From: Emrah Demir <ed@abdsec.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg@gmail.com>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>,
keescook@google.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KERNEL: resource: Fix bug on leakage in /proc/iomem file
Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2016 03:39:05 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <f8e523a05927eef49a9a3566d176aa62@abdsec.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jLVDJcQKpY7w1MCPW5hvjY=s+KF54aHvb8WOJycJFhF4A@mail.gmail.com>
On 2016-04-14 00:27, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 6, 2016 at 2:19 PM, Linus Torvalds
> <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
>> On Wed, Apr 6, 2016 at 10:54 AM, Linus Torvalds
>> <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
>>>
>>> So I'd find a patch like the attached to be perfectly acceptable (in
>>> fact, we should have done this long ago).
>>
>> I just committed it, let's see if some odd program uses the iomem
>> data. I doubt it, and I always enjoy improvements that remove more
>> lines of code than they add.
>
> Hrm, it looks like at least Ubuntu's kernel security test suite
> expects to find these entries (when it verifies that STRICT_DEVMEM
> hasn't regressed). Also, the commit only removed the entries on x86.
> Most (all?) of the other architectures still have them. Could you
> revert this for now, and I'll cook up a %pK-based solution for -next?
>
Actually, I have realized that this patch (Linus's patch) was for x86. I
was planning to code the same for other architectures.
It seems your method is better. %pK will zero other values in
/proc/iomem.
Perhaps Ubuntu patch might be a good option.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-04-14 9:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-04-06 13:03 [PATCH] KERNEL: resource: Fix bug on leakage in /proc/iomem file Emrah Demir
2016-04-06 15:20 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-04-06 17:54 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-04-06 18:05 ` ed
2016-04-06 18:21 ` Kees Cook
2016-04-06 18:31 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-04-06 18:37 ` Kees Cook
2016-04-06 18:43 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-04-06 18:53 ` [kernel-hardening] " Yves-Alexis Perez
2016-04-06 19:02 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-04-06 19:11 ` Yves-Alexis Perez
2016-04-06 19:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-06 20:49 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-04-06 19:23 ` Bjørn Mork
2016-04-06 18:52 ` Christian Kujau
2016-04-06 18:53 ` Kees Cook
2016-04-06 21:19 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-04-06 21:27 ` Kees Cook
2016-04-06 21:32 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-04-14 4:27 ` Kees Cook
2016-04-14 7:39 ` Emrah Demir [this message]
2016-04-06 18:03 ` Kees Cook
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