-01-13 1:17 ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-13 19:39 ` Sohil Mehta
2023-01-10 5:52 ` [PATCH 6/7] x86/cpu: Set LASS as pinning sensitive CR4 bit Yian Chen
2023-01-10 5:52 ` [PATCH 7/7] x86/kvm: Expose LASS feature to VM guest Yian Chen
2023-02-07 3:21 ` Wang, Lei
2023-02-09 17:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-01-10 19:48 ` [PATCH 0/7] Enable LASS (Linear Address space Separation) Sohil Mehta
2023-01-10 22:57 ` Dave Hansen
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